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# *On the History of the Process by which the Aristotelian Writings arrived at their present Form.*

## An Essay

BY

RICHARD SHUTE, M.A.

LATE STUDENT AND TUTOR OF CHRIST CHURCH

*WITH A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR*

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

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# PREFACE.

THE friends of Mr. Shute, who proposed to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press the publication of the following Essay, written for the Conington Prize Competition in 1882, take this opportunity of explaining briefly the circumstances under which it appears.

Written in the midst of Tutorial and other College duties, it suffers in form and to some extent in substance from hasty composition. But Mr. Shute's friends cannot forget his enthusiasm for the subject, and the suggestiveness of his conversation while engaged upon it; and they now publish it as it stands, unwilling that all record of that bright activity of thought should be lost, and hoping that what may appear wrong or questionable will be lightly passed over for the sake of the fresh points of view, the sound conclusions and the wise doubts to which the writer's sagacity conducted him.

The lines pursued by him are common to German writers to whom he has naturally been indebted, but it is believed that to English readers this Essay will be the more welcome, as there is no English work which systematically covers the same ground.

It is matter for deep regret that Mr. Shute was not permitted to re-write it in the light of his subsequent studies, which were extensive, and would assuredly have



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won for him, had he lived, a high place among interpreters of Aristotle. Indeed it would not have been the author's intention to publish it in the unrevised shape in which his death has left it. During his last illness he said 'that he did not consider any work he left behind him sufficiently worked up for publication; but that if his friends wanted his notes, they were to be sent to them, as he knew that they would not let anything in the shape of bad work be published. Had he lived, his work would all have been gone through again and corrected.'

There is so much good work in this Essay that his friends consider no injustice will be done to his memory by publishing it, incomplete though it be.

The text has been left untouched; but some obvious slips have been set right, all the references have been verified, and a Table of Contents and Index added.

J. A. S.
L. A. S. B.

# A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR.

*Erat in Ricardo Shute ardor animi, ingenii vis, disputandi subtilitas, morum summa mansuetudo.*

*Veritatem et amabat magno opere et librum de ea investiganda scripsit.*

*H. R.*

IN the words above written an impartial judge summed up in brief the life of RICHARD SHUTE; but it has been thought well by his friends that a few pages set here side by side with his last work should recall such remembrances as might convey to others a little more fully the impression he made on them.

He was the posthumous son of Richard Shute of High Park, North Devon, Captain in the Hannover Garde du Corps, and of Mary Power, and was born at Sydenham, Nov. 6, 1849.

He was brought up in the country, where he came by that love of birds and beasts which was always strong in him. He never forgot his delight in his first pony, Silver-tail, and would often talk of the dogs he knew as a child. With poor health, as sometimes happens, the thinking faculties quicken early, and as a little boy he was full of quaint fancies and shrewd self-constructed theories which he used to apply with varied success to life. Being always bent on doing things and thinking out difficulties in his own fashion, he was naturally a puzzle to some of those who had to do with him. For instance, he got a liking for mathematics in reading the first three books of Euclid by himself, at hours when he ought to have been learning his Greek accidence, with the result that his good tutor, knowing nothing of his real task and wondering at his invincible ignorance of his grammar, gave up his case, reporting him as an amiable but hopeless pupil, with but a poor chance of any future mental awakening—a verdict which the lad accepted with some wonder, but without attempting any vindication. He had luckily plenty of books in his way, and, tutored or tutorless, he read what

he liked when he liked, and as he had a fine memory and good natural taste, his reading of course became his real education. He was happy too in his companions, for his Sisters were children of more than ordinary ability and appreciation, and there was plenty of bright talk with them and his Mother over books and things, and no lack of eager ventures in verse and prose in imitation of favourite models or in expression of favourite thoughts.

By the time he went to school he had a turn for mathematics, some knowledge of French and Italian, the power of ready composition in English, and a large store of English verse in his head, so that his master's criticism was confined to the fact that his handwriting was barbarous, and that he was as inaccurate in minutiæ as self-taught scholars often are.

Owing to a severe illness of nervous character which caused his removal from a preparatory school, he did not go to Eton till late, in 1864. He was then more than a fair scholar (though he had not read as many Latin or Greek books as his contemporaries), and still kept up his love for mathematics, wherein he showed considerable promise. At Eton he was happy enough to come under the care of Mr. William Cory, whom he often spoke of with affection as the first teacher whose words and help really influenced him. After an ordeal that would have been 'enough to daunt a boy of less than his strong mind,' he got into the full current of school life, took eagerly to work and play, and battled bravely against his own weak health and the lack of exact training that marred some of his best work. His exercises were warmly spoken of by Mr. Cory (one of the most exacting of living critics), who noted boldness and passion in the lad's verse, and once wrote of him, 'He is in Latin an original author.' At play too he held his own, was a good runner, and a fair swimmer and sculler. He was elected in 1867 to the famous Eton Debating Society ('an unwonted tribute to intellect,' as his tutor remarked), and did a good deal of literary prentice-work in 'The Adventurer,' a school magazine, and in several of the London monthlies. His endurance and courage, the originality of his thought, his unselfishness and his

genuine sympathy for all that needed it, made him many friends in spite of his strong individuality and the uncompromising way in which he stood by his colours on every point.

From Eton he went to Trinity Hall, having gained an exhibition there in 1868; thence he migrated to Caius College. He read a good deal of literature at Cambridge in a desultory way, and did not wholly put aside his regular work at mathematics and classics. But he had 'not come up to read,' he said, and he spent many a happy day with the hounds, or attending country steeple-chases, at coursing-meetings, or on Newmarket Heath fleeting his time carelessly enough. But after a few such golden terms he made up his mind that he ought to read, and seeing that it would be difficult for him to change his mode of life at Cambridge, he resolved to break it off short and come to Oxford. Here he settled down quietly at New Inn Hall in 1869, and gave himself almost wholly to hard work.

I had met him once before at Newmarket, but it was now that I came to know him well. I can remember how after a long spell of reading he would dash with a shout into some lazy friend's room, where two or three of us were pretty sure to be found, and join eagerly in the talk, no matter what the topic. We were astonished and delighted at his quick bright restless conversation, studded with happy quotations, bristling with cunning paradox. For he dearly loved dialectic, and would take up in his play the most indefensible positions, and defy us to drive him out of them, not unfrequently coping single-handed and successfully with a loud and eager band of assailants.

Of his tastes I remember his especial fondness for poetry, especially that of the musical sort (which with him indeed took the place of music itself). I have seen him rocking to and fro in his seat crooning verse to himself like an Arab. His chief favourite at Eton had been Shelley, but at Oxford Swinburne's verse was most often in his mouth, and he had a special fondness for some of his French poems, though I think he read Browning more than anything else. He greatly delighted in comic verse, and possessed a goodly

store thereof, old and new. He was a sound judge of style, and was seldom deceived by those eccentricities of second-rate writers which unduly charm one in youth. He had got to write a legible hand, but it was a curious script, much like type, and he 'painted his letters' as it were, with a quill pen. Perhaps in consequence of his early difficulties in writing, he was able to compose whole pages in his head and set them down in their final form on paper, so that his MS. was remarkably clear.

He did not care for most indoor amusements, but he was a good whist-player, and a quick and awkward adversary at écarté. He was fond, all his life, of training animals to tricks, and in his exceeding patience was usually successful.

He had travelled in France and Italy, and spent some time in Florence and Rome, and he liked talking about those countries and their peoples, admiring especially the absence among Italians of that pretence and uneasy self-consciousness which he greatly objected to in his own countrymen.

Among us there were those who were no judges of his mental gifts, but they too were attracted to him by his hearty companionship, his love and knowledge of sport, and his unflinching gameness. He was ready for a spin or a row almost any afternoon, but though he would drive he would not ride, because he said if he did he should have a struggle to stick to reading. In the long Sunday walks of thirty or forty miles and in the punishing runs he would take every now and then, he staved off this craving for what he always held the most noble of open-air exercises.

He never spared himself, bore pain like an Indian, and though singularly quick to sympathize with another's trouble, would never let any grief of his own show in his face or bearing. We used to notice that he was much more tolerant than most of us of other people's ways and even views. His long-suffering with those he cared for or felt he ought to look after was really remarkable, and he had devotion enough for his friends to tell them when he thought they had got on the wrong path, and he would manage this with singular tact, so that a man, however young

and vain, could hardly feel his raw self-respect hurt, even though Shute spoke plainly enough to show him his full folly. Not many men of his years have courage to help their friends in spite of themselves. He had high spirits, was always cheery, and there was a quaint wild spirit of fun in him which rarely slept, and many ludicrous adventures and extravagant jests this led him into. The presence of striking incongruity was always an attraction to him, and this was a joy most of his friends could share with him.

Altogether Shute was a very characteristic person to his comrades. I can remember watching him many an evening as we all sat talking and smoking, or listening to his talk (he never smoked); and the grave kindly face, the tall spare grey-clad figure loosely flung across a big chair, the restless hands ever in abrupt action, the broken force of his speech, are all vividly present to me. Unforgotten too is his favourite Gordon setter 'Lill,' his constant out-of-doors companion, whom we all, probably rightly, treated as a distinguished person of higher sagacity than our own. In deep silent thought she would shuffle on at his heel as he strode along, and never leave him save for some exceptional bait of unwonted fragrance; after such lapse her repentance and his forgiveness, not without due penance, were also to be remembered. The best portrait of him as a young man is a photograph in which he and Lill are taken together. And I am sure he would not like the memory of Lill's broad honest black head, handsome eyes, and beautiful tan points to be left out in any notice of his undergraduate life.

The Schools found Shute overstrained by his effort to do more work than there had been time for in his two years' space. He was threatened by a return of his old nervous malady, and had one or two sharp and disquieting bouts of it in the evenings after the paper-work, but he pulled through by sheer strength of will. We all felt that if he could only stay out the Examination, the result would not be doubtful, though, as ever, he was distrustful of his own ability, and underestimated his progress. He was placed in the First Class in the Honour School of Literæ Humaniores in

1872, and a little later gained a Senior Studentship at Christ Church after a severe open competition.

This was the beginning of a new sphere of life for him. But in all essentials his character was formed, it seemed indeed to have been formed before he came to Oxford. Intellectually he had no doubt made progress, he had gone carefully over much new and some old ground during the training for his degree, and he had had the advantage of hearing the problems he was wrestling with, handled by those who at Oxford had studied them most deeply. In especial, his taste for philosophy (which he had dabbled with even at school) grew with his work, and he began to form definite plans of future research in metaphysic.

He entered on his new life and duties with zest, and won as great regard and affection from his colleagues and pupils as he had secured from his old companions. There was not the shadow of pretence or vanity about him: he was hard to move when he had made up his mind, but he usually contrived to resist the Teacher's Temptation to dogmatize, and rarely forced his theories as fundamental maxims on others. He would often leap at the solution of a difficulty, and he never lacked a ready answer, and a fair argument to support it if he was posed with a problem; but he seldom let himself be deceived by his own ingenuity, and would witness its exposure with good-natured and amused interest. He used to state his own serious opinions very directly, but he would take great pains to enter thoroughly into the views of those from whom he differed most widely, and towards an opponent he was always scrupulously and generously fair.

The old talks went on, when the day's work was over and accident gave him an evening to spare, or he wished to discuss some question that interested him, and which he fancied some friend might help him to unravel. Far into the small hours I remember these talks prolonging their devious and curiously chequered course, and I am sure that it was a gain to those of us who knew him well and saw him often to hear his hearty dutiful views of life, and to listen to the half comic but always logical analysis to which

he subjected many a respectable fallacy, many a highly-supported theory with results eminently satisfactory but not always expected by his hearers. He was a good man of business too, and altogether had more experience than falls to most young men in the management of his own concerns, so that he could and would give useful practical advice.

His friend Mr. C. L. Dodgson's photograph gives the happiest and truest likeness of him as a grown man: an enlarged copy of it is to be seen at Christ Church in the Undergraduates' Reading Room, a place the success of which he had much at heart.

He had not settled to stay at Oxford, and had determined to get called to the Bar, before deciding upon his future career. Accordingly in 1874 he began reading English and Roman Law with a certain enjoyment, appreciating heartily the peculiar mental training and the legal habit of mind it induces.

In 1875 came a break in his work; he took the Professorship of Logic and Moral Philosophy in the Bombay Presidency. He considered this step carefully, though it turned out a mistake. We bade him goodbye and good-speed, and had a few hopeful notes from India. But he soon found that his health could never stand the strain he put upon it in that climate, for he tried to work as hard as he had been able to do in England. He was ordered home by the doctors within the year.

In 1876 Shute took his place again at Christ Church, and was shortly appointed Tutor, but it was not till 1878 that he quite threw away legal ambition, gave up all thought of other work, and determined to stay as teacher and student at Oxford.

The work of the last ten years of his short life falls naturally into lines that may be shortly traced. Always persuaded that a teacher must, to keep up his own power, be a learner too, he began to follow out a regular course of philosophic study.

In 1876 he brought out *Truth in Extremis*, a little pamphlet on the question of Endowment of Research, called forth by Dr. Appleton's volume and much earnest discussion on the subject, which is of permanent interest at Oxford. In a few pages

of more logic, of less bitterness, and certainly of greater cogency than one looks for in such controversial matter, he drew out his own ideas of the student's life and aims, and the dangers of Endowment. In 1877 he published the book he had written the year before, *A Discourse on Truth*, a singularly suggestive and ingenious essay in a direction which has been neglected in England of late years. This treatise, which is eminently readable and has something of the man's own humour in its plan and structure, was taken up abroad, and resulted amongst other influences in *Uphues' Grundlehren der Logik nach Richard Shute's Discourse on Truth bearbeitet.* Breslau, 1883.

It was in 1877, after this book was out of hand, that he spent part of his Long Vacation on a canoe tour in the north-west of France. His craft, the *Eremia*, was built at Oxford on his own plan, and proved strong and handy. He set her afloat on the Rance in July, went along the Vilaine, the Loire, the Cher, and the Seine, and ended his cruise at Paris. He did some long paddles, one of 70 miles (after which he had to be lifted out of the canoe, for he could not stand), and kept a regular log of his voyage. And in spite of his over-exertion, the *Eremia* brought him the first real holiday he had had for years and did him good, for though he had his law-books in his fore-locker, he could not often open them.

In 1882 appeared *A Collation of Aristotle's Physics, Book vii*, Anecdota Oxoniensia, Classical Series, vol. i. pt. 3; Clarendon Press, Oxford,—a work which had occupied much of his time in 1880 and 1881. The present unfinished treatise was his last work, and it shows that his intention had been to go over in a thorough way the bases of Aristotelian study. He had got beyond the results here published, but had not had time to correct them or record his later impressions and acquisitions.

It is not for me to judge of the value of these philosophic studies, but I can testify to the steady zeal and careful preparation with which he laboured, and to his utter scorn of secondhand or botched work.

To his earlier boyish essays, to his numerous bits of verse, to his novel (written in my room in the evenings of one term in the year 1879 as a mere relief from the pressure of matters which he felt were then trying him too hard), he attached no weight whatever, and they are only mentioned here as a proof of Shute's versatility, though one fancied there was in his English writing promise of more than ordinary kind; and since Landor's one has not often seen such real and interesting Latin verse as he would now and then dash off on a happy impulse, and throw away, when it cumbered his desk, without remorse.

He was much concerned with all sides of College business, into which he threw his accustomed energy, and those best qualified to speak have repeatedly acknowledged the high value they set upon his ready and efficient help. With drafting the new Statutes for the House he had a good deal to do. In the year 1886 he was chosen Proctor by Christ Church, and was as assiduous in the service of the University as he had been in the service of the House.

But the main part of his time and trouble was lavished upon his teaching, and to estimate his method and success here I shall borrow the words of his tutor, friend and colleague, Mr. J. A. Stewart (in *Mind*, Jan. 1887). He is speaking of Shute's personal work with his pupils. '"He riddled through one's seeming knowledge," as one who was once his pupil has expressed it. This was the first effect of his conversations. Beginners were often discouraged, and thought that there was no truth to be obtained on the subjects discussed. But when they came to know Shute better they began to suspect that he was even enthusiastic about the truth. His enthusiasm was perhaps all the more catching, that it was, at first, only suspected; at any rate, his pupils followed his singularly lucid expositions addressed studiously to the logical understanding, with the growing feeling that it is a solemn duty which a man owes to himself, as a rational being, to try to be clear-headed. Intellectual clearness, as such, seemed to be presented as a duty. But his more intimate pupils and friends came to see that he valued intellectual clearness not merely for its own sake, but as indicating that ideas incapable

of logical handling were being kept out of discussion and left to reign in their own proper sphere. These pupils and friends observed that in his philosophical conversations (as in his ordinary talk) he held much in reserve. He was reticent—almost ironically so—about those ideas which may be summarily described as "moral and religious," when others were tempted to discuss them and hope by discussion to make them clearer. This, those who knew him well had learned to understand, was not because these ideas did not interest him, but because he felt they were not objects of speculation but practical principles of life. And he showed how deeply they interested him by his own life. The acute dialectician never asked himself "the reason why" he should spend his failing strength in doing his best for the mental improvement of his pupils. He simply assumed that it was worth doing, and that was his "metaphysic of ethic."'

This picture is exact; all I can add to it is my remembrance of the cost at which this work was done—his never-satisfied desire to do better still, his anxiety when he fancied his teaching in any particular case was not as fruitful as he could have hoped, his thrifty economy of his own time in order to lavish the hours he could save upon his pupils. He could never do enough for them. The method of teaching he used in 'getting men to think' (as he called it) is one which is perhaps in the end the most trying to the teacher, to him it was especially exhausting. But as long as he had life in him sufficient to keep at his post, he would not bate a jot of his effort or spare himself a whit.

In 1882 he married Edith Letitia Hutchinson, younger daughter of Colonel Frederick Hutchinson and Amelia Gordon, and went out of college to live in a house he had planned out himself at the north of Oxford. We all rejoiced in his great happiness and the helpful and true companionship he had gained, and we hoped that he would now see that the work he was doing must, if it was to be continued long, be done at a slower pace and with less stress. But he would not allow himself greater rest than odd fag-ends of vacations, and toiled on as before. A

threatening attack forced him to greater care for a while in 1884; but in 1885 he felt it his duty to act as Examiner in the School of Literæ Humaniores, and the prolonged strain did him no good. In 1886 the Proctorship tried him still more, and before the end of his first term of office he was taken suddenly ill. He bore his four months' illness with serene self-control and gentle fortitude, though he knew very soon that, in spite of all the loving care bestowed on him, it could have but one end, and was fully conscious of all that parting must mean to him and those nearest him. In one of his last letters he wrote to his friend Mr. W. O. Burrows, 'I think that man is happiest who is taken while his hand is still warm on the plough, who has not lived long enough to feel his strength failing him, and his work every day worse done.' And these words his Wife has had engraved on his tomb.

He died on the 22nd Sept. 1886, and was buried at Woking, hard by the grave which he himself had chosen for a Sister who predeceased him. On the wall of the north aisle of the Cathedral at Oxford is a memorial brass to him, set up by his College friends and pupils, with a Latin inscription written by the Dean.

Those who knew the man best had looked forward to his 'future success' confidently and with assurance, but though his studies lie unfinished, surely he has done his work. His influence must be a lasting one on those who knew him. No teacher that I have known had a higher ideal than Richard Shute, and I have known none that lived closer to his ideal; I have met few men as unselfish and fair-minded, and no one of more absolute and fearless courage, or more earnest in the pursuit and love of Truth—and 'this,' in the words of an old writer, I say 'not in flattery. I loved him in life and I love him none the less in death; for what I loved in him is not dead.'

F. Y. P.

# ON THE HISTORY

OF THE

# ARISTOTELIAN WRITINGS.

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# CHAPTER I.

## THE PROBLEM.

WHAT precisely is the nature of the heterogeneous collection of treatises which has come down to us under the name of Aristotle? Do any or all of them represent finished works published by Aristotle in his lifetime? Are they merely notes for or of lectures, or are they rather the opinions of Aristotle filtered, at least to some extent, through other minds? Do we possess the greater part of the authentic writings of Aristotle, or merely stray spars from a storm which has drowned a whole argosy of valuable works? These are but a tithe of the questions, answers to which, as it seems, must needwise be given before we can arrive at a true comprehension of the works which remain to us. Yet these answers have never been given, and, it is to be feared, never will be given in a form to secure universal or even general assent.

Before we attempt any answer to these questions it will be well perhaps to consider the conditions under which philosophical works saw the light in the days of Aristotle.

Zeller[1] has very well pointed out that the public to which Greek philosophers primarily appealed was the circle of their disciples. Many, perhaps the majority of them, never can be said to have published a philosophical work in any sense other than that in which a lecturer publishes his thoughts to his audience; this is obviously and notoriously true of Sokrates, and probably not less

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[1] Hermes, xi. 84 sqq.

true in fact of his contemporary Sophists. The works of these authors were primarily λόγοι, show set discourses, to be read to their pupils as models of style and elocution quite as much as vehicles for the exposition of doctrine. A most obvious case of such a set oration is the story of the Choice of Herakles which Xenophon has reported to us, possibly from the lips of Prodikus; for the very fact of his reporting at full length the story of a contemporary or almost contemporary is strong proof that that story could have already been published only in a very limited sense of the word. This story is, in fact, an early instance of those λόγοι προτρεπτικοί, which were so abundant in later Greek literature. I suspect that the celebrated works of Protagoras (Περὶ ἀληθείας) and of Gorgias (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ περὶ φύσεως) did not differ greatly in kind from this type[1]. The somewhat catchpenny title of the latter treatise suggests rather a taking advertisement for a course of striking rhetorical lectures than a serious philosophic work. Poetico-philosophic works like those of Empedokles and Xenophanes no doubt were formally published and had some vogue; but in the days when there were no public libraries nor, as it seems, any private collectors, it is not likely that philosophers would have elaborated their thoughts in a distinctly literary style, and their so-called books would be rather collections of remarks for their own or their pupils' use, of which there would exist at best a few copies. This I believe to have been indubitably the case with the writings of such authors as Heraklitus and Demokritus. That Aristotle is intimately acquainted with the works of preceding philosophers is nothing against this theory, for we are told on fairly credible tradition that he was one of the first of those who collected a library. Plato is undoubtedly

[1] Sext. Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii. 65. 87.

an exception to this rule, since his dialogues must have obtained, and been intended to obtain, what was for those times a wide circulation. But with Plato at least it is true that his most serious teaching is not expressed in his dialogues in its most scientific form, but reserved for the inner circle of his disciples. Of this we have sufficient evidence in the Dialogues themselves, in the constant references to a longer and more perfect way, and the complaints as to the insufficiency of any book to answer the purposes of teaching. Deep and far-reaching as the philosophy of the Platonic dialogues seems to us, it was not in them that he embodied what he considered the most perfect form of his philosophy, nor to them that Aristotle refers when he wishes to discuss that philosophy in its most serious aspect.

With Aristotle himself the case is yet stronger. By his time what we may call the University system of Athens was more fully developed, and the circle of students would include the majority of the worthy hearers whom Hellas contained. Moreover (whatever may be the truth as to some of his lost works) those which have come down to us, with one striking exception [1], are clearly neither prepared nor designed for a large circle of readers. I think, then, we may safely conclude that there was no publication in any sense of these works during Aristotle's lifetime; that some of them at least represent lectures (whether written out by Aristotle himself or reported by his pupils we need not yet inquire), and involve for their understanding not only a previous instruction in the main doctrines of the school, but even the ordinary paraphernalia of the lecture-room, the slate, or its representative the sanded board; on any other supposition than this the constant use of symbols

[1] Politics vii, viii (iv, v), of which I shall speak at length later, chapter viii, passim.

without any explanatory diagram is quite inexplicable, and leads even now to great differences of opinion amongst commentators; witness the controversies which have arisen as to the explanation of the celebrated chapter on Zeno's paradoxes[1]. Of very similar nature is the reference to the διαγραφή in Eth. Nic. ii. 7. 1[2].

If this doctrine be the true one, then for these treatises at least it will be absurd to talk of verbal alterations by Aristotle in later recensions; as if forsooth Aristotle had first brought out one edition of his book in the modern sense, and then made corrections of it in a second edition. In one sense, it is true, we may sometimes get two really Aristotelian versions of the same thought, since the lectures may have been, and probably were, repeated more than once, but any differences in style between the first and the second repetition of such lectures are far more likely to be accidental than intentional. Differences and developments of doctrine might, and probably would, occur, but of these in the reduplicated passages, which some have referred to two Aristotelian recensions, we find no trace. Such an explanation seems purely fanciful, and to rest on an unlikely and unprovable hypothesis.

But we have a second class of Aristotelian writings, which certainly can be regarded neither as published books nor as delivered lectures. The chief instance of these we find in the undoubtedly authentic books of the History of Animals. I think the explanation of the existence of this class of writings is to be found in a passage in the Prior Analytics, where Aristotle says that you can only begin syllogistic treatment of a subject, or in fact scientific treatment generally, when you have made a more or less complete enumeration of the facts bearing on the subject. He concludes with the following words: Εἰ

[1] Physics vi. 9. 239 *b*. 5.

[2] Eth. Nic. ii. 7. 1. 1107 *a*. 34.

γὰρ μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν παραλειφθείη τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἕξομεν περὶ ἅπαντος οὗ μὲν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ταύτην εὑρεῖν καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὗ δὲ μὴ πέφυκεν ἀπόδειξις, τοῦτο ποιεῖν φανερόν[1]. In accordance with this principle Aristotle undoubtedly made enormous collections of facts on all the subjects which he intended afterwards to treat scientifically. In the actual scientific treatment he is usually sparing of illustrations, not giving us more facts than are really required to throw light on the point treated of. This is obviously the case in such works as the Περὶ ψυχῆς, where the amount of preliminary observations, especially for the second book, must have been considerable; still more is this so with the Politics, where again, except in the book on Revolutions, illustrations are introduced with a sparing hand. Yet notwithstanding the negative criticism of Rose and others, the Πολιτεῖαι, or collection of constitutions, has earlier evidence in its favour as an Aristotelian work than any treatise which we now possess; and the fragments which remain will at least compare favourably with some parts of the History of Animals. To ask whether such works are worthy of Aristotle shows a misapprehension of the whole question. These ἱστορίαι represent collections of material of the most various value, which Aristotle himself has not sorted nor reduced to order and consistency. They represent, in fact, the note-books of a man who was seeking information from all quarters, and who intended later on to judge of the relative value of this information, and to coordinate it into a scientific theory. To blame collections of building material because they are not yet the perfected house, shows little depth or acumen of criticism.

A somewhat more doubtful class of treatises are those which are represented in our present collection by one

[1] An. Pr. i. 30, 46 *a*. 24–27.

work, the Problemata. These seem to be a carrying out in a somewhat tiresome form of the process with which we are familiar in the apodictic works of Aristotle, the raising and solution of doubts which have occurred, or might reasonably occur, with regard to the subject in hand. It is not in itself at all inconceivable that Aristotle may have prepared collections of questions of this kind, the more important of which he would afterwards incorporate in his scientific works. We know that he holds that the solution of a doubt is in fact itself a discovery, and such a collection or collections of solved doubts would, like his ἱστορίαι, give him much useful material to work upon. On the other hand, it must be admitted that considerable portions of our present book of the Problemata contain questions and solutions which we can hardly believe to have seriously occupied the mind of Aristotle, while the theology of the book, or of sections of it, attributes a much more personal character to the Deity than anything we find in undoubted Aristotelian works[1]. Yet large portions at least are well worthy of Aristotle both in language and in thought, and a collection of this kind with no connection between the separate subjects treated of is just the one to lend itself most largely to interpolation, or rather, as it would seem to Aristotle's disciples, furnishes merely a number of heads under which all future questions and solutions may be grouped. We cannot appeal for this method of treatment to the direct authority of an undoubted Aristotelian work, as we could in the case of the ἱστορίαι; but the constant repetition of such phrases as διαπορήσαντες πρότερον would make us prone to believe that the original plan at least of the collection is due to Aristotle, though there is a likelihood almost amounting

[1] Cf. Probl. xxx. 5 init. 955 *b*. 22–24, though perhaps the expression is merely a popular one.

to certainty that a great, perhaps the greater, part of the execution of the collection which we now possess is to be attributed to his disciples. The same remark applies, though in a less degree, to the ἱστορίαι, both those which we possess and the much larger number which are lost.

But besides these three classes of books which partially at least remain to us, there must be taken into account whole categories of books once attributed to Aristotle, which are completely or almost completely lost. Under this head we have, first the Dialogues, the compositions of Aristotle with which antiquity was best acquainted, and for which, next to the Πολιτεῖαι, we have the earliest authority. Next, we have another class of λόγοι or set discourses, perhaps with a dialogic prelude and end, of which the Aristotelian προτρεπτικός[1] was probably an example. We have whole clusters of historical and critical works on previous philosophers, of which the undoubtedly spurious work—De Xenophane Zenone et Gorgia—may be taken as either an instance or an imitation; these seem to be enlargements of the historical and critical sketches of preceding works on the subject which we find in so many of the didactic Aristotelian works. We have ὑπομνήματα—mere collections of notes—sometimes apparently identical with the ἱστορίαι, at other times including all works except those which are reduced to the perfected form of a dialogue or λόγος, since the Nicomachean Ethics is once at least alluded to as ἠθικὰ ὑπομνήματα. We have works on mathematics[2], on medicine[3], and on the influence of locality[4];

[1] Cf. Rudolf Hirzel, Über den Protreptikos des Aristoteles; Hermes x. 61–100. (1876.)

[2] Sext. Empiricus, Adv. Math. iii. 57–59.

[3] Galen, ed. Kühn, ii. 90 et x. 15. These books of, or attributed to, Aristotle (περὶ νόσων, etc.) are not to be confounded with the ἰατρικὴ συναγωγή which Galen tells us was falsely attributed to Aristotle but written by Menon (Galen xv. 25).

[4] Galen iv. 798.

lastly, we have a series of critical notes on Homer[1], which perhaps least of all of his reputed writings can with probability be attributed to Aristotle, since his frequently loose treatment of that author would make it most improbable that he had devoted any serious attention to critical study of him.

It is impossible to arrive at anything like a satisfactory conclusion as to the works remaining to us, unless we have some theory as to their relation to those which are lost, and as to the authenticity of the latter. The list of main heads might be very considerably increased if we were to include the multitudinous catalogue of titles accumulated by Diogenes Laertius, which yet comprises very few of the works which we now consider to be Aristotelian. I have however purposely abstained from reference to any books whose authenticity is not vouched for by authors anterior to, or at least contemporary with, Diogenes, and of far greater weight as witnesses.

But the Aristotelian problem does not consist solely or chiefly in determining the authenticity of particular books. Almost every page gives us the same questions and the same difficulties. These difficulties may be roughly put under two heads,—the repetitions and the references. Almost the whole of the Aristotelian criticism may be said to consist in a due understanding of these two questions. A full and satisfactory explanation of either is yet to be looked for.

And first as to the repetitions. These fall under three distinct heads. We have first duplicate and even triplicate treatises on the same subject, and following usually exactly the same lines. The duplicated treatises are sometimes both assigned to Aristotle, as in the case of the two Rhetorics (which however differ from each other much more than is

[1] Plutarch, Epicurus xii.

usually the case), or more commonly the second and third versions are assigned to some pupil or successor of Aristotle. Thus we have Eudemian Ethics, Physics, and Analytics; Theophrastian Metaphysics and History of Animals, with probably a large number of other works following the lines of the Aristotelian treatises[1]. The process seems to have been continued by Straton and other later Aristotelians; but of their works few or no fragments remain to us.

Secondly, we have long reduplications or analyses of portions of works, sometimes taking the form of second versions of given books, as in the double versions of the second book of the De Animâ, the seventh book of the Physics, the apparently complete double version of the Politics, and the certain double version of the Categories; sometimes that of the repetition in one work of parts of other works, as that in the tenth book of the Metaphysics of portions of the Physics; or of earlier portions of the same work, as in Metaphysics x, where we get a shortened form of portions of the earlier books, and in Metaphysics xii and xiii, where we get the same matters treated over again, though with some differences in point of view.

Thirdly, in all the Aristotelian works we frequently meet with short reduplicated passages generally, though not invariably, following each other very closely. These passages have usually, but not always, some slight verbal differences, and it is to be noticed that in the cases in which they are absolutely identical [e.g. Physics i. 2. 3 and i. 3. 1, Eth. Nic. v. 7. 1132 *b.* 9 and v. 8. 1133 *a.* 14] they are usually somewhat further removed from each other than in cases where there is a real, though not very im-

[1] Cf. Cicero, De Fin. i. 2. 6, together with the constant coupling of Theophrastus with Aristotle as to the most heterogeneous matters of doctrine by Cicero, Plutarch, Galen, etc.

portant, difference in expression. The bearing of this remark we shall see later.

We turn now to the references, and we find that the whole of the Aristotelian works as we now have them are connected together by a very elaborate series of references, or perhaps, as we shall see later, by more than one such series. We perceive that there are comparatively few references to any works which we do not possess, and that these are generally of a vague and doubtful character. But when we look at the matter more carefully, and attempt to draw any certain inferences from these references as to the order and authenticity of the books, we find that the matter, apparently so simple, really bristles with difficulties. We find cross-references between different works, which clearly could not have been inserted at the time of the writing of whichever was the earlier. We find the same work referred to by several different names. We find in the same work references to other portions of that work as both preceding and following a given portion. We find constantly the connecting link between two adjoining books occurring both at the end of one and at the beginning of the other. We find references implying an arrangement of books in an artificial order, when it is almost certainly proveable that that order could not have existed till long after the time of Aristotle. Lastly, we find references which contain grievous errors as to the real meaning of a doctrine or as to its relation to the matter in hand.

We have therefore forced upon us the examination, first, of the external evidence of the authenticity of the various works imputed to Aristotle; secondly, of the nature of the text and the causes through which it was brought into its present form; and thirdly, of the references and of the nature of the evidence which may with truth be deduced from them.

But before setting out on this task, it may perhaps be worth while to consider at some length what seems at first sight to be an almost exactly parallel history, and to inquire whether we can gather from it any hints towards the solution of the Aristotelian question.

Even as under the name of Aristotle there existed once a multitudinous collection of treatises, all of which could hardly have been the work of one man, so under that of Hippokrates we have a very considerable collection of medical works, some of which at least must be posterior in date to that renowned physician. Further, as other works closely resembling in form and matter those imputed to Aristotle are attributed to his disciples or even (in one case) to his descendants, so too to the descendants and disciples of Hippokrates are attributed some of the works which other critics and historians have assigned to Hippokrates himself, while other works which bear the name of Hippokrates are attributed to later ὁμώνυμοι. Just as some at least of Aristotle's works seem mere collections of notes, so a very large proportion of the works assigned to Hippokrates are mere bundles of disconnected jottings in which the same thing is often repeated several times over. These works were said by the older commentators to be collections of observations published without editing by the disciples of Hippokrates soon after his death. They are called ὑπομνήματα in opposition to his more finished writings, the συγγράμματα or συντακτικά, a distinction sufficiently familiar to Aristotelian students. With Hippokrates, as with Aristotle, there is a considerable period during which we have no real history of the manuscripts, though with him also we have during this interval incidental notices and quotations, since M. Littré seems to make out his case as to the quotation from Hippokrates in the Phaedrus, and we have the express and repeated

testimony of Galen that in physical and medical matters Aristotle is often the mere interpreter of Hippokrates. *Ταῦτα σύμπαντα καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἕτερα πολλά, τά τε τῶν προειρημένων δυνάμεων καὶ τὰ τῶν νοσημάτων τῆς γενέσεως, Ἱπποκράτης μὲν πρῶτος ἁπάντων ὧν ἴσμεν ὀρθῶς εἶπεν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ δευτέρως ὀρθῶς ἐξηγήσατο*[1].

M. Littré enumerates eight chief points bearing on the criticism of the works of Hippokrates[2].

(1) The collection exists authentically from the time of Herophilus and of the foundation of the Alexandrian libraries (circa B.C. 300).

(2) Portions certainly belong to other writers than Hippokrates.

(3) A large portion consists of notes, which no author would have published in their present form.

(4) Several works are, or comprise, compilations, analyses, and extracts of other works in the collection still in existence.

(5) The treatises do not all belong to precisely the same epoch.

(6) The Hippokrateans must certainly have possessed a whole mass of works which were already lost at the time of the publication of the collection [that is, in M. Littré's sense, the time of the transfer of the collection or of copies of it to the Alexandrian libraries].

(7) The most ancient authorities have hesitated as to the author to whom this or that special treatise should be assigned.

(8) There is a small number of writings which all ancient critics agree in assigning to Hippokrates.

All these statements, except the first, may be transferred *mutatis mutandis* to Aristotle, and we may add one or

[1] Galen ii. 90, ed. Kühn, and so also continually in other passages.

[2] Littré, Hippokrates, Introduction, vol. i. p. 263.

two more resemblances gleaned from other portions of M. Littré's invaluable introduction.

(1) In the time of the commentators, certainly at least in that of Galen and Erotion, there were no MSS. claiming to be due to the hand of Hippokrates himself. In like manner, as Stahr very justly argues[1], the doubt which Andronicus expressed as to the authenticity of the De Interpretatione and Categories, a doubt based apparently entirely on internal grounds, is strong evidence that he did not believe himself to possess any autographs of Aristotle himself; nor does the story of Strabo, if rightly understood, give any contradiction to this view[2].

(2) The names under which the Hippokratean treatises are known to us are certainly in many cases, and possibly in all, later than the works themselves. Perhaps none of them go back as far as the time of Hippokrates. The same remark is notoriously true of such Aristotelian conglomerations as the Organon and the Metaphysics; and it will be our task to prove that it is of much wider significance and applies to a considerable number, if not to all, of the apparently homogeneous treatises.

But if there are many points of resemblance between the histories of the Aristotelian and Hippokratean treatises, there are differences so numerous and so important, as to render analogical arguments from the one history to the other of extremely doubtful value.

In the first place, though we have a break in the history of the MSS. of Hippokrates, there is no reason for assuming that at any time they were treated with other than the most loving care. We have nothing equivalent to the Skepsis story, however we may interpret that story. From the temple at Cos the manuscripts or their copies apparently went straight to the libraries at Alexandria; and the only

[1] Stahr, Aristotelia, ii. 72–73. [2] Cf. later, cap. 2, p. 32.

change which they seem likely to have suffered is the gradual accretion of further observations and further treatises on kindred subjects, ascribed to the name of the master probably because they precisely followed his lines of argument and inquiry: for though the eagerness of the Ptolemies as book-collectors may have led to some deliberate forgeries, this process cannot have attained any great perfection before the time when the canon of the Hippokratean works was finally established; which was, as it appears, but a very few years after the first opening of the Alexandrian libraries.

Secondly, in this very matter of early criticism Hippokrates has been far more fortunate than Aristotle. The Alexandrian librarians and littérateurs from the very earliest foundation of the libraries, that is, within a century and a half of the death of Hippokrates, set themselves to the work of arranging, criticising, and examining the master's works, and though their treatises are lost to us, yet their tradition is carried on unbroken, and in all probability we have all the most valuable results of it in the works of Galen. It is true that the one work of Galen himself which would have thrown most light on the matter, his formal discussion of the authenticity of each special Hippokratean treatise, is now lost to us, but his extant works preserve for us sufficient information for a tolerably accurate reconstruction of his canon, and of the kind of evidence upon which it was based.

With Aristotle the case is lamentably different. We have, it is true, some vague traditions of Alexandrian and other commentators; but we cannot with certainty assume even that the works upon which they commented are those which we now have under the name of Aristotle. Not a trace of these commentaries remains to us, and (as far as we can judge) the works of Andronicus Rhodius, the well-head of all the commentaries that remain, were com-

posed without any reference to them. Had we any portion of these works, or above all the book which Andronicus composed on the authenticity of the treatises which he included in his canon, we should be in a position widely different from our present miserable state of vague guessing. But Andronicus is lost; Nicolaus [1], the commentator on the Metaphysics, is lost; Didymus [2], Asperius [3], and Boethus [4] (the friend of Galen and learned Roman consul) have all disappeared; so also has Galen's own commentary on the Analytics [5]; and Alexander Aphrodisiensis, great though he be, writes more than five centuries after the author on whom he is commenting. Even of his works not many remain, and some portions at least of those which are attributed to him are undoubtedly spurious. After him we get only third or fourth-hand repeaters, like Ammonius, Simplicius, or the crowd of dull scribes who lurk under the name of Johannes Grammaticus or Philoponus. For some of the most undoubtedly Aristotelian works we are not even so well provided, and have nothing better than the trivialities and absurdities of ninth to twelfth century Byzantine commentators. It is true that in some cases we have the further aid of the twice or thrice translated versions and commentaries of Arabian or Jewish literati; but the text from which these learned men drew was already a late product of criticism, and does not carry us back a step beyond the existing Greek commentaries.

Yet another important point in which Hippokrates has

[1] His work on the Aristotelian Metaphysics is referred to by a commentator quoted by Brandis in his edition of the Metaphysics of Aristotle and Theophrastus, p. 323, note.

[2] Quoted often by Galen and Athenaeus; the fragment referring to the Aristotelian Ethics and Politics, quoted by Stobaeus, is not beyond suspicion.

[3] Quoted by Simplicius frequently. [4] Galen, ii. 215 et xix. 13.

[5] Galen, xix. 41.

been more fortunate than Aristotle. Galen quotes only four treatises of Hippokrates which we do not possess. He omits to mention fifteen treatises or parts of treatises which we now have ; but a large proportion of these are obviously only summaries or cuttings from works included in the Galenian canon, so that the practical identity of our Hippokratean collection with that known to Galen is even closer than it at first appears.

How different is the case with Aristotle! Not one tithe of the works which passed under his name with antiquity remain to us ; and, on the other hand, the only lists which have come down to us purporting to enumerate all his works seem to contain very few of those which we now have. This latter is, it is true, of little importance since all the treatises which we now possess are referred to by authors of far greater weight than the makers, or rather copiers, of these Aristotelian lists. But what right have we to assume that the whole or anything like the whole of the genuine Aristotelian works is now in our hands? We can only do so in the teeth of all the most trustworthy evidence of ancient authorities. We hear of early doubts as to the Categories, De Interpretatione, and Metaphysics, but none whatsoever as to the Πολιτεῖαι, the Dialogue on Philosophy, the Eudemus, the Protrepticus, and many others. As to the arguments from style and matter these must always be of very doubtful nature, resting, as they needs must, upon preconceived ideas of the arguer. That short quotations from lost works of Aristotle (chiefly with reference to meanings of words) do not seem very weighty or important may be due very much more to lack of judgment on the part of the quoter than to any fault or weakness of the author quoted ; while the longer fragments, notably that from the Eudemus quoted by Plutarch in the Consolatio ad Apollonium and the passage from the

Πολιτεῖαι on the functions of the βουλή, πρυτάνεις and ἐπιστάτης, are, in my humble opinion, worthy of the Aristotle whom we know. But of all such arbitrary negative criticism we may say with M. Littré, 'Une pareille critique repose sur des fondements incertains ; rien n'est sujet à controverse comme les arguments tirés de la gravité du style et de sa concision. D'ailleurs il y a là une pétition de principes ; car avant de dire que tel style appartient à Hippocrate, il faut prouver que les ouvrages où l'on croit, à tort ou à raison, reconnaître ce style, sont réellement de l'auteur auquel on les attribue' (i. 171); and later, 'L'incertain Soranus, auteur de la vie d'Hippocrate, a eu toute raison de dire qu'il est possible d'imiter le style d'un écrivain, et que le même homme peut lui-même écrire de différentes manières' (Littré, i. 179).

When, therefore, a critic asks us to believe that we have with one or two unimportant exceptions all the authentic works of Aristotle, and that on the other hand by far the greater proportion of the works which we now possess are authentic, we have considerable ground for rejecting his plea at once, unless he can produce for it very strong external as well as internal evidence. But when this author asks us further to believe that Hippokrates never wrote at all, in the face of the whole tradition of antiquity and of the evidence which can certainly be evolved from Plato, a contemporary or almost a contemporary; and further, that there was no real Pythagorean doctrine, but only a Pythagorean life ; that that which we take for Pythagoreanism is an invention of Plato and his disciples; when I say he affirms this in the teeth of repeated assertions of Plato, and of Aristotle, who must have been the contemporary of these fraudulently inventive disciples of Plato, and who can have had no motive for concealment or possibility of being deceived ; then we can only conclude

that the writer's erudition, which is enormous, stands out of all relation to his judgment, and that to the latter we need not assign any undue weight [1].

To sum up then; the strong apparent similarity of the conditions of Hippokratean criticism to those of Aristotelian vanishes to a great extent on closer inspection. The external evidence as to the authenticity of the books is at one and the same moment stronger and less important for Hippokrates than for Aristotle. For as far as the Hippokratean *ὑπομνήματα* are concerned, it is of infinitesimal importance who inserted this or that report of a case into the general corpus of such reports collected by the guild of physicians of Cos. The repetitions, moreover, in the Hippokratean works occur chiefly, if not entirely, in these *ὑπομνήματα*, and the criticism is free from that chief and perhaps most insoluble difficulty of Aristotelian scholarship, the insertion of duplicated and triplicated passages into formal didactic works (e.g. the Nicomachean Ethics, De Animâ, and Physics). We must then give up our hopes of finding practically useful analogies in the labours and results of the editors of Hippokrates, and proceed without such aid to the discussion of our problem.

[1] Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus and De Ordine et Auctoritate Librorum Aristotelis.

# CHAPTER II.

## ARISTOTLE TILL THE TIME OF CICERO AND THE LATIN RENAISSANCE.

WERE any of the Aristotelian writings published during the master's lifetime? We have already answered that question as far as the bulk of the works which have come down to us is concerned. For these there was certainly no other publication than the public reading of such of them as may be considered as representing courses of lectures. But this answer is very far from solving the whole question. We know that certain reputed works of Aristotle were generally known within a few years after his death, and that from that time forth throughout the whole of antiquity no doubt was expressed as to the authenticity of these works. The chief members of this class are the Dialogues and the Politeae. Into the question of the authenticity of these works it is not within our scope to enter at length; and as to the former, almost all that was worth saying has been said by Bernays in his monograph on the subject. But I may remark in passing upon the absurdity of an argument upon which Rose lays great stress, that the Dialogues could hardly have been written after the death of Plato, by reason of their admittedly Platonic character, since at the time of Plato's death Aristotle was already a man of mature years, and must already have elaborated the more important parts of his own system; while on the other hand they

could not have been published during Plato's lifetime, since one at least of them, the Νήρινθος, Κορίνθιος, or Νηρίτιος, introduces Plato as an interlocutor, which, says Rose, could never have been done during Plato's lifetime.

As to the first horn of this supposed dilemma it only need be said, that it would only prove that the dialogues which are Platonic in doctrine were probably written before Plato's death; but this is not at all in opposition to the supposition that the Νήρινθος was written after that time, since there is not the slightest evidence that the doctrine of the Nerinthus itself was Platonic. As to the second horn, we must ask whence Rose gets this important piece of information, that living men are not introduced as interlocutors into dialogues Platonic or other? Is it likely that all the young men who are introduced as interlocutors in the Platonic dialogues were already dead when these dialogues were published? Menon, Glaucon, Adimantus, Simmias, Kebes, Theaetetus, and half a score of others were more or less contemporaries of Plato. Charmides was probably younger. Is it at all likely that all these should have died before the dialogues in which they are respectively introduced were written? We have no reason to believe that these dialogues, or the majority of them, were written when Plato was a very old man, since there are at least two or three Platonic writings which are certainly posterior in date to any of those in which the personages I have mentioned appear. But if Rose means merely that the principal personage in the dialogue could not be a living man, then granting that assumption, though it too is an unproveable one, I need only remark that the words of Themistius certainly do not prove that Plato was the chief interlocutor in the dialogue Nerinthus. In truth, they can hardly be said to *prove* that he was an interlocutor at all, though they undoubtedly suggest it. The

passage of Themistius runs as follows: Ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ Κορίνθιος τῷ Γοργίᾳ ξυγγενόμενος—οὐκ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ Γοργίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ ὃν Πλάτων ἔγραψε ἐπ' ἐλέγχῳ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ—αὐτίκα ἀφεὶς τὸν ἀγρὸν καὶ τὰς ἀμπέλους Πλάτωνι ὑπέθηκε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἐσπείρετο καὶ ἐφυτεύετο· καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὃν τιμᾷ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ διαλόγῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ[1].

On the other hand, I cannot attach much weight to Bernay's identification of the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι with the dialogues. Even though he could prove, as I think he has proved, that some or all of the references to ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι in the Aristotelian works referred to the dialogues, I do not think it would at all follow that these were really Aristotelian works. It would prove merely that some editor had believed that they were[2]. But of the general belief of antiquity we have enough direct evidence without falling back upon indirect; and it is to be noticed that in a passage undoubtedly Aristotelian the word ἐξωτερικός is used in the sense attributed to it by Zeller, not in that for which Bernays argues. The passage occurs in the first book of the Politics, and runs thus: καὶ τοῦτο [τὸ ἐνεῖναι τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον] ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἁρμονίας· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως, τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον, p. 1254 *a*, 31–36. Here the meaning of the expression is clearly that the investigation of this subject belongs to a branch of inquiry somewhat alien to the matter in hand, i. e. either to Ethics or to Psychology. But the question as to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι is not really of vital importance towards settling the problem of the authenticity of the Aristotelian Dialogues, and I think that the weight of

[1] Themistius, Or. xxiii. p. 295 c.

[2] Cf. chap. v, on Titles and References, passim.

evidence in favour of the authenticity of some at least of these dialogues is overwhelming.

As to the Πολιτεῖαι, we can trace them down from Timaeus of Tauromenium, an author who wrote within sixty or seventy years of the death of Aristotle[1]. The only argument against them rests upon the mention of the Ammonias, which ship or ship's name took the place of the older Salaminia, and which is mentioned in one of the preserved fragments of the Politeae. Böckh argues chiefly from the silence of preceding inscriptions, that the change was not made before the year 322 B.C., that is, some time after the death of Aristotle, but the evidence is by no means strong, and even were it conclusive, would not yet finally demonstrate the spurious nature of the Politeae as a whole, since no one will assert that their text in the mutilated fragments which we possess is free from all corruption ; and the alteration, if it be one, is just such a one as a scribe would make who knew the state of things in his time, and assumed it to be the same in that of Aristotle. It must be admitted that the author from whom we got the statement must have found the word Ἀμμωνιάς in his text of the Πολιτεῖαι (if indeed he was not quoting at second, third, or sixteenth hand) ; but that fact tells little or nothing against the possibility of alteration in the centuries which elapsed between his remark and Aristotle's writing[2].

If then there were, as we may assume, certain dialogues and historical treatises written by Aristotle, the first would almost certainly have received such publication as Athens afforded in his lifetime, for they must necessarily from the beginning have been intended for pub-

[1] Cf. Polybius, xii. 5, in his defence of Aristotle against the attacks of Timaeus.

[2] Aristoteles, ed. Berol. frag. 403, p. 1545 *a*, 42 sqq.

lication. The second would have been very likely to have seen the light early, for they were on a subject of far greater general interest than most of Aristotle's works, and moreover, as we may judge from the longer fragments, were worked into something more like a connected whole than was the case with the other *συναγωγαί* and *ἱστορίαι* compiled by Aristotle. We may no doubt assume that their chief interest to Aristotle himself would be as forming material out of which he might evolve the general scientific results which are happily preserved to us in the Politics; but he might probably and reasonably consider that this collection, got together with immense labour, might also be made useful to gain him some of that immediate fame, the wish for which cannot be entirely absent from the mind of any creative thinker. Even on the supposition that other works of Aristotle were published during his lifetime, it could only be through his Dialogues and Politeae that he could hope to be immediately known to a wide circle of non-philosophic readers. If he were during his lifetime something more than the revered teacher of a limited circle of pupils, we may safely assume that this publication took place.

As to the works which remain to us in their entirety, I am inclined to guess that no one as a whole ever issued beyond the limits of the lecture-room during the master's life, though there seem grounds for thinking that portions of the Metaphysics and De Caelo, some at least of the Parva Naturalia [1], the two books Περὶ φιλίας [2], now included in the Nicomachean Ethics, and the two books on the ideal state [3], Politics vii, viii (iv, v), may have first seen the light perhaps in some other form during the lifetime of Aristotle. If, indeed, we are to accept the

[1] Cf. post, on the question of the avoidance of hiatus, pp. 164 sqq.

[2] Cf. post, chap. vii, pp. 142 sqq. [3] Cf. post, chap. viii, pp. 164 sqq.

authority of Plutarch and the authenticity of the letters of Alexander and Aristotle, we shall be forced to admit that the most abstruse and most obviously unfinished of all the Aristotelian writings, was published by him against the will of his king and master[1]. But if we believe this, we must believe, first, that the name ἀκροαματικοὶ λόγοι was popularly used and understood in the days of Aristotle himself, a supposition which all competent critics would at once reject. We must believe, further, that Alexander was such a conceited noodle as to seek for distinction by the possession of some secret talisman of knowledge, as if, forsooth, he was so much in need of any stray morsel of fame merited or unmerited; we must believe that the Aristotelian circle of earnest scholars imitated the mummeries of the Mysteries, which were already fallen into absolute disrepute; we must believe that Aristotle wrote in the style of a quibbling charlatan; and, if we allow our credulity to extend to the whole passage, we must throw in the beliefs that Alexander, thanks to the teaching of Aristotle, was no contemptible leech; that he kept always under his pillow an edition of the Iliad prepared for him by Aristotle; that Alexander, somewhere in the centre of Asia, cooled down in his affection for Aristotle, and showed his coolness; and (if we turn over a few pages) that Aristotle was suspected of privity with the murder of Alexander by poison[2]—a story which perhaps no one but the mad Caracalla ever took seriously, least of all men Plutarch himself[3]. Simplicius in his version of the matter, though he follows the account of Plutarch, seems to understand Alexander's letter and Aristotle's answer as referring to the publication of ἀκροαματικοὶ λόγοι generally; but he adds the further valuable information, that Aristotle in the

[1] Plutarch, Alexander, vii. [2] Plutarch, Alexander, lxxvii.
[3] Dio Cassius, 77. 7.

ἀκροαματικοὶ λόγοι purposely practised obscurity[1]; perhaps a little extra absurdity thrown in need hardly be counted amid this tissue of childish nonsense.

Let us now turn to the fate of the Aristotelian writings other than the dialogues and histories in the period immediately succeeding the master's death. A passage of Cicero may serve as an introduction to this part of our inquiry. It runs thus: 'Platonis autem auctoritate qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et Peripateticorum; qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant; nam cum Speusippum sororis filium Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duos autem praestantissimos studio, atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium et Aristotelem Stagiritem; qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lyceo; illi autem qui Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt; sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi, certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt, et eam quidem plenam et refertam; illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita rationem disserendi reliquerunt; ita facta est disserendo, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae; quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut dixi, nominibus una; nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat; abundantia quadam ingenii praestabat, ut mihi videtur quidem, Aristoteles; sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio' (Acad. Post. i. 4. § 17–18).

Now we must of course deduct from this account Cicero's statement of the practical identity of the Peripatetics and

[1] Simp. in Phys. Prooem. 2. 22–33.

the Old Academy. Cicero, like other eclectics, had a mania for proving that all schools were substantially in agreement; just as, later, Simplicius is for ever proving to us that Aristotle never really criticises Plato, but only misunderstandings of Plato. Even as Cicero here assures us that there is no real difference between the Peripatetics and Old Academy, so elsewhere he asserts that the distinction of doctrine between Stoics and Peripatetics is a merely verbal one[1]. But, deducting what we may call the personal equation of Cicero, there remains to us the definite testimony, that at a very early period both in the Academy and in the Lyceum a regular course of lectures was organised, a systematic education given. We may safely assume that this complete education comprised most at least of the subjects treated of in our present Aristotelian books. In what way, then, were Aristotle's works made useful for this education? I think that only one answer is really possible. The notes on Aristotle's lectures, whether his own or those taken by his former pupils—the then lecturers,—were read out to the class, who, as I believe, could not otherwise easily obtain access to copies of them. Occasional notes and criticisms were interpolated by the lecturer, who probably did not always warn his hearers as to what was interpretation and what text. Only on this supposition can the repetition of the whole, or nearly the whole, of the Aristotelian titles in the works ascribed to Eudemus, Theophrastus, and, later, Straton be explained.

Doubtless these repeated lectures departed from the original in very different degrees. Their fidelity would be almost in inverse proportion to the originality of the lecturer. As far as we can judge from the remaining works of Theophrastus, he was a good deal more than

[1] De Fin. iv. 28.

a mere repeater and cautious editor. Yet Cicero, speaking probably of some works which are now lost to us, attributes to him a close following of the Aristotelian matter, and Galen seems rarely if ever to find any difference in doctrine between them.

With Eudemus the case is different; with him we find not new treatises following the lines of Aristotle, but merely repetitions of Aristotle's works with a certain amount of verbal alteration, and possibly occasionally a modest suggestion of criticism. Near as the Eudemian Ethics seem to the Nicomachean, as far as we can judge the Eudemian Physics were yet nearer. The suggestion of Fritzsche that Simplicius only quotes the passages in which Eudemus agrees with Aristotle, omitting those in which he varies from him, is hardly worthy of serious discussion. The differences to an intelligent editor, like Simplicius, or those from whom he copies, would have been far more important and likely to be noticed than the resemblances. Further, the very words of Simplicius with regard to Eudemus, *ὁ γνησιώτατος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων*, suggest quite as easily and naturally a faithful reproducer[1], as a disciple who merely faithfully follows the general lines laid down by his master. The theory that the Eudemian Ethics is in fact intended as an explanation of difficulties of the Nicomachean, is contradicted by the most cursory reading of the two treatises. That there should be occasional explanations is well in accordance with the theory I have stated. One perhaps is rather surprised to find how few these explanations are, and how often what is easy in the Nicomachean Ethics becomes difficult in the Eudemian. Some of these extra difficulties are no doubt due to the greater corruption of the text, but on the most favourable view the book could never

[1] Simplicius in Physica, p. 93 *b*, l. 36.

have been intended as a systematic exegesis of the earlier work; still less is it an original treatise following out the same general lines. As to the Eudemian Ethics, Spengel very well remarks, 'Wer immer diese Eudemia geschrieben hat, er konnte sich nicht einbilden ein eigenes Werk zu geben; es ist keine weitere Ausführung und Begründung des ursprünglich Gegebenen, kein historischer Commentar, wie ihn Theophrastus zu Aristoteles περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν lieferte, ein Werk, welches zeigt, was in jener Zeit für das Verständniss der Schriften des Meisters geleistet werden konnte, mitunter auch wirklich geleistet worden ist; es ist die Darlegung desselben Stoffes in Anderer Form, wie entstanden, vermögen wir bei dem Mangel aller nähern Kenntniss der Schule nicht nachzuweisen[1].' Now I hold that, so far from this Eudemian work being abnormal or difficult of explanation, it exactly represents that which went on yearly in the Lyceum, at all times except when a man of real originality like Theophrastus occupied the professorial chair. Straton probably followed much more closely in the steps of Eudemus than in those of Theophrastus, though, by a gradual process of change, each successive lecturer would probably be a step further from the real Aristotle. This doctrine of course assumes that the autograph lectures of Aristotle were not in the possession of the School, but this I think is sufficiently clear both from the facts which we actually know about the successive Peripatetic teachers, and from any reasonable explanation we may give of the Skepsis story. Whether there ever did exist autographs of these lectures, or merely careful and generally accurate notes, we have no means of determining. The former is perhaps the more probable theory *à priori*, the latter would more easily account for the free way in which Aristotle's immediate successors

[1] Spengel, Aristotelische Studien, i. 12–13.

(Theophrastus, etc.) seem to have treated the master's works or lectures.

As to the Skepsis story itself. The full understanding of it can only be arrived at when, having first made up our minds as to what we mean by Aristotelian 'Books,' we compare the stories of Strabo and Athenaeus (for Plutarch in fact adds nothing[1]) with the evidence which we have *aliunde* as to the existence of Aristotelian works and the continuity of the Aristotelian school, between the times of Theophrastus and of Cicero. The account of Strabo presents one obvious peculiarity. In the first part of his statement he talks not of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, but of their libraries; that is, apparently, their collections of the books of other people. In the second part we are told that the descendants of Neleus after a long interval sold the 'books' of Aristotle and Theophrastus to Apellicon of Teos. These 'books' might of course only mean the libraries, but the remainder of the story assumes that they were the writings of these authors. In this there is of course no necessary contradiction, but there is at least a suggestion of some confusion. When Strabo goes on to state that meanwhile the Peripatetic school were greatly at a loss for want of authentic works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, possessing only a few and those chiefly the exoteric, the statement at first blush seems so absurd and impossible that one cannot wonder that many editors have rejected it as utterly false. Was it likely that Theophrastus, the successor of Aristotle and the inheritor of the glory of his school, should leave that school entirely bereft of the instruments by which alone it could maintain its position, nay rather its bare existence? Moreover, if real books of

[1] Strabo, xiii. p. 608–9 Cas.; Plutarch, Sulla, xxvi; Athenaeus, 3 *a–b* and 214 *a–f*.

Aristotle existed, would not the successors of Theophrastus, Straton, or Eudemus have taken care to procure copies of these books before they parted with them? If the books were already in any sense published, there would have been no difficulty about this; if they were not, we must remember that Neleus himself was a Peripatetic, and is hardly likely to have refused to his fellow-disciples so simple a boon as the right to copy these precious volumes, a boon which involved no loss to himself, but an inestimable advantage to those to whom it was granted.

But putting aside these *à priori* considerations, let us turn to the external evidence. We have first that of Athenaeus, who deals directly with the same subject. In his first notice of the matter[1] he is talking of the magnificence of a certain Roman gentleman, Laurentius, who was appointed either Pontifex Maximus or Flamen Dialis by Marcus Antoninus, and how he had collected the books of a number of celebrated Greek authors, amongst others 'those of Aristotle and of Neleus who preserved Aristotle's books, from whom our king Ptolemy Philadelphus, having bought them all, put them together with those which he had bought from Athens and Rhodes and brought them to fair Alexandria.' Now it is of course quite probable that Ptolemy may have bought many other works besides those of Aristotle from Athens and Rhodes, but I think that the presumption here is that Athenaeus or his epitomator means us to understand that all the works to which the words quoted refer were those of Aristotle. We have in favour of this theory the story that Ptolemy son of Lagus sent an embassy to Theophrastus to buy books of him, and further, that Ptolemy Philadelphus possessed more than a thousand books or rolls of Aristotelian

[1] Athenaeus, i. 2 *b*–3 *b*.

works[1]. That the Alexandrian libraries were full of real or spurious Aristotelian works there can be no manner of doubt; nor further, that a number of these works reached these libraries within a comparatively few years after the death of Aristotle. Hermippus, the pupil of Kallimachus, the Alexandrian librarian, almost certainly inserted into his life of Aristotle a list of his works. In truth, the knowledge and love of Aristotle seem never to have failed at Alexandria, for we find that in the time of Caracalla there were Aristotelian clubs or *συσσίτια*, which there is no reason to suppose were of recent date, and which that extraordinary madman suppressed on the ground that Aristotle had conspired against Alexander, and that it was his duty to avenge the wrongs of his idol and model[2].

The other account given by Athenaeus seems to be in contradiction with that in the passage just quoted. Talking of the futile rising of the Athenians under Athenion, and the part taken therein by Apellicon as his lieutenant, he describes him as having originally been a philosopher of the Peripatetic school, as also was Athenion himself, and as having bought the library of Aristotle and many others[3]. This account is therefore in general agreement with that of Strabo, though, if it be taken as authentic, it throws some doubt upon the ignorance of Apellicon, which makes a point in Strabo's story. The question then which we have to deal with is this: Are the two accounts which go under the name of Athenaeus in any way reconcileable? I think that they are absolutely reconcileable, with the exception of a single word. It cannot

[1] Scholl. Arist. 22[a]. 12. Cf. also on his sending to Theophrastus, Diog. Laer. v. 37; on his love of Aristotle, Ammon. in Aristot. Cat. f. 10 *a*. (ed. Ven. 1545).

[2] Dio Cassius, lxxvii. 7.

[3] Athenaeus, 214 *d–e*.

be true that Ptolemy Philadelphus bought *all* the books of Aristotle from Neleus, unless indeed we understand that the books so bought were not the originals but merely copies. We may indeed perhaps conjecture that the exact reverse was the case; that of some at least of the Aristotelian works Ptolemy bought the originals, returning accurate copies to the owners, a plan which we know he adopted in some of his other book-dealing transactions. But here we are getting beyond the limits of tangible history into the cloudland of conjecture.

What was the nature of the two sales to Alexandria, that of Theophrastus and that of Neleus? I should conjecture that the books sold in the first instance were those which were already in publishable form, the Dialogues and Historical Works. Neleus very possibly added a certain number of the collected notes, putting them together into some kind of books; but of course it is quite equally probable that the whole story of the sale of books by Neleus to Ptolemy arises from an attempt of the epitomator to combine the well-known story of the sale by Theophrastus with the belief which probably by his time was common, that Theophrastus left all his Aristotelian books to Neleus. The substitution of Neleus' name for that of Theophrastus would seem the most obvious way out of the difficulty.

What we are most chiefly concerned with is the question as to what was taken by Neleus to Skepsis, and what was left to his Peripatetic brethren. I believe that the statement of Strabo that what he left was chiefly exoteric, though certainly not true in the ordinary sense, contains at least an element of truth. If our theory be right that the Dialogues and at least some of the historical works were published during or soon after Aristotle's lifetime, while the rest of his lectures were left in the form of notes, either his own or those of his pupils, it will lead us,

I believe, to an easy solution of the whole question, and one which is in accordance with all the known facts.

I hold it as indisputable that at the time of the death of Theophrastus a regular curriculum of lectures was organised, in which all or most of the subjects treated of by the master himself were dealt with in due course, to a great extent in Aristotle's own words, but with considerable latitude of addition and criticism allowed to each lecturer. It is most unlikely that only the president of the school was permitted to give such lectures. All the surviving disciples of the master who had persevered in philosophy would assist the president, either as lecturers, or at least as privat-docents. Each of these would have his notes for his own course or courses, both those of the lectures which he had heard from Aristotle, and those which he was in the custom of delivering himself. If then Theophrastus at his death bequeathed to Neleus both his own and Aristotle's library (which, as it was collected to a great extent by his own labour and expense, he had a perfect right to bequeath to whom he would) and also his own private notes of his own and of Aristotle's lectures, no great apparent loss was inflicted upon the school as a whole. The lectures went on as usual, each lecturer giving his own version of the Aristotelian doctrine, and each probably believing and trying to get his pupils to believe that his was the most correct version of the master's thought, or at all events that it differed only from that thought by reason of certain valuable additions and corrections of the teacher's own invention. In such a state of things the loss of Theophrastus' notes would not be greatly observed or regretted. It would no doubt have been an entirely different matter had the notes so bequeathed away been Aristotle's own autographs, but we have already observed that it does not

seem likely that Tyrannion and Andronicus believed that they had the absolute handwritings of Aristotle before them; while the story is all against any recopying of the documents during the time of their stay at Skepsis; and although Apellicon undoubtedly had the manuscripts rearranged and recopied, it is not at all likely that he would have destroyed a single scrap of what he believed to be Aristotle's own handwriting. Apellicon lived in an age when libraries had been long established, and when the value of autographs was fully understood. He is much more likely to have forged Aristotelian autographs than to have destroyed any which he really possessed.

The fact that no really published works of Aristotle were lost to the school meanwhile, may be inferred from what we know of those of Theophrastus. The story makes precisely the same assertion about his works as about those of Aristotle, but we know well that his works were popular, much commented on, and much attacked during the whole time that they were supposed to be locked away out of all men's ken in the cellar at Skepsis. Hermippus, who probably gave a list of the Aristotelian writings, certainly did of those of Theophrastus [1]. Cicero mentions him over and over again as an author well known to all, and repeatedly attacked by the Stoics and Epicureans. If this be oblivion, what is knowledge?

It is to be noticed that Cicero himself, the friend of Tyrannion (who must all this time have been engaged with Andronicus on the new edition), is quite unaware of any new find of Aristotelian works, or that those which he has in his hands have only just been exhumed. Yet surely the Topics, De Caelo, Physics, and Problemata are not exoterica, whatever may be said of the Rhetoric, Nicoma-

[1] Cf. Scholiast, quoted in Note to Brandis' Aristotelis et Theophrasti Metaphysica, p. 323, ed. Berol. 1823.

chean Ethics and the article rather than treatise Περὶ τῆς ἐν ὕπνῳ μαντικῆς. Yet to all these works Cicero more or less definitely refers [1]. It is nothing to the point that these references may come only second or third hand, for, if that be the case, they must come even more necessarily from teachers who lived before the supposed resuscitation of Aristotle. A further passage, which at first sight might be taken as a confirmation of the Skepsis story in its barest form, is really a strong argument against it. The passage is worth quoting in its entirety. 'Cum enim mecum in Tusculano esses et in bibliotheca separatim uterque nostrum ad suum studium libellos, quos vellet, evolveret, incidisti in Aristotelis Topica quaedam, quae sunt ab illo plurimis libris explicata. Qua inscriptione commotus continuo a me eorum librorum sententiam requisisti. Quam tibi cum exposuissem, disciplinam inveniendorum argumentorum, ut sine ullo errore ad eam rationem via perveniremus ab Aristotele inventa, libris illis contineri; verecunde tu quidem, ut omnia, sed tamen ut facile cernerem te ardere studio, mecum, ut tibi illa traderem, egisti. Cum autem ego te non tam vitandi laboris mei causa, quam quod id tua interesse arbitrarer, vel ut eos per te ipse legeres, vel ut totam rationem a doctissimo quodam rhetore acciperes, hortatus essem; utrumque, ut ex te audiebam, es expertus. Sed a libris te obscuritas rejecit. Rhetor autem ille magnus haec, ut opinor, Aristotelica se ignorare respondit: quod quidem minime sum admiratus, eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum, qui ab ipsis philosophis praeter admodum paucos ignoretur. Quibus eo minus ignoscendum est, quod non modo rebus iis, quae ab illo dictae et inventae sunt, allici debuerint, sed dicendi quoque incre-

[1] Topics, Cic. Topica, passim. De Caelo and Physics, De Nat. Deor. ii. 15–16, Acad. Pri. ii. 37, 119–120. Problemata, Tusc. i. 33. Rhetoric, Orator, passim. Ethics, De Fin. ii. 11. 34, ii. 13. 40. Περὶ τῆς ἐν ὕπνῳ, De Divin. i. 38. 81, ii. 62. 128.

dibili quadam cum copia, tum etiam suavitate . . . Cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat partes, unam inveniendi alteram judicandi, utriusque princeps ut mihi videtur, Aristoteles fuit' (Topica, i. 1, etc.).

This quotation, in the first place, throws considerable doubt on the alleged second-hand nature of Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle. Apparently he at least has copies of some of his works in his library, and in another passage we find him calling on a friend to borrow some Commentarii Aristotelici[1]; but reserving this question for further discussion[2], let us pass on to the gist of the quotation. Cicero says that Aristotle is very little known either by rhetoricians or by philosophers, but he adds that the latter at least are hardly pardonable for their ignorance. Could these words have been written if the Aristotelian works had only just been rediscovered, and were not yet regularly published; for if a publication had recently taken place Cicero must surely have mentioned it here or elsewhere? But if we compare this passage with others we shall see that it is chiefly the philosophers of his own day whom he blames for their ignorance of Aristotle. Their predecessors, he thinks, were better acquainted with him. Thus Panaetius, though nominally a Stoic, 'had Aristotle always in his mouth[3],' while Epicurus attacked Aristotle in most contentious fashion[4], and an attack must imply at least a certain amount of knowledge; and one seems to detect certain echoes at least of Aristotelian doctrine in Epicurus' disciple Lucretius, such, for instance, as the allusion to the theory of *ἀντιπερίστασις*, which is carefully explained in the Aristotelian Physics[5], though we must admit that such supposed echoes must needs be uncertain, as these commonplaces of dispute were treated by philosopher after philosopher.

[1] De Fin. iii. 3. 10. [2] Chap. iii. pp. 53 sqq. [3] De Fin. iv. 28. 79.
[4] De Natura Deorum, i. 33. 93. [5] Cf. Lucretius, i. 370 sqq.

Having established that there was no general or complete ignorance of the works or doctrines of Aristotle in the period which elapsed between the death of Theophrastus and the purchase by Apellicon, let us return to the Aristotelian school at Athens possessed, as we shall hold, of certain published Aristotelian works, chiefly of a more popular character, and of courses of lectures which contained, or were believed to contain, the essentials of the more difficult Aristotelian doctrines. But the successors of the school were not great men like their predecessors. They probably altered less than the first generation of Aristotle's pupils had done, but their alterations would almost invariably have been mistakes. The unimportance, comparatively, of their own intentional alterations would have made it less likely that they should publish their lectures as new works, and so give them any degree of stability. Their interest would rather be that they should remain unpublished, since, if this publication took place, they would either have to prepare fresh lectures, for which perhaps they had neither ingenuity nor inclination, or to give up their teaching and their bread ; for by this time systematic teaching had become a regular paid profession at Athens. It would be during this period that the distinction between exoteric and esoteric teaching would have grown up, since the professors would naturally be very anxious that those of their notes which referred to subjects on which there were no authentic published treatises should not be divulged by their pupils—a sentiment which has not been altogether unknown to more modern occupants of professorial chairs. The principle was of course most strictly applied to the doctrines of Aristotle which were not yet made public, or rather to the courses of lectures which at that time represented those doctrines, and which would diverge a little further from the original with

each repetition, or at least with each fresh occupant of the professorial chair. The very fact of these doctrines being kept to some extent a secret would tend to the greater corruption of the text; for in the first place they would be copied by the professors themselves, or by trusted pupils, rather than by skilled professional copyists; and in the second place, as these lectures did not now profess to be reports of the words of Aristotle, but merely statements of his doctrine, verbal accuracy in the copying would be continually less esteemed. Meanwhile another change was coming over the school. Every philosophic school, if it wishes to preserve a sufficient body of adherents, must take its part in the philosophic jousts of the day; so that its subjects of teaching are to a great extent conditioned by those of contemporary educational associations; especially when those other associations have provoked the attention of the general public. This was precisely the case with the knot of professors at the Lyceum. They seem never to have been an extremely popular school, and no doubt were often at their wits' end to keep up their numbers in the face of the literary attractions of the three Academies, the caustic wit of some of the Pyrrhonist teachers (Timon, etc.), and the practical value of the Stoics' teaching. They could not therefore choose their battlefield, but were forced to accept that which their rivals had pitched upon. Analytic Logic, Scientific Procedure, First Philosophy, Psychology in its higher sense—all these had to be laid aside, and the Peripatetic teachers had to carry on the unequal fight in endless controversies as to the Summum Bonum, and the Criterion of truth; the last a meaningless and insoluble question which Aristotle himself always passes over with truly royal contempt.

But the worst was not yet. Gradually the Peripatetics, who were provided by their master with the most perfect

instrument for scientific argument which the human intellect has yet invented, were compelled by the general usage of those around them to lay aside their glorious apodictic syllogism for the contentiously effective, but scientifically sterile form of the hypothetical. The only courses which were likely to attract hearers were the ethical and the dialectical. For the latter, as it was then understood, the greater part of their master's logical system was absolutely useless, and we are no longer astonished at Cicero's statement that the Peripatetics failed in Dialectic [1]. The two parts of the whole Aristotelian curriculum which remained of much practical use to them were the Ethical writings and the Topics. The lectures on the other parts of the course were either discontinued or performed in a perfunctory fashion, and the notes of earlier professors on these more recondite matters remained on the shelves of the Lyceum library at the mercy of worms and dust. Some perhaps were altogether lost; others were saved from further corruption just by the fact that they were not further used. The Topics, as they were possessed by these later Aristotelians, must have been much mutilated and interpolated. It is a significant fact that Cicero, starting from the statement that he is going to explain the Aristotelian Topics, when treating of Syllogism, gives only the Stoical or Hypothetical form [2].

One great man was worthy and willing to be an interpreter of the philosopher at least on the political side. Polybius is a warm admirer of Aristotle as he knows him, and defends him indignantly against a contemptible libeller. In his account of the Lokrian history and constitution he goes into a considerable digression on the subject of an attack which Timaeus of Tauromenium had made upon the veracity of Aristotle with regard, as it appears, to a story

[1] De Fin. iii. 12. 41.

[2] Cicero, Topica, passim.

told by the latter in his Politeae. Polybius says first (xii. 5) that Aristotle's account is in accordance with the tradition of the place; secondly, that Timaeus' mistake does not arise from ignorance but from zeal to defend the Lokrians from a story not very agreeable to their dignity (cap. 7); thirdly, (cap. 8) that Aristotle's story is in itself the more probable; fourthly, that Timaeus, in order to justify his virulent assault on Aristotle, ought to prove that Aristotle's story about the Lokrians was due to some favour, spite, or mercenary motive. 'Since, however, no one would dare to make such an assertion, we must admit,' says he, 'that those who use such bitter and scurrilous language are in grave error.' He then quotes part of Timaeus' libellous attack, and ends up by saying that is absolutely beneath the dignity of history (cap. 9). When we turn, however, to other parts of Polybius' great work, we find sufficiently clear proof that he was not acquainted with at least one treatise which would have interested him most deeply. In the sixth book, before he begins his admirable account of the Roman constitution, he gives a general sketch of what he believes to be the history of the succession of constitutions in cases where they are not interfered with by external causes. He prefaces his discussion by stating that Plato and some other philosophers have already perhaps treated more accurately of the succession of constitutions (vi. 5). But that their treatises are elaborate and within the ken of very few people. He will, therefore, give a more general and summary exposition of the whole subject. He forthwith developes his own theory, which is that the true order of succession is Kingdom, Tyranny, Aristocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy and Ochlocracy or Cheirocracy, Mob-law and Fist-law[1]. Now it is noticeable that this order is very far removed from that of Plato, the only theorist on the sub-

[1] Polyb. vi. 7–9.

ject whom he actually names. On the other hand, it is exactly identical with the account given in the first book of the treatise Περὶ φιλίας (Eth. Nic. viii. 12), if we assume that the treatment there is intended to be historical. Of course one is naturally inclined to think that this cannot be the case, in face of the very severe condemnation passed upon Plato in the Politics [v. (viii.) 12. 1316 *a*. 1] for assuming a regular order of changes. But in the first place it is not quite inconceivable that even Aristotle should have been inconsistent with himself in different works; and in the second place there is considerable reason for imagining that the actual working up of these two books is due rather to an able pupil than to the master himself[1]. If we look at the actual words of the chapter in question, there is a good deal in favour of the theory that the author intended the succession at least from each member of the opposed pairs to its opposite to be historical. Μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· . . . . ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακίᾳ τῶν ἀρχόντων . . . . ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται[2]. If we combine these expressions with the well-known Aristotelian doctrine that a kingdom was only possible in an early stage of society, and that the only 'pure' form suitable for highly developed states, though not in itself the best, was πολιτεία or τιμοκρατία we shall get connecting links also between the pairs, and shall thus have a historical or quasi-historical order represented by the following diagram, in




[1] Cf. chap. vii, pp. 142 sqq.

[2] viii. 12. 1160 *b*. 10–17.

which the lengths of the upright lines represent the distance in point of excellence of each pair of opposites, and the zigzag line taken as a whole represents the historical development.

Now this is precisely the same as the order given by Polybius, with the exception that he gives the name Democracy to that which Aristotle calls Timocracy or Politeia. It seems to me, therefore, likely that he had seen either the chapter or quotations from it. On the other hand, it is most unlikely that he had seen it definitely ascribed to Aristotle or to any well-known author. Had he done so, surely he who mentions Plato, whom he does not follow, would mention also Aristotle, whom he does, and who, as we have already seen, was known to and esteemed by him. That Polybius did not know the Aristotelian Politics is, I think, distinctly proveable, for in these chapters there are many passages where an allusion to the book, had he known it, would have been almost certain. Thus, for instance, he talks in chapter iii of the excellence of the Spartan constitution as consisting of its just mixture of three forms, making the remark quite as an original one; so too just below he points out that there are many forms to be found under each of the three heads; very much in the same way as Aristotle had done before him. If we are to consider Polybius as a vulgar plagiarist, we shall say that these proofs are rather in favour of than against his having read the Aristotelian work; but the nature of the man, and his constant habit of naming his authorities when he is quoting from authors of any reputation, make it much more probable that he considers himself to be inventing or else using notions which were generally in the air, certainly not copying the ideas of a well-known philosopher. One or two minor facts tend in the same direction. Thus Polybius, like Aristotle, describes the extreme form

of oligarchy which is already nodding to its downfall, but he has no apt name to give it. If he did not scruple to take so much from Aristotle he certainly would not have stopped short at appropriating that most happy name δυναστεία for describing this state of things. Again, he does not allude to Aristotle's contemptuous treatment of what he (Aristotle) conceives to be the Platonic doctrine of the cyclical revolution of constitutions, which Polybius himself adopts. Yet surely if he knew of this work of Aristotle, and esteemed it so much as to follow it in many details, he would not state a theory which is scornfully dismissed in this very work without making some attempt to substantiate it.

The result then which we arrive at is this: that Polybius knows Aristotle's Politeae under that philosopher's name; that he may very possibly know the two books Περὶ φιλίας, but probably does not know them as Aristotelian; that he almost certainly does not know the Politics.

How much or how little of Aristotle assailants like Epicurus and Chrysippus may have known, we have no means of judging. But it is to be noticed generally that far too much is made of the silence as to Aristotle in the two centuries immediately succeeding his death. As a matter of fact, almost all the books in which he would be at all likely to be mentioned are lost. The silence is not that of authors who pass over Aristotle, but the absolute silence of a vast desert of thought, beneath whose sands we know not what may lie buried.

Let us now turn back for a moment to Egypt, and see what has been happening there during these centuries. Alexandria is throughout this time the chief centre of intellectual activity, but it is the activity of the grammarian and the philologist rather than that of the philosopher. The Egyptian kings are for ever anxious to fill their

magnificent libraries, but quantity rather than quality is the thing aimed at. It is the age of literary forgeries; and a brisk trade in them goes on between Athens and Alexandria. At a very early period all the authentic works of Aristotle, which were in any sense published, would have found their way to the latter city. There were, as I have shown, strong reasons against sending to Alexandria any notes which might remain of the esoteric works (I use the word as Peripatetic, though certainly not Aristotelian). The forgers therefore would naturally have fallen back upon dialogues, and, what were still more easy to counterfeit, ἱστορίαι. Second-rate and fourth-rate collections of observations were doubtless fathered upon Aristotle, and, in addition to these, any amount of lives of preceding philosophers; among the latter seem to have been works on almost every thinker of note[1]. It seems also that logical works, real and forged, found their way in great profusion to Alexandria. I am inclined to think that all our present logical treatises were to be found in the Alexandrian libraries, and that they in all probability did not form a tithe of the whole logical collection which there passed under the name of Aristotle. Probably also the Politics, and possibly parts of the physical treatises, were to be found there[2].

We have thus in the time immediately preceding the find of the Aristotelian library at Skepsis, and the suddenly aroused interest in Aristotle at Rome, the following state of affairs. The Peripatetic school existing at Athens, and possessing in its library a large number of collections of notes of very various antiquity, some mounting up almost or quite to the time of Aristotle, some comparatively recent, but none of very certain authority; a certain

[1] Cf. later, chap. iv, on the list of Diogenes, pp. 85 sqq.

[2] Chap. v, pp. 109 sqq.

small number of works attributed to Aristotle, early published, and still remaining in circulation (chiefly dialogues and the Politeae); and the libraries of Alexandria teeming with works attributed to Aristotle, of which only a very small proportion were genuine.

# CHAPTER III.

## CICERO AND THE ROMAN RENAISSANCE.

WHAT exactly was it that Apellicon, Tyrannion, and Andronicus respectively did for Aristotle? I think the answer to this question is to be gathered from the conclusions we arrived at in the last chapter.

Apellicon priding himself upon his already acquired Peripatetic knowledge, and probably aided by his friends of the Athenian Peripatetic school, tried to remedy the raids of worms and damp, by piecing the newly acquired treasures with the best of the notes on the parallel courses of lectures which were to be found in the Lyceum library. Possibly in some cases he had two versions of the same lectures in the store of books unearthed from Skepsis, since this store is said to have contained the library of Theophrastus, as well as that of Aristotle. In such a case he would probably have preferred to use the Skepsis books, as of higher authority, but I doubt much whether this resource was open to him in the majority of cases, since often the piecing has been done with books later than the probable date of the departure of Neleus. This piecing as a rule seems to have been performed on the principle of parsimony, inserting from the supposed less trustworthy source only what seemed necessary to fill in a gap in the Skepsis MSS.; but it was done with the most absolute absence of judgment, and probably done in a hurry, for Apellicon himself must have been greatly occupied about this time with his political adventures.

Apparently, when a MS. had been so pieced as to make something like sense, it was recopied, and the original destroyed or at least neglected. This would be true both of the Skepsis MSS., and still more of the notes preserved in the Lyceum library; since the former would probably be illegible, and the latter would be considered of very inferior authority to the now joint production, which no doubt followed the Skepsis MSS. wherever that was possible. The MSS. which were attributed to definite authors would have a fairer chance of preservation than those which were anonymous; but, the moment that this conglomerate edition was accepted as the Textus Receptus of the prime doctrines of the Peripatetic school, all the other versions of this doctrine were doomed to destruction, and they would vanish exactly in proportion as larger excerpts from them were included in this Textus Receptus, or again as they corresponded more nearly with it in argument and phraseology. To both these causes I attribute the gradual but almost entire disappearance of Theophrastus and Eudemus. The Characters of Theophrastus which remain to us give no exception to this rule, for in them Theophrastus is really working at an original line, and, as we may fairly believe, has no exact Aristotelian prototype, and something like this is true of what remains to us of his physiological works. The fact of the existence of a single form for the three books which seem common to the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics is, as I shall attempt to show, a very characteristic instance of the working of the second cause [1].

When Sulla swept down upon Apellicon and his intrigues, and carried off to Rome his library, which, besides the books he had bought from Skepsis, would doubtless contain either originals or copies of the chief MSS. from the

[1] Chap. vii, p. 160.

Lyceum library[1], the whole store was, according to Strabo's story, handed over to Tyrannion, himself a leading man of the Peripatetic sect, and a friend of literary Romans. He may possibly have belonged to that Neapolitan branch of the Peripatetics, of whose existence we learn through Cicero (De Finibus, v. 75). He, apparently, joined with himself Andronicus of Rhodes, who perhaps devoted himself chiefly to the work of commenting and investigating the authority of the works as a whole, while Tyrannion spent his attention chiefly on the condition of the actual text. A great deal of the work which these learned men would have to perform would be the pruning away of the excrescences and more obvious repetitions caused by the clumsy patching of Apellicon and his associates. They may possibly also have used the less doubtful works contained in the Alexandrian libraries, copies of which would at that period not have been difficult of attainment. But their chief work, or at least that of Andronicus, would have been the establishing of a canon of what might be considered as legitimately Aristotelian works, in the sense of being traceable back to within a few years of his time, and of fairly representing his doctrine. Probably by far the greater part, if not all, of the works found at Skepsis already existed in some form either at Athens or Alexandria. What the Skepsis MSS. enabled these scholars to perform was the work of exclusion of spurious books; or, at least, of those whose authenticity could not be established. The πίνακες of Andronicus were, as I hold, intended to perform a work rather negative than positive, and represented a canon which, though considerably wider than the

[1] We must remember always that Athenion and Apellicon were the leaders and patrons of the Peripatetic sect. It is possible, though not proved, that the Peripatetics generally may have been involved in their ruin and may also have had the Lyceum library confiscated and carried off to Rome.

works now remaining to us, was considerably nearer to our present list than to that of Diogenes [1]. As it was with Andronicus, so probably was it with Tyrannion, assuming for the moment that it was he who chiefly concerned himself with the rehabilitation of the text. In the joint or conglomerate MS. manufactured by Apellicon, he would lop off what was obviously exuberant. In the treatises which were already in general circulation he would be able in many cases to cut out interpolations by comparing the existent copies with the purer text of the Skepsis MSS. I am inclined to think that in some cases at least the MS. which Cicero uses is not the corrected text of Tyrannion, but the corrupt recension which that corrected text supplanted. That Cicero's Rhetoric of Aristotle is substantially the same as ours no one can doubt, nor, I think, can any reasonable person dispute that this book at least he read first-hand ; yet he often gives us passages which differ from the originals, as we now have them, by what seem absolutely unnecessary additions. Of course these additions may possibly be Cicero's own, but they certainly look as if they were statements of what he found in his text. Thus in the De Oratore (iii. 47. 182–183) he gives us correctly Aristotle's statement of the uses of metrical feet in speaking, and of his preference for the Paean, as also his distinction between the two kinds of Paean (Ar. Rhet. iii. 8. 3–6), but he adds in the middle, 'In quo [in heroo] impune progredi licet duos dumtaxat pedes, aut paullo plus ne plane in versum aut similitudinem versuum incidamus.' The only words of Aristotle which bear at all on this point are those in the third section, Διὸ ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μή· ποίημα γὰρ ἔσται. Ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται, ἐὰν μέχρι τοῦ ᾖ [2]. Now it is of course quite possible that the 'duos dumtaxat pedes, aut paullo plus' may be a gloss of

[1] Cf. chap. iv, p. 89.

[2] p. 1408 *b*. 30.

Cicero's on the μέχρι τοῦ of Aristotle, but it looks more as if there had been some such gloss in the text with which Cicero is working. From a single such instance one can of course infer nothing, but there seem to be a good many of the same nature. Combining this fact with Cicero's absolute ignorance of any important change in the position of the Aristotelian philosophy which has just taken place, I should be inclined to guess that the edition of Tyrannion and Andronicus was the work of a lifetime, or rather of such portions of a life as a man like Tyrannion, who was so much occupied with other literary work, could give to his own pet subject, and that very probably a considerable portion of the edition was unpublished while Cicero was writing. I think it is also quite clear that Tyrannion himself did not give his work forth to the world as a rediscovery of Aristotle, but merely as a corrected text of works the majority of which at least were known in some form to the Peripatetics themselves, and some of them also to the external world. Cicero must have had within his reach, either in his own library or in those of his friends, a large number of treatises claiming to be Aristotelian. He apparently at one time played with the idea of translating both Plato and Aristotle[1]. He was intimate not only with Tyrannion but with other Aristotelians[2]; yet he has no notion of that which would have been, were Strabo's version an accurate one, a complete revolution in the fortunes of the sect. That the find of Skepsis was very important to the possibility of satisfactory study of Aristotle is undoubted; that it had much to do with the revival of interest in Aristotelian doctrines and literature is I think improbable.

For this revival I think we must look chiefly to the influence of the champions of the New Learning, specially

[1] De Fin. i. 3. 7. [2] Tusc. iii. 10. 22

to Cicero and his friend Atticus. Peripateticism was in fact in its practical nature rather Roman than Greek, in its many-sided interests and detached standpoint more cosmopolitan than either. Of course its primary attraction to Cicero himself was in its thoroughly practical and scientific treatment both of rhetoric proper and of the general art of controversy, but he had also much interest in its scientific procedure and minute questionings, especially such as told upon the psychological peculiarities of man. Besides the Rhetoric, which he had at his fingers' ends, and the Topics, some parts of which at least he knew, he quotes in the De Divinatione i. 38. 81 a statement which seems to have been got by putting together two passages from the Parva Naturalia. His words are, 'Aristoteles quidem eos etiam qui valetudinis vitio furerent, et melancholici dicerentur, censebat habere aliquid in animo praesagiens atque divinum.' This doctrine may be elicited by combining Aristotle's Divinatio per Somnum 2. 463 *b.* 15 with De Somno 3. 457 *a.* 27. The first passage explains how the dreams even of inferior men may be in some way prophetic, and says that Nature herself is λάλος καὶ μελαγχολική; the second shows the physical connection of μελαγχολία with light sleep, which is the state most favourable for dreams. It is possible that the passage in Cicero refers only to the former of these passages, but I think it more probable that he had both of them in his head. In the same way we have a good many references to observations of Aristotle as to the habits of birds and beasts, besides the general statement of his compass of learning, which accords fairly well with the books contained in our canon[1]. It matters not a whit whether Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle was accurate or inaccurate, first-hand or filtered through many minds. His merit is that he pointed him out to his fellow-Romans as a great storehouse of

[1] De Fin. v. 4. 9 sqq.

scientific knowledge, as a master of style (illustris et splendida oratio; Flumen aureum fundens; uberrimus, etc.), and as a teacher of definite doctrine as well as of sublimity of thought.

But Cicero, though he is the best known, is by no means the only illustrious Roman of the day who devoted himself to Aristotelian literature. In the De Oratore[1], Sulpicius, one of the interlocutors, says to Cassius the orator, 'I need neither your beloved Aristotle nor Carneades.' Lucullus has apparently a more perfect collection than Cicero[2]. For the Roman, Aristotle already has a place of his own, different from, but perhaps hardly lower than that occupied by Plato, who for all Greeks who have not come under Roman influence is, and will still remain absolutely without a rival in the kingdom of thought.

From this time forward we find that Rome is the centre of Aristotelian culture, as Athens is of Platonic. All the great scholars of Aristotle in the first two or three centuries either are real Roman citizens like Flavius Boethus, or have taken up their abode in Rome like Andronicus, Tyrannion, and Galen. Aristotle from henceforth is the Doctor of the Latins. Even when the knowledge of Greek has vanished from them, they keep up a glimmering knowledge of him through the later sixth century versions and commentaries of Boethius (himself, like his almost namesake, a person of distinction in the political as well as in the philosophical world). Aristotle moves eastward into Greece only when the seat of Roman empire is transferred. If he himself was only a half-Greek, as some German scholars have asserted, Greece herself never fully understood the glory she might acquire by claiming the doubtful maternity, while the western races, and specially those of

[1] De Oratore, iii. 36. 147.

[2] De Fin. iii. 3. 10.

Latin blood, have from the first without hesitation or grudging adopted Aristotle as a spiritual forefather.

To turn to the absolute evidence as to Aristotle's works which we can extract out of Cicero. We are met at the outset by a considerable difficulty. Aristotle, or the immediate disciples of Aristotle, treated the same matters in several different forms. Thus all or most of the questions raised in the Ethics, Metaphysics, and De Animâ seem also to have been treated of under the form of Dialogues, sometimes apparently at considerably greater length than in the treatises[1] which we now possess. If then we find allusions in Cicero or any other comparatively early author to doctrines which we now find embodied in this or that Aristotelian treatise, we have no right to assume absolutely that Cicero possessed that treatise, unless we have a perfectly recognisable quotation, or a definite statement as to the treatise from which Cicero is drawing his information. Now the moment we are off the sure ground of the Rhetoric, which Cicero quotes not once or twice, but more than a score of times, we are met by this difficulty, and in many cases it is quite impossible to escape from it. Thus though Cicero refers very definitely to the Aristotelian Topics, and talks about their value and difficulties, yet the most definite allusion to Aristotle's doctrine in the Ciceronian Topics is to a point now only to be found in the treatise which we call the De Interpretatione[2]. In the same way the statements as to Aristotle's attacks on the ideal theory of Plato may possibly refer to some books of the Metaphysics, but equally possibly to the Dialogue Περὶ φιλοσοφίας. So too what Cicero tells us in the Acad. Post. (i. 7. 26) as to the πέμπτον σῶμα, which he repeats also in the Tusc. Disp.

[1] Cf. De Rep. iii. 8. 12.

[2] 'Itaque hoc idem Aristoteles σύμβολον appellat quod Latine est nota,' Cic. Topica, viii. 35; Aristot. De Interp. 2. 16 *a*. 27; id. 14. 24 *b*. 2.

(i. 10. 22), may refer to the Aristotelian doctrine as expressed in the De Caelo, while the last part of the second passage seems to refer to the eighth book of the Physics, and the twelfth of the Metaphysics (the notion, that is, of an intellect always existing ἐντελεχείᾳ, and in some way the cause of all motion); on the other hand, the citations may very well be taken from dialogues, or may indeed come from commonplace-books, or be repeated through other authors. Besides the Rhetoric and Topics, Cicero cites definitely an historical work on orators and their methods, in one book[1], perhaps the τεχνῶν συναγωγή of Diogenes' list (though, as I shall show later, the argument from Diogenes to the later list is extremely doubtful), also the Dialogues, the Eudemus[2], the Περὶ δικαιοσύνης[3], the Nerinthus[4], and (probably) that entitled Περὶ φιλοσοφίας[5]. In this last quotation he mentions that he is citing the third book, and he also tells us as to the Rhetoric that it consisted of three books; as to the dialogue Περὶ δικαιοσύνης he says that it contains four great books. This agrees with the number given in Diogenes' list, and (though the fragment of Cicero which remains to us does not contain Aristotle's name) yet the reference is proved independently by a parallel quotation in Lactantius[6]. The passage is interesting as proving not only that the division into books is as old as Cicero, but also that the books were not of identical size, as has sometimes been imagined.

Cicero further mentions the Nicomachean Ethics (about which he makes the absurd mistake of attributing it to Nicomachus[7]), but though he is well acquainted with the general outlines of the Peripatetic system of morals, and

[1] De Oratore, ii. 38. 160. [2] De Divin. i. 25. 53. [3] De Rep. iii. 8. 12.
[4] Tusc. Disp. v. 35. 101. Cf. Bernays, Dialog. Arist. p. 84.
[5] De Nat. Deorum, i. 13. 33.
[6] Lactantius, Inst. v. 14 and 17. Quoted by Bernays, Dialog. Arist. p. 152.
[7] Cicero, De Finibus, v. 5. 12.

alludes to them very frequently, there is no single statement of his which can be certainly referred to the Nicomachean Ethics, nor which even proves that he had read the book. The nearest approach to a quotation is perhaps to be found in the De Finibus ii. 11. 33, where Cicero says, 'Bestiarum vero nullum judicium puto, quamvis enim depravatae non sint pravae tamen esse possunt. Ut bacillum aliud est inflexum, et incurvatum de industria, aliud ita natum; sic ferarum natura non est illa quidem depravata mala disciplina, sed natura sua; nec vero ut voluptatem expetat natura movet infantem,' etc., where there seems to be an allusion to Eth. Nic. vii. 7. 1149 *b*. 27[1]. If this be in truth the case, it is curious as showing that these doubtful books were known to Cicero, though he does not here make an allusion to the Nicomachean Ethics. On the other hand, he so frequently alludes to Aristotle's moral doctrines, and always in such very vague terms, that I think that as far as the Ethics is concerned Madvig's[2] conclusion is irresistible that Cicero's knowledge of these works is entirely second-hand. It is true Cicero states (De Finibus, v. 5) that Aristotle has a somewhat different doctrine as to the Summum Bonum in the exoterical works and in his commentaries; but the assumption that the Nicomachean Ethics is un-Aristotelian does not suggest a very careful study of it, and there is no allusion to any definite doctrine contained therein, as there is with regard to the book of

[1] *"Ωσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν [ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι] ἀνθρωπικαί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἔλαττον δὲ [κακόν, Rassow] θηριότης κακίας φοβερώτερον δέ. οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει.* De Finibus ii. 6. 19 is possibly a reference to Eth. Nic. i. 7–10.

[2] Madvig, De Finibus, Excursus vii.

Theophrastus with which it is connected. It seems, however, from the expression 'cujus (Nicomachi) accurate scripti de moribus libri,' that Cicero would have referred the Nicomachean Ethics, by whomever written, to the class of commentaries rather than to that of exoteric writings, so that (according to the statement that Aristotle himself wrote both commentaries and exoteric treatises on morals) there must have been existent at least two other ethical writings ascribed to Aristotle; one at least of an esoteric character, and one of the more formal expositions which Cicero calls commentaries. The latter may possibly have been our Eudemian Ethics, which in almost all the earlier writers are attributed to Aristotle; but there does not seem to exist even in the extended list of Diogenes any single dialogue covering the field of Ethics generally. The probability seems to be that the whole of Cicero's opening statement is a mere rhetorical flourish with no precise reference.

Besides these direct references to Aristotelian works there are a considerable number of passages which are said to be quoted from Aristotle, but whereof the book cited is not mentioned. Very few of these, with the exception of the frequent quotations from the Rhetoric[1], refer to Aristotelian works now known to us. A great proportion of them seem to come from Dialogues or popular works. Of this nature is the metaphor quoted in the De Natura Deorum, ii. 37. 95, as to the condition of people living inside the earth who had only heard by report of the wonders of the exterior world and the power of the Gods, who were then led up through the opened gates of the earth. This passage, like many others, justifies Rose's remark that the majority of fragments attributed to Aristotle are very Platonic in their form and doctrine, for

[1] Orator and De Oratore, passim.

here we seem to have a distinct imitation of the Platonic myth of the cave. The citation itself Bernays, with considerable probability, refers to the Dialogue Περὶ φιλοσοφίας[1].

In a fragment which remains to us of the Hortensius, 'Aristotle,' says Cicero, 'compares our souls to the victims of Etruscan pirates, who are slain by them with deliberate cruelty; whose live bodies are attached to corpses; even so are our souls attached to the corpses of our bodies.' The idea is a trite one enough in later Roman times, and is repeated by Epictetus, with perhaps a slight improvement, in his celebrated phrase, ψυχάριον εἶ βαστάζον νεκρόν. It may possibly have been original in Aristotle, and if so we should probably consider it as an improvement on the Platonic idea in the Cratylus that σῶμα is σῆμα ψυχῆς, but Bernays does not seem to have very strong evidence as to its derivation from the dialogue Eudemus[2]. There is also a passage in the De Officiis[3] which seems to be a quotation from an Aristotelian dialogue: 'Quanto Aristoteles gravius et verius nos reprehendit qui has pecuniarum effusiones non admiremur, quae fiunt ad multitudinem deleniendam. Ait enim qui ab hoste obsidentur, si emere aquae sextarium mina cogerentur, hoc primo incredibile nobis videri, omnesque mirari; sed cum attenderint veniam necessitati dare, in his immanibus jacturis, infinitisque sumptibus nihil nos magnopere mirari; cum praesertim nec necessitati subveniatur, nec dignitas augeatur, ipsaque illa delenitio multitudinis sit ad breve exiguumque tempus; eaque a levissimo quoque; in quo tamen ipso una cum satietate memoria quoque moriatur voluptatis. Bene etiam colligit, haec pueris et mulierculis et servis et servorum simillimis liberis esse grata, gravi vero homini, et ea quae fiunt judicio

[1] Dialog. Arist. p. 107.

[2] Ib. p. 24.

[3] De Officiis, ii. 16. 56.

certo ponderanti probari nullo modo posse.' Here I think the style is evidently that of a dialogue, but I can find no one reputed Aristotelian title under which safely to place it.

Again, speaking of the letter of advice which he is trying to compose to Caesar, Cicero says to Atticus (Ad Att. xii. 40), '*συμβουλευτικὸν* saepe conor; nihil reperio; et equidem mecum habeo et *Ἀριστοτέλους* et *Θεοπόμπου πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον*: sed quid simile? Illi, et quae ipsis honesta essent scribebant et grata Alexandro. Ecquid tu ejusmodi reperis?' And later (Ad Att. xiii. 28), 'Nam quae sunt ad Alexandrum hominum eloquentium et doctorum suasiones, vides quibus in rebus versentur; adolescentem, incensum cupiditate verissimae gloriae, cupientem sibi aliquid consilii dari, quod ad laudem sempiternam valeret, cohortantur ad decus; non deest oratio.' This passage must certainly refer to the dialogue or letter *Περὶ βασιλείας*, or to that *Περὶ ἀποικιῶν*, or to both.

To the History of Animals there is probably an allusion in the De Finibus, iii. 19. 63, 'Ut enim in membris alia sunt tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adjuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic immanes quaedam bestiae sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pinna dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinnoteres vocatur, in eandemque cum se recepit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae, aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt.' We find in the History of Animals, v. 15, p. 547 *b*, 25, etc. a mention of the pinnoterae and of their conjunction with the pinnae and several other shell-fish.

Another longer passage[1] would also naturally be referred to the History of Animals or to some similar treatise, but no trace of it is to be found in our existing Aristotelian treatises. It relates a peculiarity of the flight of covies

[1] De Natura Deorum, ii. 49. 125.

of cranes, and runs as follows: 'Illud vero ab Aristotele animadversum, a quo pleraque, quis potest non admirari? Grues, cum loca calidiora petentes maria transmittunt, trianguli efficere formam; ejus autem summo angulo aer ab iis adversus pellitur; deinde sensim ab utroque latere, tamquam remis ita pinnis cursus avium levatur. Basis autem trianguli, quem grues efficiunt, ea tamquam a puppi ventis adjuvatur; haeque in tergo praevolantium colla et capita reponunt; quod quia ipse dux facere non potest, quia non habet ubi nitatur, revolat, ut ipse quoque quiescat. In ejus locum succedit ex iis, quae acquierunt, eaque vicissitudo in omni cursu conservatur.'

In the Brutus 12. 46 there is a passage which seems to be taken from the one book on the doctrines of preceding orators of which Cicero speaks in the De Oratore[1]: 'Itaque ait Aristoteles, cum, sublatis in Sicilia tyrannis, res privatae longo intervallo judiciis repeterentur, tum primum, quod erat acuta illa gens et controversa natura, artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse. Nam antea neminem solitum via nec arte, sed accurate tamen et de scripto plerosque dicere, scriptasque fuisse et paratas a Protagora rerum illustrium disputationes, quae nunc communes appellantur loci. Quod idem fecisse Gorgiam, cum singularium rerum laudes vituperationesque conscripsisset; quod judicaret hoc oratoris esse maxime proprium rem augere posse laudando, vituperandoque rursus affligere. Huic Antiphontem similia quaedam habuisse conscripta . . . Nam Lysiam primo profiteri solitum artem esse dicendi; deinde, quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus autem jejunior, orationes eum scribere aliis coepisse, artem removisse. Similiter Isocratem primo artem dicendi esse negavisse, scribere autem aliis solitum orationes, quibus in judiciis uterentur; sed, cum ex eo,

[1] De Oratore, ii. 38. 160.

quia quasi committeret contra legem, quo quis judicio circumveniretur, saepe ipse in judicium vocaretur, orationes aliis destitisse scribere, totumque se ad artes componendas transtulisse.' Now the facts as to Tisias, Theodorus, and Gorgias might be taken as a somewhat distorted version of the passage at the end of the Sophistici Elenchi[1], but we have there no mention of the other orators; and though these are all mentioned in the Rhetoric, yet these special facts are not recorded of them. I think moreover that it is clear that Cicero is quoting one connected passage, or at all events epitomizing a connected discourse. This can hardly be other than the historical work on orators; and here therefore we have another instance of a ἱστορία which has served as the basis of an Aristotelian scientific work.

Another long passage in the De Natura Deorum[2] gives an Aristotelian argument in favour of souls for the stars, and of their voluntary motion, which reminds us to some extent of the argument in Metaphysics xi. 8. pp. 1073 *b*–1074 *b*, but is certainly not taken directly from that treatise; neither do I see any reason for assuming with Bernays that it is part of a dialogue. The other passages which Cicero quotes, and which there is no good reason on other grounds to consider as extracted from Aristotelian dialogues, have far greater stylistic merit. The present passage is at once less popular in style, and more like in matter to the Aristotelian treatises to which we are accustomed. It contains the triplicate Aristotelian distinction φύσει, παρὰ φύσιν (=τύχῃ or ἀνάγκῃ), and ἀπὸ διανοίας (cf. Eth. Nic. iii. 5. 1112 *a*. 32), and the general observations which we find in the Physics and De Caelo; for still less can I agree with Rose in finding contradictions or even marked differences between the statements in this passage and those

[1] Sophistici Elenchi, 33, p. 183 *b*. 31–184 *a*. 8. [2] De Nat. Deorum, ii. 16.

in the latter Aristotelian work. I think therefore that we have got here a fragment either of Aristotle himself or of some author fully inspired with his idea, and probably even with his style, as we know it. The passage in the Tusculan Orations (i. 28. § 70), which states that Aristotle held that the stars were eternal a parte ante, may refer to this lost book, or to frequent statements both in the De Caelo and in other Aristotelian treatises [1].

Besides, however, these individual quotations and references, we have the general statement as to the scope of the subjects covered by the Peripatetic School in general, and by Aristotle in particular [2]. Here Cicero begins by stating that there are three parts of this philosophy; the first deals with nature; the second with speech and argument; the third with the rule of life. 'Nature,' he says, 'is so fully investigated by this School that (poetically speaking) no part of sky, sea, or earth is neglected by them. . . . Aristotle himself investigated the birth, life, and shapes of all animals, Theophrastus the nature of the vegetable world also, and the causes and laws of nearly all things which are born from the earth; by which previous knowledge the investigation of the most abstruse matters was made easier; the same men handed down to us principles not only of dialectical argument but also of rhetorical discourse, and the fashion of treating both sides of the argument as to individual points was first adopted by Aristotle, not however after the style of Anesilas, who attacks all positions whatever, but yet so as to bring out in all cases what can be said on both sides. Since further the third division of their doctrine investigated the rules of right life, these same men directed their search not only to

[1] Cf. Eth. Nic. iii. 5. 1112 *a.* 25; Met. xi. 8. 1073 *a.* 34; De Caelo, ii. 12, 291. *a.* combining it with the fact that the *πρώτη φορά* is necessarily eternal.

[2] De Fin. v. 4.

the rules of private life, but also to the guidance of the state. The customs, institutions, and methods of education of almost all states, not only of Greece but of barbarous lands, are known to us through Aristotle, their laws also through Theophrastus, and whereas each of them taught what should be the nature of the ruler of a state, and further described at greater length what is the best constitution of a state, Theophrastus going beyond this taught also what were the tendencies to be looked for in different states, and the critical periods which had to be dealt with as the occasion demanded. As to types of individual life, they preferred above all others the quiet and contemplative species intent upon the study of truth; this life, since it is most like that of the gods, they held to be most worthy of the wise men, and about these matters their style of discourse is stately and notable.'

Now I think it clear that after the first general statement Cicero is referring to particular works. It does not at all follow that with regard to these works he knew anything more than their names, but from his vague allusions we may infer pretty positively what titles of works were known to him. I think this comes out quite clearly both as to the works of Aristotle and as to those of Theophrastus; thus we have 'animantium omnium ortus' corresponding to *περὶ ζῴων γενέσεως*; 'victus' may refer to parts of the History of Animals, though it is not the subject treated of at greatest length in that book. I should be inclined rather to refer it to a lost Aristotelian or pseudo-Aristotelian treatise. The expression 'animantium figurae' will answer fairly well to *περὶ ζῴων μορίων*; later on we get perfectly definite references to the Topics and Rhetoric, and also to the general Aristotelian method *διαπορεῖν πρότερον*. Lastly, we have a work attributed to Aristotle on the best kind of rule, which is probably precisely the

subject of the dialogue περὶ βασιλείας; on the best constitution (=perhaps Politics vii, viii (iv, v), and the collections of constitutions of Greece and barbarous lands which is of course the lost Πολιτεῖαι: the whole finishing with a statement of the doctrine of the excellence of the life of contemplation and intellectual activity which is in exact accordance with the Nicomachean Ethics, though it is too vague in its character to be considered as a definite quotation from that work.

When we turn to the works attributed by Cicero to Theophrastus, the resemblance to the titles of works assigned to him by others becomes still closer. The first work, which must have been entitled Περὶ φυτῶν, does not indeed appear in the list of Diogenes[1], but all the rest are unmistakeably to be found there: thus the 'laws of all states' are represented in this list by the lengthy work Νόμων κατὰ στοιχεῖον κδ'[2], the very epitome of which occupies ten books. We have also works Περὶ βασιλείας and Περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, corresponding to the two subjects on which both Aristotle and Theophrastus are said to have written, besides a work in six books on Politics generally; but the most striking coincidence is that between Cicero's expression 'quae essent in republica inclinationes rerum et momenta temporis,' and the title given by Diogenes, πολιτικὸν πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς, in four books. As to the ethical works, Theophrastus has so many of these attributed to him, and they follow so generally the lines of the Aristotelian treatises in their titles, that it is impossible to refer Cicero's remarks to any one of them.

I think then that we may safely conclude that Cicero was acquainted with the names of a far larger number of Aristotelian works than he anywhere quotes, or than he had in all probability read or opened, and further that,

[1] Diogenes Laertius, lib. v, cap. 2, sec. 13. [2] Ib. v. 2. § 13. 44.

with the exception of the Dialogues and the Πολιτεῖαι, the majority had the same titles as those which have come down to us. Whether the books were in their content the same, on Ciceronian evidence, taken by itself, we have no means of judging. For in truth there is strong evidence that, with the exception of the Rhetoric, he had no extended knowledge of any Aristotelian works but the Dialogues. All he says as to the beauty of the Aristotelian style, both in this passage and in many others, proves that this must have been the case. Cicero was hardly the man to admire greatly the nervous apophthegm, the pregnant conciseness of our Aristotelian discourses, tempered as these great qualities are by absolute disregard of the graces of style, and frequently of the rules of grammar. Least of all could such expressions as Flumen aureum fundens [1], Aristotelia pigmenta [2], eloquentia [3], be applied to such works.

Of the Dialogues, on the other hand, he had certainly made a most careful study, and to some extent at least had formed his style on them. The two most important bits of information which he gives us with regard to them is, that each book of a dialogue containing more than one had a separate preface [4], and that Aristotle made himself the chief interlocutor in his own dialogues [5].

For the rest Cicero gives us a few bits of general information which are of some interest. Of these, perhaps the most important is that of the unbroken tradition of the Peripatetic School [6]. It is true that in this very account Cicero arranges them into true or false Peripatetics, according to their views on the question of the Summum Bonum; but this arrangement may be at least partly due to Cicero's

[1] Acad. Pri. ii. 38. 119.
[2] Ad Att. ii. 1. 1.
[3] Ad Att. xiii. 28. 2.
[4] Ad Att. iv. 16. 2.
[5] Ad Att. xiii. 19. 4
[6] De Finibus, v. 5.

own predilection for moral questions, or to the main subject of the book in which the passage occurs. It does not by any means prove that the Peripatetics had altogether given up all questions other than moral; though it is probable, on grounds which I have already mentioned, that morals had of late constituted their chief pursuit and interest.

Cicero also furnishes us with a considerable amount of tradition as to the supposed quarrel between Aristotle and Isocrates. It is curious that the works of Aristotle at least afford not only no evidence in favour of this tradition, but very considerable presumption the other way; for although he attacks Plato and his disciples (φίλοι ἄνδρες) with considerable vigour and inconsiderable fairness, yet his allusions to Isocrates are never conjoined with hostile criticisms. The citations from that author are usually rather of points to be imitated, than of errors to be avoided. The tradition is undoubtedly a very early one, but it finds no support in any Aristotelian work.

# CHAPTER IV.

## ARISTOTLE FROM CICERO TO ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS.

IMMEDIATELY after the Ciceronian period, and thence onward for more than a century, we have another great gap in our history of the Aristotelian writings, broken by a few scattered notices. But here there is no pretence for saying that the gap is due to any failing in interest in the Aristotelian literature. It depends simply upon the unfortunate fact that all the many commentators who treated of Aristotle during this period are now lost to us.

The first of these, in point of date, was probably Nicolaus of Damascus, an author of whose historical works considerable fragments remain, and who wrote apparently in the time of Augustus. He is said to have written a commentary on the Aristotelian Metaphysics, and if the account be true, we shall be able to trace back that obviously post-Aristotelian title very nearly to the times of Andronicus; but the whole account is second-hand, and much trust cannot be placed in it [1].

Next comes Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who praises Aristotle for his acuteness and clearness and pleasantness of style, as well as for his wide learning [2]. He has of course a more definite story than Cicero of the libels invented by Aristotle [3] against Isocrates, for scandal always becomes more circumstantial as it gets further from its source.

[1] Brandis Aristotelis et Theophrasti Met., p. 323, note.
[2] De Vett. Script. Cens. c. 4, Reiske 5, p. 430.
[3] De Isocr. Jud. 18, Reiske 5, p. 577.

But his most important contribution to Aristotelian literature is his argument [1] to prove that Demosthenes did not borrow his principles of oratory from the Rhetoric of Aristotle, but rather that Aristotle himself framed his Rhetoric by observing the actual usages of Demosthenes and of other orators. Of course he fully makes out his case, which, indeed, was not hard to do, but incidentally he gives us a good deal of very valuable information. First, we notice that his citations from the Rhetoric are not only roughly but actually the same as the text which we now have, thus proving that he is using the revised edition of Tyrannion and Andronicus; while a few not very important differences suffice to show us that we are not here dealing with citations which have been corrected by some later editor, or copyist from an Aristotelian MS., a possibility which, in dealing with quotations in Greek texts, so often makes our inferences dangerous or valueless. What is still more important, he has in one quotation two distinct references to the name ἀναλυτικά, where, curiously enough, the first reference does not appear in our present version; for quoting Rhet. i. 2. 1356 *a.* 36, he says, τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δείκνυσθαι, ἢ φαίνεσθαι δείκνυσθαι καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς κ.τ.λ., where our MSS. without exception read διαλεκτικοῖς. He agrees, however, with our version in reading ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν a few lines further down, and later again has, as our text has, the references to the Topics and Methodica. He argues quite fairly enough that (assuming, as he does, the accuracy of the references in the Aristotelian text) Aristotle must have written a good many important works before he wrote the Rhetoric, and that consequently the Rhetoric could not well have been known till the greater part at least of the speeches of Demosthenes were delivered. Happily for his argument he is able to establish it

[1] Ad Amm. de Dem. et Ar. c. 10, Reiske 6, pp. 735 sqq.

equally satisfactorily by means of references to the events of the day contained in the Rhetoric itself. The importance of his quotation of this passage including references to other Aristotelian works will be seen when we come to examine the question of the evidence as to titles and references [1].

Strabo, who is almost, if not quite, a contemporary of Dionysius, has nothing very important except the celebrated passage as to the history of the Aristotelian library; but in one other place he gives a statement, culled second-hand from Posidonius, that Aristotle calls the parts between the Tropics ἡ διακεκαυμένη, and that between the Tropics and the Arctic circle ἡ εὔκρατος [2]. The statement as to its first part has some slight resemblance to Problemata xii. 3. 906 *b.* 12: Αἴτιον δὲ τῆς εὐωδίας ἐστίν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· διαθέρμου γὰρ καὶ διακεκαυμένης οὔσης, ὃ ἂν ἐκφύσῃ τὸ πρῶτον εὐῶδες ὄζει .... τούτων δὲ [τῶν πυρουμένων] τὰ πρὸς ἕω τῶν πρὸς μεσημβρίαν [εὐωδέστερα], ὅτι γεώδης μᾶλλον ὁ τόπος ὁ περὶ τὴν Συρίαν καὶ Ἀραβίαν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ Λιβύη ἀμμώδης καὶ ἄνικμος. The second part stands about equally near to Problemata xxvi. 31. 943 *b.* 21: Διὰ τί ὁ ζέφυρος εὐδιεινὸς καὶ ἥδιστος δοκεῖ εἶναι τῶν ἀνέμων, καὶ οἷον καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ Ἠλυσίῳ πεδίῳ, 'ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ζεφύροιο διαπνείουσιν ἀῆται;' Ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος κρᾶσιν; Οὔτε γὰρ θερμὸς ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας καὶ ἕω, οὔτε ψυχρὸς ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄρκτου, ἀλλ' ἐν μεθορίῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ θερμῶν πνευμάτων. There is also a passage in the Meteorologica i. 6, p. 343*a.* 8, which bears somewhat on the subject, ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ μεταξὺ τόπῳ τῶν τροπικῶν οὐχ ἕλκειν τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διὰ τὸ κεκαῦσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου φορᾶς, but it does not seem at all likely that Posidonius should have put together passages so far removed from each other, which even when combined do not give exactly the statement for which Strabo makes him responsible. It is far more prob-

[1] Cf. chap. v, pp. 100 sqq.

[2] p. 94, Cas.

able that this statement comes from some lost geographical work like the still existent and spurious Περὶ κόσμου.

Philo Judaeus has no mention of Aristotle except in his citation in the treatise on the Incorruptibility of the World, which Rose pronounces to be spurious. The passage itself is certainly popular in form, and would probably come from a dialogue [1]. A much more important authority on Aristotelian criticism would have been Didymus the grammarian, who is said to have flourished during the time of Nero, and whose manysided activity seems to have embraced such different fields of criticism as Homer, Aristophanes, and Aristotle. But little, however, remains to us of that part of his labour which bears on our subject. We have a certain number of stray notes on Aristotelian uses, and references to the supposed Aristotelian series of commentaries on Homer, to which, as we have seen, Plutarch also alludes. But we have a long fragment attributed to Didymus by Stobaeus, lib. 2, cap. 7, which is quoted in Mullach's Fragmenta, vol. ii, pp. 53–101. There we have an account of various ethical systems, amongst others that of Aristotle, with, further, an epitome of the Aristotelian Politics [2]. Here too we have definite quotations from the Nicomachean Ethics, and an allusion to Aristotle's criticism of Eudoxus, which is said to occur ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νικομαχείων [3]. This would be a statement of very great importance if it were really made by a commentator as early as the time of Nero, for it would prove that the Nicomachean Ethics already contained the three doubtful books and the treatise Περὶ φιλίας. Unfortunately, however, Stobaeus, or his editor, is absolutely untrustworthy in the names which he assigns to his excerpts. This may be seen by the strangely modern ethical doctrines which he

[1] p. 489, Mang.

[2] Mullach, vol. ii, pp. 100–101.

[3] Mullach, vol. ii, p. 60.

attributes to Democritus. Here a confusion may doubtless have arisen between Democritus of Abdera and Democritus Platonicus, but unhappily there were also two writers known under the not very distinctive name of Didymus.

When we reach Plutarch we certainly seem to get a step nearer to our Aristotle. But Plutarch is a magazine-writer and not a critic; he aims at what is telling rather than at what is exact, and we have therefore to use his information with considerable caution. It is very valuable as informing us of the state of knowledge and opinion as to Aristotle in the writer's own time, but we cannot argue from any of his statements as to the past without the greatest possible risk of error.

We find then in Plutarch first an allusion to the Metaphysics[1], which, if we except the doubtful quotation from Nicolaus of Damascus[2], is the first definite mention of that book. Secondly, allusions to a number of other books which, though perhaps mentioned by other authors, are not quoted equally definitely. One very important passage in this context occurs in the article against Colotes, where, after pointing out the differences of opinion between Plato and his disciples, Aristotle and Xenokrates, and again between Straton and both Plato and Aristotle, he finishes up with the following sentence: Τάς γε μὴν ἰδέας περὶ ὧν ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι πανταχοῦ κινῶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπάγων ἀπορίαν αὐταῖς, ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν διαλέγων [διαλόγων, ed. Didot rightly] φιλονεικότερον ἔδοξεν ἐνίοις ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἐκ [* *] τῶν δογμάτων τούτων, ὡς προθέμενος τὴν Πλάτωνος ὑπεριδεῖν φιλοσοφίαν[3]. The references here to the Physics and to the Ethics are clear enough, for in Physics ii. 2, pp. 193 *b*–

[1] Alexander, vii. 5. [2] Brandis, Ar. et Theophr. Met. p. 323.

[3] Adversus Coloten, xiv. 4.

194*a*, we get a sufficiently sharp critique of the Platonic ideal theory generally, while in Ethics Nic. i. 6 we get the same kind of criticism applied to the central Platonic doctrine—that of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. As to the dialogues, too, we shall have no difficulty in assigning the critique of the Platonic theory to that named Περὶ φιλοσοφίας; for, though there is a special work Περὶ τῆς ἰδέας attributed to Aristotle in the list of Diogenes, this can hardly be a dialogue according to the probable theory of Bernays, that in this list the dialogues occupy the first place arranged in order of the number of their books. If this theory be correct the last dialogue in the list will be the Περὶ παιδείας, which is the last of the one-book series in the first part of the list, and the treatise, Περὶ τῆς ἰδέας, which comes much further down the list, must belong to some other class. It is to be noticed, however, that the symmetry of arrangement with regard to the number of books seems to vanish with the first class in the list. Unless we are to assume a quite unworkable number of categories, we must admit that all the works except the dialogues are arranged in the most haphazard order.

To return to our citation, it is curious that in this passage there is no reference made to the Metaphysics, which surely more than any other Aristotelian treatise attacks the Platonic ideal theory. It is the more curious as we know that Plutarch is acquainted with the name at least of the Metaphysics. Perhaps his knowledge of that book began and ended with its name.

In a passage from the article De Oraculorum Defectu we have an equally clear reference to the De Caelo. The passage runs, Εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία τὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὑπόψονταί τινες, ὡς φυσικὰς αἰτίας ἔχοντα. τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων ἑκάστου τόπον οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος, ὥς φησιν, ἀνάγκη τὴν γῆν πανταχόθεν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπ' αὐτῆς διὰ βάρος ὑφιστάμενον τοῖς

κουφοτέροις. ἂν οὖν πλείονες ὦσι κόσμοι, συμβήσεται τὴν γῆν πολλαχοῦ μὲν ἐπάνω τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος κεῖσθαι, πολλαχοῦ δὲ ὑποκάτω· καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὁμοίως, πῇ μὲν ἐν ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν χώραις ὑπάρχειν πῇ δ' ἐν ταῖς παρὰ φύσιν. ὧν ἀδυνάτων ὄντων ὡς οἴεται, μήτε δύο μήτε πλείονας εἶναι κόσμους ἀλλ' ἕνα τοῦτον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπάσης συγκείμενον, ἱδρυμένον κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς προσήκει ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων διαφοραῖς. Here the allusion is obviously to De Caelo i. 8. 4. 276 *b*, etc.[1]

There are also several allusions to the Πολιτεῖαι, one of which is important as proving that Cicero at least could not have read that book. It occurs in the life of Camillus, where Plutarch tells us that Aristotle also had heard of the capture of Rome by the Kelts, but that he calls the preserver of Rome Lucius, whereas the real praenomen of Camillus was Marcus[2]. Cicero, however, certainly did not know that there were any allusions to Rome in the Πολιτεῖαι, for his national pride would surely have prevented him from including his state in the comprehensively contemptuous term Barbaria. But of the Politeae, as of the History of Animals and of the ἱστορίαι generally, we must always bear in mind that they represent not any fixed work of Aristotle or of anyone else, but merely a continuously open note-book; and this note as to the capture of Rome may well have been suspected to be of later origin by Tyrannion and Andronicus, and so excluded from their edition. Even though, as is probable, Cicero had not read the Πολιτεῖαι it is hardly to be believed that his friend Tyrannion, with whom he was in constant correspondence, would have failed to call his attention to this interesting historical notice of his country, had Tyrannion himself believed the passage to be genuinely Aristotelian.

Other notes of less importance attributable to the same source are the story that Aristotle considered Nikias,

[1] Plutarch, De Oraculorum Defectu, xxv. 424 *b–d*. [2] Plutarch, Camillus, xxii.

Thukydides son of Melesias, and Theramenes to be the best of statesmen and patriots, but put the two former before the latter with his reasons for so doing[1]; and the story of Polykrite and the redemption of the Naxians by her agency[2].

To the dialogues there are several allusions, two separate ones to the Eudemus; the former in the life of Dion[3], the latter and more important one in the Consolatio ad Apollonium[4]; this second passage is so important in its bearing on several points of Aristotelian criticism that, notwithstanding its length, it is worth transcribing in its entirety: Τοῦτο δέ, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ τὸν Σειληνὸν συλληφθέντα τῷ Μίδᾳ ἀποφήνασθαι. βέλτιον δ' αὐτὰς τὰς τοῦ φιλοσόφου λέξεις παραθέσθαι. Φησὶ δ' ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ ἐπιγραφομένῳ περὶ ψυχῆς ταυτί· Διόπερ ὦ κράτιστε πάντων καὶ μακαρίστατε, καὶ πρὸς τῷ μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας νομίζειν, καὶ τὸ ψεύσασθαί τι κατ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ βλασφημεῖν οὐχ ὅσιον, ὡς κατὰ βελτιόνων, ἡγούμεθα, καὶ κρειττόνων ἤδη γεγονότων· καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἀρχαῖα καὶ παλαιὰ διατελεῖ νενομισμένα παρ' ἡμῖν, ὥστε τὸ παράπαν οὐδεὶς οἶδεν οὔτε τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τὸν θέντα πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα τυγχάνουσι διὰ τέλους οὕτω νενομισμένα. πρὸς δὲ δὴ τούτοις, διὰ στόματος ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁρᾷς, ὡς ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν ἐκ παλαιοῦ χρόνου περιφέρεται θρυλούμενον. τί τοῦτ'; ἔφη. κἀκεῖνος ὑπολαβών, 'ὡς ἄρα μὴ γίγνεσθαι μέν, ἔφην, ἄριστον πάντων, τὸ δὲ τεθνάναι τοῦ ζῆν ἐστὶ κρεῖττον. καὶ πολλοῖς οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου μεμαρτύρηται. τοῦτο μὲν ἐκείνῳ τῷ Μίδᾳ λέγουσι δήπου μετὰ τὴν θήραν ὡς ἔλαβε τὸν Σειληνόν, διερωτῶντι καὶ πυνθανομένῳ, τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ βέλτιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τί τὸ πάντων αἱρετώτατον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, οὐδὲν ἐθέλειν εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ σιωπᾷν ἀρρήτως. ἐπειδὴ δέ ποτε μόλις πᾶσαν μηχανὴν μηχανώμενος προσηγάγετο φθέγξασθαί τι πρὸς αὐτόν, οὕτως ἀναγκαζό-

[1] Nikias, ii.
[2] De Virtutibus Mulierum, xvii. 254 *e*.
[3] Dion, xxii.
[4] Consolatio, xxvii. 115 *b*.

*μενος εἰπεῖν, Δαίμονος ἐπιπόνου καὶ τύχης χαλεπῆς ἐφήμερον σπέρμα, τί με βιάζεσθε λέγειν ἃ ὑμῖν ἄρειον μὴ γνῶναι; μετ' ἀγνοίας γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων κακῶν ἀλυπότατος ὁ βίος. ἀνθρώποις δὲ πάμπαν οὐκ ἔστι γίνεσθαι τὸ πάντων ἄριστον, οὐδὲ μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου φύσεως. ἄριστον γὰρ πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι, τὸ μέντοι μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνυστόν, δευτερὸν δέ, τὸ γενομένους ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τάχιστα.'*

Now Rose assumes that in this and other passages in the same dialogue the chief speaker is Plato. It seems to me that there is nothing in this or in any other passage which should make us reject the express testimony of Cicero that Aristotle makes himself the chief interlocutor. Of more weight seems to me an objection which might be raised, that there is a pessimism about the whole passage which is diametrically opposed to the practical optimism of Aristotle; but even this objection does not seem to me final; the writer, it is true, is not our Aristotle, but he is a dignified, gracious, and worthy thinker out of whom our Aristotle might easily have developed. We certainly should not have assumed on internal evidence that the dialogue was Aristotelian; but there is nothing in this internal evidence to make us reject definite external evidence. But after all the style is the most important thing about the whole passage; and does it not merit all, and more than all, the encomia of Cicero? The 'golden river' is now no longer a strange bit of hyperbole, but a literal truth. If many such passages as this were to be found in the dialogues attributed to Aristotle, we need no longer wonder that Cicero should have taken him as his model.

One point as to this matter of style is to be particularly noticed—the absolute absence of hiatus—the only apparent exception being the ἃ ὑμῖν, which of course is merely apparent. Valentine Rose indeed, following Usteri, has produced another and very hideous hiatus by reading

ἔφη ἄριστον[1] for the perfectly explainable and under the circumstances absolutely necessary ἔφην ἄριστον of the vulgate text and presumably of the MSS. The absence of hiatus in this passage is the more noticeable in that Plutarch, who most frequently himself avoids it, does not do so in this article; in fact the sentences which immediately precede the quotation contain an unusual number of peculiarly hideous infractions of the rule. Had this passage been found in one of the hiatus-less articles of Plutarch, it might be said that he himself had doctored his author to make him fit the rules of his own taste. But if, as Wyttenbach[2] probably conjectures, this discourse was written in Plutarch's youth, before he had formed a definite style or adopted the rule of the avoided hiatus, then we have the stronger proof that this quotation is taken straight from his authority without any alterations or emendations. The argument to be drawn from the absence of hiatus in works attributed to Aristotle I must reserve for the chapter on the Aristotelian Politics, where I shall have the opportunity of treating all these passages together[3].

Another small passage which may come from a dialogue is that in the De Cupiditate Divitiarum, σὺ δ' οὐκ ἀκούεις, φήσομεν, Ἀριστοτέλους λέγοντος, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οὐ χρῶνται [τοῖς χρήμασιν] οἱ δὲ παραχρῶνται[4]. But it may only be a free allusion to the doctrine of the Nicomachean Ethics.

On the other hand, the advice said to have been given by Aristotle to Alexander to deal with the Greeks as their leader and with the barbarians as their master must come, if from any definite treatise, from the dialogue or λόγος, Περὶ βασιλείας[5]; for I am inclined to agree with Hirzel in

[1] Rose, fr. 40 in Aristot. ed. Berl. p. 1481 *a*. 44, and note.
[2] Prolegomena to the Consolatio. [3] Cf. chap. viii, pp. 164 sqq.
[4] De Cupiditate Divitiarum, viii. 527 *a*. [5] De Fortitudine Alexandri, vi. 329.

his modification of the theory of Bernays, and to hold that in the first list are included, not only dialogues proper, but set discourses with dialogical prefaces[1]. It is, however, quite possible that this advice may be merely a tradition as to some oral advice of Aristotle to Alexander extracted from one of the many worthless lives of the philosopher.

The statement of the effect of oil in calming the sea and the explanation of that effect looks as if it came from a lost passage of the Problemata. It is a curious anticipation of an hypothesis, now at last about to be put to a practical test, which through the intervening score of centuries has only been kept alive as a proverb.

Another passage which seems also to belong to the Problemata, though not to be found in our remaining books, is alluded to in the De Facie in Orbe Lunae[2], *Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ὁ παλαιὸς αἰτίαν τοῦ πλεονάκις τὴν σελήνην ἐκλείπουσαν ἢ τὸν ἥλιον καθορᾶσθαι, πρὸς ἄλλαις τισὶ καὶ ταύτην ἀποδίδωσιν· ἥλιον γὰρ ἐκλείπειν σελήνης ἀντιφράξει σελήνην δὲ* [cetera desunt]. Now Aristotle takes great interest in the question of eclipses and their causes, and the phraseology of this passage is distinctly Aristotelian; but no one of the several passages in which he talks about eclipses at all answers to this maimed quotation[3].

I omit of set purpose a reference to the Physics in the Pseudo-Plutarchian De Placitis Philosophorum[4].

As to history or pretended history, Plutarch, in addition to his grand story of the plots of Aristotle against the life of Alexander, gives us the following items; that Aristotle induced Philip to restore Stageira[5]; that the seats and shady retreats of Aristotle and Alexander his pupil were

[1] Cf. ante, p. 7.

[2] xix. 932.

[3] Aristotle on eclipses, Problemata, xv. 11. 912 *b*, and xxvi. 18. 942 *a*; An. Post. i. 31. 1. 87 *b*. 40; ii. 2. 3. 90 *a*. 16; ii. 12. 1. 95 *a*. 14.

[4] i. 3. 38. 878 *b*.

[5] Alexander, vii.

still to be seen at Pella[1]; that Diogenes reproached Aristotle for his dependence on Philip[2]; that Aristotle stammered[3]; that Theocritus of Chios wrote a sarcastic epigram, girding at Aristotle for preferring the court of Pella to the groves of the Academy[4]; all of which statements are perfectly possible but by no means to be believed, at all events on the authority of Plutarch.

If with Plutarch we come forth from darkness to glimmering dawn in the history of the Aristotelian treatises, with Galen we break out into full day-light. That most estimable physician and commentator loved and honoured Plato and Aristotle with a reverence but little short of that which he paid to his own master Hippocrates.

Whenever Galen quotes Aristotle,—and his quotations are very numerous,—his text is practically the same as ours, though he includes in his Aristotelian canon several works which are altogether lost to us. But the list of works which Galen quotes and which still remain to us is sufficiently copious. Amongst these naturally those which bear upon the history and parts of animals most attracted the attention of a scientific surgeon. Thus we have a very large number of quotations of the History of Animals and the treatise on the Parts of Animals[5]. Next in order to these come the physical works in the proper sense, the Physics, the De Caelo, the Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, and the Meteorologica[6].

The Problemata are often quoted, chiefly, as we might expect, as to matters which bear upon surgery and natural history[7].

[1] Alexander, vii.
[2] De Exilio, xii. 604 *d*.
[3] De Audiendis poetis viii. *τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους τραυλότητα*.
[4] De Exilio, x. 603 *c*.
[5] Ed. Kuhn, vi. 781, xix. 321, iv. 791, v. 347, vi. 647, etc.
[6] Ib. i. 448, i. 487, i. 489, viii. 687, xix. 273, xix. 275, ii. 8.
[7] Ib. iv. 791, 792, xvii. 29, etc.

The De Anima is quoted two or three times[1].

The first of these passages contains a reference also to the book De Sensu et Sensibili. As to this book Galen makes the remark, *ἐπιγράφεται δὲ τοῦτο . . . περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητηρίων*, a fact the bearing of which we shall see later on[2]. There are a few references to the logical works, but with these we know well that Galen was fully acquainted, since he himself had written commentaries on the *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* and on the two books of the Prior Analytics[3]; he quotes also the former book in a passage which, if it is to be taken in its accurate sense, would seem to show that he had a good deal more of the Aristotelian works than he names. *Περὶ δὲ τῆς αἰσθητῆς [κινήσεως τῆς ἀρτηρίας], ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην ἔνιοι τὴν προσθήκην ἀξιοῦσι ποιεῖσθαι, τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἄξιον εἰπεῖν. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτάρκως ἐνίοτε διελθών, τί προστιθέναι φησὶ δεῖν αὐτῷ διὰ τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις ἔξωθεν ἄλλο τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστοτε συμφέρειν τῷ λόγῳ*[4].

Now the expression *σοφιστικαὶ ἐνοχλήσεις* only occurs once in our present Aristotelian treatises[5], so that if Galen finds it in Aristotle sometimes, or often, it must be in works which are now lost to us. Possibly, however, Galen for once deserts his usual accuracy, and means only that warnings of this kind often occur in Aristotle, which is undoubtedly true. Galen also quotes the Topics[6], but I think not the Categories; perhaps therefore he was induced by the doubt of Andronicus to treat these as spurious; the argument, however, is not a strong one since, as I have said, the quotations from the logical works are few.

But Galen is not a mere reproducer of passages quoted from Aristotle's works; he sometimes combines passages

[1] ii. 871, xix. 355. If the treatise *οἱ ἰατρικοί* be really genuine.
[2] Cf. chap. v, passim. [3] xix. 41, 42. [4] viii. 725.
[5] De Interpretatione, vi, p. 17 *a*, 36. [6] viii. 579.

and slightly varies them, so as to bring out more fully the sense of his author ; a very noticeable instance of this is in the passage where he deals with the regular hierarchy of the animal and vegetable kingdom. He writes as follows : *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων Ἀριστοτέλει καλῶς εἴρηται τά τ' ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι κατὰ βραχὺ τῶν φυτῶν ἡ φύσις ἀποχωροῦσα ἕτερον ἑτέρου ζῷον ἐργάζεται τελεώτερον, ἕως πρὸς τὸ πάντων ἀφίκηται τελεώτατον* [*τὸν ἄνθρωπον*] (iii. 328). The two passages to which Galen seems here to refer occur, the one in the History of Animals, viii. 1. p. 588 *b*. 4 :—*οὕτω δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀψύχων εἰς τὰ ζῷα μεταβαίνει κατὰ μικρὸν ἡ φύσις, ὥστε τῇ συνεχείᾳ λανθάνειν τὸ μεθόριον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ μέσον ποτέρων ἐστίν· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων γένος τὸ τῶν φυτῶν πρῶτόν ἐστιν. καὶ τούτων ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον δοκεῖν μετέχειν ζωῆς, ὅλον δὲ τὸ γένος πρὸς μὲν τἆλλα σώματα φαίνεται σχεδὸν ὥσπερ ἔμψυχον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῶν ζῴων ἄψυχον*, the other in the De Partibus Animalium, iv. 5. p. 681 *a*. 12 :—*ἡ γὰρ φύσις μεταβαίνει συνεχῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀψύχων εἰς τὰ ζῷα διὰ τῶν ζώντων μὲν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ζῴων, οὕτως ὥστε δοκεῖν πάμπαν μικρὸν διαφέρειν θατέρου θάτερον τῷ σύνεγγυς ἀλλήλοις.*

Of the books now lost to us, the most important are *Περὶ ὑδάτων καὶ ἀέρων καὶ τόπων*[1] ; the book *Περὶ νόσων* or *νοσημάτων*[2] (unless indeed we are to refer the words of Galen to the *ἰατρικὰ β.* of the list of Diogenes) ; there is a possible allusion to an Aristotelian book on Anatomy, but it is not a certain one[3]. As to the second of these three treatises, Galen informs us that Aristotle in his treatment of diseases followed Hippocrates, which statement, coming from a man who had before him an enormous amount of evidence which is now lost to us, would in itself be a sufficient answer to the assertion of Rose, that Aristotle is ignorant of the works imputed to Hippocrates, even were it not the fact (as Littré has shown that it is) that both Plato

[1] iv. 798. [2] ii. 90. [3] xv. 298.

and Aristotle actually quote the works of Hippocrates. Perhaps the most important statement which Galen makes with regard to Aristotle is that the four books of the Analytics are only named by οἱ νῦν by that title; that Aristotle himself refers to the Prior Analytics as the books about Syllogisms and to the Posterior Analytics as the books on Proof; both these facts we know to be true as far as the existence of references under these names is concerned; but our Aristotle has a far larger number of passages in which the reference is made directly to the Analytics [1].

An interesting passage in Galen tells us of the fate which even in his lifetime had befallen his own books; people apparently were anxious to get copies of anything which bore his name, and not very scrupulous booksellers sold to a too confiding public works which were entirely spurious or which contained an imperfect version of his doctrine [2]; if this could happen during a man's own lifetime and at a period when criticism was fully awake, how much more widely extended must necessarily have been the corruption of books which, like Aristotle's, were never finished in a literary form and which had passed through so many vicissitudes.

From Galen to Athenaeus is a falling back from light into darkness, but here it is the man and not the period which is at fault; Athenaeus quotes Aristotle often enough, though the great majority of his quotations come from a single book, the History of Animals. But here we have a curious fact to notice. A very large proportion of these quotations come from a book which Athenaeus calls Τὸ πέμπτον περὶ ζῴων μορίων, or sometimes merely Τὸ περὶ ζῴων. Now our treatise De Partibus Animalium contains no fifth

[1] Cf. later, chap. v, pp. 109 sqq.

[2] xix. 8 sqq.

book, and the book which Athenaeus so constantly cites is identical with our fifth book of the History of Animals[1].

Quite consistently with this he cites what is now our ninth book of the History of Animals as the eighth book (387 *b*); this ninth book of the History of Animals he sometimes cites by this name and sometimes by that of Τὸ περὶ ζῴων ἤθων (282 *c*, 307 *c*). It should be noted that there are one or two passages quoted by Athenaeus as coming from the fifth book Περὶ μορίων which do not occur in our fifth book of the History of Animals, notably 294 *d* and 329 *a*, but these seem to be merely passages that have dropped out, as we should naturally expect that some would do from the nature of the subject. Cp. ante, pp. 5 et 44. We should notice that Galen never refers to this doubtful book. The conclusion seems to be that in the time of Athenaeus and perhaps up to his time this book was, in some or all the MSS., attached to the end of our four books De Partibus Animalium ; though it certainly more naturally and properly belongs to the History of Animals, and, therefore, was very wisely moved to its present position. Another peculiarity of Athenaeus is that his quotations from a book which he calls Περὶ ζωικῶν are almost always to be referred to parallel passages in the History of Animals ; thus, for instance, the notice in Athenaeus 330 *a*, *b* has its exact parallel in the passage quoted by Athenaeus himself from the History of Animals v. 5. 540 *b*.

[1] Athenaeus, 312 *c*, *d* = Hist. of Animals, v. 10, p. 543 *a*. 19, etc. Ath. 63 *b* = H. A. v. 12, p. 544 *a*. 23. Ath. 394 *a* = H. A. v. 13, p. 544 *b*. 1, etc. Ath. 88 *b* = H. A. v. 15, p. 547 *b*. 2, etc. Ath. 105 *c* = H. A. v. 7, p. 541 *b*. 19, 20. Ath. 286 *c* = H. A. v. 5, p. 540 *b*. 6–19. Ath. 304 *c* = H.A. p. 543 *a*. 20, etc. Ath. 310 *e* = H. A. v. 10, p. 543 *b*. Ath. 315 *a* = H. A. v. 10, p. 543 *b*. 1, 2. Ath. 319 *d* = H. A. v. 11. p. 543 *b*. 11. Ath. 321 *e* = H. A. v. 8, p. 543 *a*. 8. Ath. 320 *f* = H. A. v. 26, p. 555 *a*. 23 and H. A. v. 11, p. 543 *b*. 5. Ath. 323 *e* = H. A. v. 6, p. 541 *b*. 12–15. Ath. 317 *d* = H. A. v. 9, p. 543 *a*. 5–8. Ath. 328 *f* = H. A. v. 9, 543 *a*. 5. Ath. 317 *d* = H. A. v. 12, p. 544 *a*. 6–14. Ath. 326 *c* = H. A. v 18, 550 *b*. 13, 14. Ath. 303 *d* = H. A. v. 11, 543 *b*. 11.

6–19; so too the passages 305 *d*, 313 *d*, 315 *e*, have all their parallels in our present books of the History of Animals; but in all cases something is added which does not exist in these books, so that we should be led to imagine that the ζωικά known to Athenaeus, which are also mentioned by other authors, were something like a second text of what we know as the History of Animals standing in the same relation to it as the Eudemian Ethics do to the Nicomachean, or perhaps more exactly as Books B, Γ, E, etc. of the Metaphysics stand to M and N.

Athenaeus has further an allusion to the Nicomachean Ethics (Ath. 673 *e*, *f*) but no quotation from it, and one or two silly stories about Aristotle.

Plotinus shows throughout his phraseology his Aristotelian knowledge, but once and once only does he actually quote from any Aristotelian work; in the first Ennead and the fourth book he is discussing the question of happiness and the Peripatetic theory that external goods are, to some extent at least, necessary for happiness. There, in one and the same page, he alludes first to the doctrine that a man cannot be happy if he meet with misfortunes like those of Priam; to the theory that pleasure is needwise combined with a happy life, and to the Aristotelian use of the word σπουδαῖος[1]; the whole of this book is completely filled with Aristotelian expressions and criticisms of doctrines and phrases which occur in the Nicomachean Ethics; but there is nothing sufficiently definite to enable us to establish with certainty any facts as to the state of the text.

When we turn to Sextus, the sceptical physician, we find very little real knowledge which we cannot glean from earlier writers, and that little seems to be most of

[1] Enn. I, bk. 4, ch. 5, p. 32, ed. Basil. 1580; Vol. II, p. 308, ed. Kirchhoff.

it second or third-hand. There are one or two references to the Rhetoric[1] and to the Physics[2], also a more definite reference to the Aristotelian theory of time[3]; but this very reference, although correct, tends to show us that the information of Sextus Empiricus was not first-hand, for further on in the same book he tells us that Strato, or, as other people think, Aristotle, defines time as 'the measure of motion and rest[4].' In the earlier passage he had told us that Aristotle defined time as 'the number of that which is in succession or motion;' and that Strato had corrected this definition by adding rest to motion, on the ground that things in rest were as much in time as things in motion. He does not seem to see any contradiction between these two statements, or at least any reason for deciding that Aristotle held one opinion more than the other.

The fact seems to be that he is merely quoting from commonplace books or collections of extracts. A still more striking instance of his real ignorance of Aristotle occurs in the passage where he informs us that Aristotle identified health and *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, a mistake which could not have been made by anyone who had really read Aristotle[5]. Perhaps the most important of the citations of Sextus is that allusion to the Categories where he explains Aristotle's doctrine of the six forms of motion: *Ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐξ εἴδη τῆς κινήσεως ἔλεγεν ὑπάρχειν· ὧν τὸ μέν τι εἶναι τοπικὴν μετάβασιν· τὸ δὲ μεταβολήν· τὸ δὲ γένεσιν· τὸ δὲ φθοράν· τὸ δὲ αὔξησιν· τὸ δὲ μείωσιν*[6]. This quotation is the more important since not only does it refer to the disputed book, the Categories, but to the most disputed

[1] Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. ii. 61 = Rhet. i. 2. 1. 1355 *b*. 26.
[2] Adv. Math. x. 31 and x. 33.
[3] Adv. Math. x. 176. Cf. Phys. iv. 13, p. 222 *a*. l. 30, etc.
[4] Adv. Math. x. 228. [5] Adv. Math. xi. 77. [6] Adv. Math. x. 37.

portions of that book, the Postpredicaments. Unfortunately there is no trace of any scientific knowledge of the text of Aristotle in the writings of Sextus; and since we know that the Categories, or rather the two versions of them, were already in existence in the library of Alexandria, we cannot be at all certain that Sextus is not here quoting from some author who wrote before the authenticity of the Categories had been called in question by Andronicus.

Another perfectly definite quotation refers to the Aristotelian Meteorologica, and gives the story of a person who always saw the figure of a man preceding him[1]; the only difference being that Sextus gives the country of the man, which Aristotle, in our version at least, omits. There is a story that Empedocles first started the art of rhetoric, and that Zeno was the first dialectician, which is attributed by Sextus to Aristotle, which by the aid of a parallel passage in Diogenes Laertius we are enabled to assign to the Aristotelian or pseudo-Aristotelian dialogue 'Sophistes[2].'

There is also a long passage, apparently from some mathematical work of Aristotle, explanatory of the notions of length without breadth, etc., where the explanation given is sufficiently in accordance with Aristotle's general doctrine as to ἀφαίρεσις[3]. Lastly, there is a curious passage in which Aristotle is made to say that Parmenides and Melissus are rebels against nature[4]. Now it is noticeable that this expression does not occur in Aristotle, but does occur in the Theaetetus of Plato: it is, of course, conceivable that Aristotle may somewhere have quoted Plato; but the chances seem greater that Sextus, or his authority, is confusing the two authors. The doctrine is of course

[1] Pyr. Hypot. i. 84. Cf. Arist. Meteor. iii. 4, p. 373 *b*. 2–10.
[2] Adv. Math. vii. 6. Cf. Diog. Laert. viii. 57.
[3] Adv. Math. iii. 57–59.
[4] Adv. Math. x. 46.

quite in accordance with that of Aristotle[1]. There is one curious and important reference to the Aristotelian Metaphysics[2]; here Sextus quotes Aristotle as his authority that Hermotimus of Clazomenae and Parmenides of Elea, and, long before them, Hesiod, had some notion of a final cause, and this statement is to be found in the first book of the Metaphysics[3]. But Sextus does not here mention the name of the treatise, and if, as is most probable, the first book of the Metaphysics appeared originally in some other form, for instance as a portion of the dialogue Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, we cannot be sure whether Sextus or his authority had it before him in its first or in its second combination. One thing at least we may say with almost certainty of Sextus, that he had no first-hand knowledge of the Aristotelian logical works; his only notion of the Syllogism is of the Stoic hypothetical form, and there is no trace in any of his logical writings of Aristotelian influence; from which we may the more certainly conclude that the quotation from the Categories already referred to is not first-hand. Sextus is in fact an authority of the most variable value. For writers of distinctly sceptical tendencies he had great sympathy and interest, and accordingly he has preserved for us most valuable epitomes of the arguments of Protagoras and Gorgias, and again of those of the new Academy; but all other writers, with the exception of course of his own master Pyrrho, he is content to take from any epitome which lies near to hand. Even as to the Stoics and Epicureans, schools which were in full vigour in his own day, he is most vague and unsatisfactory; as to Aristotle or Plato, except by accident, he is a witness of no value whatever.

We come lastly to Diogenes Laertius, an author whose information on the subject of Aristotle has given rise to

[1] Arist. Phys. i. 2–3. 184 *b*. [2] Adv. Math. ix. 7. [3] Metaph. i. 3, 4, p. 984 *b*. ll. 19–31.

more controversy than that of all his predecessors. The crucial question with regard to Diogenes is naturally that of the origin and authenticity of his list of the works of Aristotle; that this list is extracted from Favorinus may be said to be agreed upon by all critics; that Favorinus copied the πίνακες of Andronicus is an opinion pretty generally accepted, and has in its favour the consensus of two such generally opposed scholars as Bernays and Rose, beside a host of other writers; nevertheless I hold that it is proveably mistaken.

Let us look first at the external evidence; we find that from the time of Cicero onwards the disciples and successors of Tyrannion and Andronicus are fairly uniform in their list of books. These books coincide fairly well with our present list, with the exception of certain additional books now lost to us. The most important of these are a certain number of the Dialogues or λόγοι [assuming that these are not quite identical]; that Περὶ δικαιοσύνης, the largest apparently of this class of works attributed to Aristotle, the dialogue Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, the Eudemus, the Nerinthus or Korinthius, the Sophista, the Gryllus, the Protreptikus, the Περὶ βασιλείας, and perhaps one or two more. Besides these we have works on mathematics, and on climate and its influence [Περὶ ὑδάτων καὶ ἀέρων καὶ τόπων] alluded to by Galen (iv. 798), and from which we seem to have another extract in the passage where he says that food and climate have enormous effects on cattle so as to change the nature of their flesh and their other sensible qualities (Galen vii. 729). As to the medical work of Aristotle mentioned more than once by Galen, it is in the first place not to be confounded with the ἰατρικὴ συναγωγή really composed by the Peripatetic Menon, and falsely attributed to Aristotle (Galen xiv. 615 sqq., et xv. 25–26); and on the other hand I think it is not likely

to be identical with the ἰατρικά which occur in Diogenes' list, since Galen seems to talk of the book as if it were rather a scientific discussion of the facts and symptoms of disease than a practical treatise on therapeutics (Galen ii. 90). Against this we might perhaps put the story of Plutarch, that Aristotle taught Alexander not only philosophy and science, but also practical medicine; but the very words of the allusion show that Plutarch is proceeding on vague guesswork, and is not referring to any given book[1]. In fact, I think we may safely assume that that entertaining littérateur has no first-hand knowledge of any books of Aristotle except the Dialogues.

When we turn to the list of Diogenes, we find that, with the exception of the Dialogues, there is hardly a work which we can certainly identify as belonging to our present collection. Πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως, ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου, in eight books, may very probably be our Politics. The latter words seem to suggest that there was some doubt in the minds of the compilers of the list as to whether this work should be attributed to Aristotle or to Theophrastus. Now we find in the list of the works of Theophrastus a treatise called Πολιτικῶν, in six books, and this will really exactly accord with the eight of the Aristotelian work, if we take into account (what we shall prove later on) that two books of the Politics, whether they be Aristotelian or no, belong at least to a different recension, and therefore might easily be annexed to the Aristotelian Politics in one manuscript and omitted in another[2]. We have almost certainly also the History of Animals with his Περὶ ζῴων in nine books (omitting of course book 5) and the spurious

[1] Δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ φιλιατρεῖν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ προστρίψασθαι μᾶλλον ἑτέρων Ἀριστοτέλης· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν θεωρίαν ἠγάπησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοσοῦσιν ἐβοήθει τοῖς φίλοις, καὶ συνέταττε θεραπείας τινὰς καὶ διαίτας, ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν λαβεῖν ἔστιν.—Plutarch, Alexander, viii.

[2] Cf. chap. viii, pp. 168–169.

Περὶ φυτῶν. The works Ἀναλυτικῶν ὑστέρων μεγάλων, in two books, may be our Posterior Analytics, and Συλλογισμῶν α. β. is very likely to represent our Prior Analytics; but the identification of the Μεθοδικά with the Topics seems an absolutely mistaken one, or at least one for which there is no proof whatsoever[1]. The very number of books (eight) which seems at first in favour of the identification is in fact a strong argument against it, for the number of books of the Topics, including the Sophistici Elenchi, which up to a very much later period than the time of Favorinus belonged to that collection, was nine and not eight. There are besides these treatises the names of several of the works which we now possess. But the books referred to cannot be the same, since the number of books is entirely out of accordance with those which we now find, and we cannot doubt that, from the time of Andronicus at least and probably before it, the number of books in each treatise was finally settled[2].

The notice of the Categories, De Interpretatione, and the Politeae, seems to be put in as an appendix with the Letters and the Poems, possibly because Favorinus or Diogenes himself had heard that there was some dispute as to their authenticity. It is quite possible that a but half-educated book-maker may have been aware of this discussion, which was sufficiently notorious, and yet may have inserted into his list a number of works which never came under discussion at all, simply because they never were included within the critical canon. People now-a-days talk glibly enough about Merv and its distance from the Indian frontier, who would find it hard to say in what country Merv lies or to give a list of half-a-dozen of the most important towns of Central Asia.

But besides and beyond these few and doubtful works of

[1] Cf. chap. v, pp. 115 sqq. [2] Cf. Cicero, De Oratore, ii. 38. 160.

the Aristotle known to all the disciples of the Andronican tradition, we have an enormous hotchpotch of titles arranged, with the exception perhaps of the Dialogues, in no conceivable or intelligible order.

If Andronicus did indeed arrange a critical list of the authentic writings of Aristotle, on which point, in face of the definite evidence of Porphyry, there should be no shade of doubt, the list which remains to us in Diogenes, putting aside the question of its enormous omissions, cannot be that of Andronicus. For what says Porphyry? That 'Andronicus arranged the separate works of Aristotle and of Theophrastus into sequent treatises, πραγματεῖαι, collecting the cognate questions into the same volume' (Plotinus I, p. 39, ed. Kirchhoff). Now, if we look at the list as we have it in Diogenes, putting aside the Dialogues which, as Bernays shows, come first, not by reason of their matter, but of their style, we have first a treatise, Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, presumably metaphysical; then one on the Laws of Plato; thirdly, apparently notes or quotations from the Platonic Republic. These three may possibly be connected as being all critical studies of Plato. Then follow, an economic work; a work on friendship; one on bodily affections; one on sciences; then four or five logical works, followed by an ethical one; another logical work; a work Περὶ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων (metaphysical or lexicographic); a work on anger; another ethical work; one on first elements; one on science; one on first principles; two apparently logical works; one on question and answer; one on motion; several logical works; one ethical (Περὶ τοῦ βελτίονος); one metaphysical (Περὶ τῆς ἰδέας,) then more logical. So it is throughout the whole list. There is neither order nor arrangement, except sometimes for small groups, in the very middle of which is often inserted a treatise which belongs to an entirely different branch of

enquiry. Treating the matter with reference merely to what we know of the Aristotelian work of Andronicus and his successors, we arrive only at the negative conclusion, that the lists are not those of Andronicus, and bear no relation to them ; unless indeed we are to conceive that Diogenes or Favorinus cut these lists into small pieces and shuffled them.

But we need not go further than Diogenes himself to establish that these lists stand in no relation to the Aristotelian knowledge of the day. In the rest of his work Diogenes cites Aristotle pretty frequently ; and that Aristotle is not the Aristotle of the lists, but the Aristotle of Diogenes' own immediate predecessors and contemporaries. Thus we have an apparent allusion to the Περὶ ψυχῆς in the account of Thales[1], and a direct quotation from the same in the account of the Aristotelian doctrine, following immediately after the enigmatical list[2]. It is noticeable that the account of the doctrines of Aristotle given throughout this chapter is based on the contemporary Aristotle, and is full of references to existing works which do not occur in the lists. Just before the list there is an allusion to the doctrine that a man cannot have many friends, which is stated by Diogenes to be taken from the seventh book of the Ethics. This seems to refer to our ninth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, chapter 10, where the question whether it is possible to have many friends is discussed at considerable length ; but on no hypothesis, that I know of, can the books in the Nicomachean treatise be reduced by two, and by two only, unless we adopt Fritzsche's doctrine, that of the three disputed books the fifth book only is Aristotelian, and hold further that the sixth and seventh had not been inserted as late as the time of Diogenes, who seems here

[1] Diog. Laert. i. 24 = Περὶ ψυχῆς i. 2. 405 *a*. 19 et i. 5. 411 *a*. 8.

[2] Diog. Laert. v. 33 = Περὶ ψυχῆς ii. 1. 412 *a*. 19.

for once to be quoting first-hand; a more simple and probable hypothesis is to imagine merely some scribe's miswriting of ἑβδόμῳ for ἐνάτῳ. If the quotation from Didymus, alluded to already, is really from an author of the time of Nero, it would settle the question, as to the much earlier existence of our present order; but that quotation, as we have already seen, is not beyond doubt. We get, further, citations of a book Περὶ ποιητικῆς, which may possibly be a continuation of our Poetics; a book Περὶ παιδείας, which certainly is not any book known to us, and which, on the other hand, is, it must be admitted, in the list of Diogenes; one from the dialogue, Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, which is also in the list, but, as we have already shown, is well-known to all the ancient world. Of a large number of nameless quotations, some may refer to the Dialogues [1], others are absolutely untraceable [2], and several have distinct reference to works which we now possess [3]. Lastly, there are several references to works which we neither possess nor can find in the list; as the treatise on Magic [4], a treatise on Beans [5], and a treatise on Education [6].

It must be admitted that some of the names in the list of Diogenes are to be found as references in the Aristotelian works; as, for instance, the Διαιρέσεις is referred to in the treatise Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς [7]; the ἐκλογὴ ἀνατομῶν, or ἀνατομαί simply, are referred to constantly in the physiological works [8], the ἰατρικά may possibly be the same as the Περὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας, the most definite citation of which calls it αἱ τῶν νόσων ἀρχαί [9], a title more in accordance with the notice of Galen, though it is alluded to as a work to be performed and under the former name in the doubtful

[1] ii. 55; iii. 37.
[2] i. 99; ii. 26; ii. 45; viii. 52; viii. 63, etc.
[3] i. 24; v. 29; viii. 19, etc.
[4] i. 1.
[5] viii. 34.
[6] ix. 53.
[7] ii. 3. p. 330*b*, 16.
[8] Hist. Anim. iii. 1. 509*b*. 22 et passim.
[9] De Part. Anim. ii. 7. 653*a*. 8.

treatise De longitudine vitae [1]; the Optics are cited in the Problems [2], but one cannot say with any certainty what portion of this treatise is due to Aristotle himself. So, too, the *τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγή* is cited in the Rhetoric [3], but all these citations, as we shall prove in the next chapter, show, not that Aristotle wrote such books, but that some editor or editors thought that he did; that Andronicus is one of these editors cannot be denied, and we shall point out later that at least some of these references in the Aristotelian works are due to him. But the consensus of the writers who follow the tradition of Andronicus forbids us to think that all, or even many, of these works were known to or acknowledged by him. But Diogenes himself furnishes us with the most definite proof as to the source of the list of Favorinus. Immediately before giving his similar list of the works of Theophrastus, he quotes Favorinus, and there distinctly tells us that Favorinus' authority is Hermippus [4]; the point anent which Favorinus is cited is, it is true, not the list, but an unimportant matter as to the old age of Theophrastus. But the list follows without a break, and, if we are justified in assuming that the list also comes from Favorinus, there is at least a strong presumption that the authority of Favorinus was the same in both places. To Hermippus then we look as the prime originator of this strangely confused catalogue, first copied by Favorinus, and after him by Diogenes, though it is probable that either or both of them may have added works to this list; the list, in fact, on the very face of it, is not a *catalogue raisonné* of the works of an author, but merely a statement of the MSS. which exist in a library. Who can doubt, for instance, that *Διαιρέσεις ἑπτὰ καὶ δέκα*, *διαιρετικῶν ᾱ*, *διαιρετικόν ᾱ*, are

[1] 1. 464 *b*. 32.
[2] xvi. 1. 913 *a*. 27.
[3] Bk. iii. ch. 9. 1410 *b*. 2.
[4] Diog. Laert. v. 41.

merely different MSS. containing the same writings in more or less perfect form? In the same way we have *συλλογισμοί ᾱ*, *συλλογισμῶν ᾱ*, $\overline{\beta}$, *συλλογιστικὸν καὶ ὅροι ᾱ*, again *τέχνη ᾱ*, *ἄλλη τέχνη ᾱ*. Would a critical editor, as we must suppose Andronicus to have been, have inserted all these into his list as of undoubtedly Aristotelian authority? We know that, as a fact, Andronicus was so critical, that he rejected the De interpretatione and parts at least of the Categories.

It remains for us, then, to conclude that we have got here a list of the MSS. as they were found, in early times, in the Alexandrian library; and that, too, before the forgeries and duplicate versions had grown to such a cumbrous bulk as they afterwards attained, owing to the misplaced munificence of the Alexandrian kings. For instance, we do not find here two versions of the Categories, nor forty books of the Analytics, but we are on the way to making up this number, which Ammonius tells us was afterwards reached[1]; for including the various works on syllogisms, we have altogether fifteen books concerned with the subject-matter of our four books of the Analytics. Perhaps we have here a catalogue merely of the Aristotelian works in one of the several libraries established by the Ptolemies; and we shall probably have to add up all the MSS. in these libraries in order to make up the enormous roll of a thousand books mentioned by David the Armenian[2]. The forgeries of course went on ever accumulating, but already in the time of Hermippus there must have been a considerable number of them, for, putting aside obvious duplicates, we cannot possibly conceive that all the separate works attributed to Aristotle in this list should have been written by him, in addition to all those which on better grounds we attribute to him. Perhaps we shall not altogether wrong Theophrastus in suspecting that even

[1] Amm. Ad Cat. 13 *a*, ed. Ven. 1545.

[2] Stahr, Aristotelia, ii. 63.

the first book-hunting embassy of Ptolemy son of Lagos [1], and the consequent voyage of Strato to Egypt [2], was not altogether fruitless of introducing spurious or doubtful Aristotelian works into the newly-founded Alexandrian library. The eighty talents which, according to the doubtful story of Diogenes, Strato received from Ptolemy Philadelphus, had to be paid for in weight of books, if not in value thereof.

Diogenes Laertius brings us to the threshold of the Aristotelian scholiasts, whose works have survived to us; he is a contemporary, or almost contemporary, of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, the greatest of all the Greek scholiasts who deal with Aristotle. From this time, then, the text of Aristotle is a definite thing, which we can deal with, and whose changes, if any, we are in a condition to trace. That there were such changes I shall attempt to show in a later chapter [3]. But from this time forward it is not impossible to reconstruct the Aristotelian text; that text is commented upon with the greatest care and accuracy; all the various readings are preserved, and we have to deal with only two difficulties; the first and worst being the entire lack of writings belonging to the great school of Greek commentators with regard to certain Aristotelian treatises, the other a less frequent and more subtle difficulty, the passing over by the commentators of passages which presented no difficulties to them because they found only one easy reading, which passages have now come down to us in a condition impaired by the second flood in which Aristotle, as well as all Greek literature, was practically submerged, from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries; for the labours of Byzantine commentators tended rather to the corruption than to the elucidation of the text; often in such cases we can see that Alexander, Themistius, or

[1] Diog. Laert. v. 37. [2] Diog. Laert. v. 58. [3] Ch. vi, passim.

Ammonius has got a reading entirely different from ours, but the attempt to reconstruct that reading is both difficult and dangerous.

The result of our work up to this point has been to prove that the works of Aristotle known to the learned world in the first two centuries after our era included all, or almost all, of our present collection ; that they included further, as undoubtedly Aristotelian, certain of the Dialogues, the Πολιτεῖαι, and two or three more treatises, but that they did not include the muddled and heterogeneous list handed down to us by Diogenes and his copyists.

# CHAPTER V.

## OF TITLES AND REFERENCES.

No author is so plentifully provided with references and cross-references as Aristotle; if we are to believe that all these are genuine we must hold that he arranged his works on a preconcerted system, so that every one of them should stand in its place, and that he carried this scheme in his head not only with regard to works already completed but also as to works of which he had not as yet written a line. We must assume further that the titles of the works were already fixed by Aristotle, and that they have not varied since. Thus, for instance, in the test passage at the beginning of the Meteorologica we have first references to three physical works which precede, though there the divisions are not quite the same as those of our present books; and we have also a more general reference to the physical works which are to follow[1]; on the other hand, besides these general references we have at least an equal or perhaps greater number of references to these same books under other names. Which names, then, if any, rightly belong to them? Are we to suppose that Aristotle was at once so exact and so inexact as to connect all his multifarious works by a system of references and cross-references, and at the same time to confuse his reader by referring to the same work under two, three, or more names?

On the question of the titles of the treatises we are not left entirely to Aristotle; we have already referred to

[1] Meteor. i. 1, pp. 338*a*. 20–339*a*. 8.

Galen's statement that the books which we call respectively the Prior and Posterior Analytics are cited by Aristotle as the books about Syllogism and the books about Proof. Now Galen knew these books and also the Topics well, and had a sufficiently accurate general acquaintance with the remaining Aristotelian works. In Aristotle, as we now have him, the reference to the Analytics is sufficiently constant, though there are also references to the books on Syllogism and those upon Proof: it seems hardly conceivable that Galen should have told us this story in the face of these frequent references to the Analytics, unless either he did not find these references in his text, or finding, attributed them to some comparatively recent interpolator. In the same way we have noticed that the fifth book of the History of Animals, as it stands in our collections, is known to Athenaeus, and presumably to earlier authorities, as the fifth book of the Parts of Animals; further, that the only passage which Cicero cites from the Topics is to be found in the treatise now called Περὶ ἑρμηνείας. The evidence is in fact generally in favour of considerable variation of names for some time after the Christian era, and some of the names are undoubtedly badly chosen; we shall have reason, for instance, later on to think that the term ἠθικά did not originally belong to the whole of the Aristotelian treatise or collection of treatises which now pass under that name. The same thing is confessedly true of the Physics. An earlier nomenclature breaks up this treatise into two parts, τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν and τὰ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως. The only book which we can prove to have been from an early period in the same state and with the same divisions as those which we now find, is the Rhetoric.

As regards references, in some cases at least, there is a cross-quotation between two treatises; each cites the other; the most obvious and well-known case of this

kind is with the Topics and Analytics; the Analytics cites the Topics four times, the Topics cites the Analytics five, if we include, as we should, the Σοφιστικοὶ Ἔλεγχοι amongst the books of the Topics. In the same way the Meteorologica cites the book Περὶ αἰσθήσεως[1], though the passage so cited does not exist in our book under that title; but the Περὶ αἰσθήσεως refers to Περὶ ψυχῆς[2] as πρότερον, while the Περὶ ψυχῆς cites the Περὶ γενέσεως[3] καὶ φθορᾶς, which itself must necessarily immediately precede the Meteorologica, if the first chapter of that work be genuine. The references then generally are by no means beyond suspicion, and it becomes our duty to examine more in detail the evidence with regard to them, and the facts which may be deduced from that evidence.

Of the cross-citation various explanations have been given; the least probable, perhaps, is that which has found most supporters, viz. that Aristotle issued more than one edition of his works, and that these citations belong to a second edition. In favour of the doctrine of a second recension we have, it is true, the great name of Torstrik[4], though he applies this doctrine in a somewhat different manner. Trendelenburg[5] varies between this doctrine and that of a repetition of lectures merely, in which the earlier lectures were less full than the later. So that in the second course books would be inserted which would contain references to works posterior in the order of thought but prior in fact, since they had already been given in the first course; while in this second repetition these same works would come later, and therefore naturally and properly would refer back to what now (in this second course) preceded them, the inserted book or books. But in the first

[1] Meteor. i. 3. 341 *a*. 14.
[2] Περὶ αἰσθ. 1. 436 *b*. 14.
[3] Περὶ ψυχῆς, ii. 5. 417 *a*. 1, and elsewhere.
[4] Torstrik, De An. Praef. § 2.
[5] Trendelenburg, De Anima prooemium, 114–115.

place, as we have already tried to show[1], the notion of a recension of books by Aristotle, or in fact of any editing of the Ἀκροαματικοὶ λόγοι by him, is mistaken. In the second place, it is simply inconceivable that any lecturer should keep in his head so enormous a course so as to give references often to minute points in passages to be found in other portions of the course far removed both in thought and in order.

But if this difficulty as to quotations and cross-quotations were the only one it might perhaps be got over; as a matter of fact it is neither the only one nor the greatest. We get in the Aristotelian works three classes at least of reference, which cannot be explained on the assumption that Aristotle is the author of these references; first, we get references to works which Aristotle can hardly have written, and of which there is no trace even as far back as the time of Andronicus; secondly, we have references to minute points, in what purport to be future treatises; and thirdly, we get references which involve mistakes or changes as to doctrine, fact, or order. First, we have the evidence of Cicero that the book Περὶ φυτῶν, not the book which we now possess, but a much earlier treatise, was composed by Theophrastus, and his statement here is a precise and definite one, not resting upon any inference of his own, but evidently due to the teaching of his master, whether that master in this matter was Tyrannion or Antiochus. Cicero distinctly opposes Aristotle's knowledge of the animal kingdom to Theophrastus' knowledge of the vegetable kingdom[2]. The book Περὶ φυτῶν was, in fact, variously attributed to Aristotle and Theophrastus, and does not seem to have been one of those frequent works of which there were two versions, that of Theophrastus differing somewhat from that of Aristotle. On the whole the

[1] Cf. ante, ch. ii, pp. 23 sqq.

[2] Cic. De Fin. v. 4. 10.

balance of opinion was in favour of Theophrastus; but there could have been no doubt at all had the critics of the time had before them, as we have, a number of references to the books Περὶ φυτῶν existing in well-known works of Aristotle. A book Περὶ μετάλλων is distinctly promised in the Meteorologica[1], notwithstanding that Brandis in his index[2] denies that there is any reference. Neither can I think it likely that the reference Meteorologica, book iv[3], can be, as Brandis thinks, to the end of the third book[4], for in the end of this very chapter Aristotle promises to treat the whole subject of minerals specially elsewhere, and according to this view of Brandis the only place in which he again refers to the subject of minerals contains merely a reference back to this same chapter.

The Θεοδέκτεια, another work which, notwithstanding the doubts of Heitz and the somewhat strained interpretation of Rose, is certainly referred to in the Rhetoric[5] as an Aristotelian work, occurs also, we may notice, in the list of Diogenes; that is, according to our interpretation, was amongst the works attributed to Aristotle in the Alexandrian catalogue: now it is to be noticed that the reference to the Θεοδέκτεια occurs in the Rhetoric, that is, in a work which was continually extant and continually subject to alteration in the whole period between Aristotle and Andronicus. Now if, as I shall hope to show, there is some reason to suppose that a good many at least of the systematic references were inserted by Andronicus himself, and if it was also the case that the criticism of Andronicus rejected the Θεοδέκτεια as spurious, we should have an easy explanation of all the facts of the case; the Θεοδέκτεια would be one of the works which was attributed to Aristotle in the period most fertile

[1] iii. 6. 378 *b*. 5. [2] 104 *a*. 43–46. [3] iv. 8. 384 *b*. 32–34.
[4] iii. 6. 378 *a*. 15, etc. [5] Rhet. iii. 9. 1410 *b*. 2.

in forgeries, the second and third centuries before our era. If then the insertion of references had already begun, we understand how, in the text of the Rhetoric, which was already fairly established by the time of Andronicus, a reference to this work would occur; we understand also how the name is inscribed in the list of Diogenes. Now we have no right to assume that the find at Skepsis included all the Aristotelian works known to us; any which had been published in any form during the lifetime of Aristotle or Theophrastus would be less likely to be found there, since the wish to possess the original of published books is certainly not to be attributed to anyone earlier than the Ptolemies in Egypt, and therefore MSS. of books already published would be esteemed of less value and less carefully preserved. It is possible, though not proveable, that the story of Athenaeus as to the sale of certain books by Neleus to Ptolemy Philadelphus may refer to original or assumed original MSS. of books already in circulation [1]; we know at least that the Ptolemies were amateurs of originals, so much so that they would give large prices for those originals, and return carefully executed copies. We know further that even at the library of Alexandria these originals rapidly disappeared, and that all that remained were copies which had several times been re-edited. Still it is probable that, by reason of the constant corruption of books in Greece proper, the most correct copies of any works not to be found in the Skepsis treasure were to be looked for in the Alexandrian libraries. The task then which Andronicus performed for books already in vogue like the Rhetoric, the Πολιτεῖαι, and the Dialogues (if indeed he edited these latter at all) would be a comparison of copies, correction of obvious errors, and excision of interpolations. Now the allusion to the Θεοδέκτεια,

[1] Athen. 3 *a–b*.

even although Andronicus might be too doubtful about the treatise itself to include it in his critical edition, would be one to a work which, in some time past at least, had been attributed to Aristotle, and Andronicus and Tyrannion, as conservative editors (and all good editors are conservative), would not have felt justified in striking out this reference from their text, though they themselves would probably not have inserted it. The fact that the Θεοδέκτεια vanishes from this time forth would depend on the principle on which I have already laid stress, that the whole sound critical treatment of Aristotle finds its well-head in the work of Andronicus, and that books not included in his canon were soon looked upon as spurious.

Much the same thing may be said of the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, the ἐγκύκλια and the ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι, to all which there are references in our text; I hold that Bernays on the one hand has made out his point that these expressions refer in most, if not in all, cases to dialogues or other treatises popular at least in form though perhaps not in matter; on the other hand I agree with his opponents in believing that the use of the word ἐξωτερικός and its implied opposite ἐσωτερικός in the senses respectively of 'popular' and 'secret doctrine' is certainly later than Aristotle; that the only proper Aristotelian use of the term is that which we find in the Politics, ἐξωτερικωτέρα σκέψις[1], which certainly means 'an enquiry alien to the present matter.' The absence of the word ἐσωτερική or -κός in our works is no argument against the assumption that ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are opposed to deeper and more secret treatises, since all the works which we now have belong to the latter class; they can therefore only cite each other by special names, and can not refer to any treatise within the 'esoteric' class by a general designation

[1] Polit. i. 5. 1254 *a*. 33.

which would apply equally well to the treatise in which the citation was made as to that which was cited. There would be moreover, as we have already pointed out, a natural tendency amongst editors, who were themselves usually Peripatetics, to exalt the esoteric and unpublished works above the exoteric and published ones. We find, as we should expect, that references to esoteric works are much more common in treatises which were in vogue all through the period of darkness than in those which may be supposed to have remained unpublished during that time. The Peripatetic philosophers, in giving their wares forth to the world, took care to inform that world that they had much more valuable goods in reserve, which could only be obtained by direct initiation and oral instruction. Thus they talk of the dialogues under the general and somewhat contemptuous name of the external doctrine, without taking the trouble to specify what special dialogue the doctrine is to be found in. The whole tone with regard to them is slighting: Λέγεται ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια[1]—τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥᾴδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις[2]—τεθρύληται γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων[3]—ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν[4], where the distinction between the ἀκροαματικά and the ἐξωτερικά is precisely drawn. It is noticeable that this sharper distinction between the ἐξωτερικά and τὰ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν occurs in a work which must necessarily have existed and been currently known in the centuries intervening between Theophrastus and Andronicus; for no version of the Skepsis story asserts that Neleus carried off the works of Eudemus as well as those of Theophrastus

[1] Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 *a*. 26.
[2] Pol. iii. 6. 1278 *b*. 31.
[3] Met. xii. 1. 1076 *a*. 28.
[4] Eth. Eud. i. 8. 1217 *b*. 22.

and Aristotle. Out of all the times in which the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are mentioned by Aristotle (or rather his editors) more than half fall into two books, the Eudemian Ethics (including for that purpose the doubtful three books 4, 5, 6 Eud.) and the Politics. Now the former we know from internal and external evidence, the latter at least from external evidence, to have been in vogue during the pre-Skepsis period. The remaining allusions are one in the Nicomachean Ethics[1], one in the Physics[2], and one in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics[3]. Now there is no difficulty whatever in supposing that Andronicus, himself a Peripatetic, may have fallen sometimes into the customary Peripatetic method of designating the more popular works, though the distinction would have lost the greater part of its meaning when all the works equally were published; and we must notice moreover that out of these three quotations one at least is to be found in a book whose nature and origin are and are likely to remain a matter of controversy[4]. It is to be noticed further as bearing in the same direction that, with the exception of the dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας, none of the dialogues are definitely alluded to in this system of references. Rose would of course explain this by saying that the dialogues are all of them spurious; but, in order to combine his two contradictory assumptions of the absolute authenticity of all the references and the practical co-extensiveness of the genuine Aristotelian writings with our present canon, he has to play such curious tricks with grammar, with his text, and with common-sense, that I prefer to follow Bernays and the unanimous verdict of antiquity in believing, first, that these dialogues were the works of Aristotle in a sense as full as, or perhaps fuller

[1] Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 *a*. 26.
[2] Physics, iv. 10. 217 *b*. 31.
[3] Met. xii. 1. 1076 *a*. 28.
[4] Cf. post, chap. vi, p. 139.

than, any others which are included in the Aristotelian canon; secondly, that these dialogues are definitely alluded to as ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, ἐγκύκλια and under other vague designations. It seems to me that the only consistent and satisfactory explanation of the fact of these vague allusions, coupled with the studious avoidance of the names of these writings, lies in the theory which I have broached. How little willing the Peripatetics were to acknowledge the doctrinal value of the Aristotelian works which they contemptuously called the ἐξωτερικά we may see from a statement of Alexander Aphrodisiensis quoted by David the Armenian. Ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ἄλλην διαφορὰν λέγει τῶν ἀκροαματικῶν πρὸς τὰ διαλογικά, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀκροαματικοῖς τὰ δοκοῦντα αὐτῷ λέγει καὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαλογικοῖς τὰ ἄλλοις δοκοῦντα, τὰ ψευδῆ[1].

The Ἐκλογὴ τῶν ἐναντίων[2] is a work as to which we can hardly say whether it was or was not Aristotelian; it is referred to three or four times, and it does not seem that there is any justification for identifying it with the second book of the Topics, nor again with the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, nor with any part of it; Alexander[3] informs us that this book occurred in the treatise Περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, but he is not very consistent in his notices of it. In the Politics there are three or four references to the Oeconomica, a work now entirely lost to us, if it ever existed.

But a much more certain proof of the non-Aristotelian nature of these references lies in the large number of future references; some of these, it is true, are quite general in their nature, and such as a man might possibly insert looking to a book which he had planned but not published, as, for instance, the references in the Physics to the explanation

[1] David in Cat. Prol. 24 *b*. 33–36, ed. Berol.

[2] Metaph. 1004 *a*, l. 2; 1054 *a*, l. 30; 1055 *b*, l. 28. Topics, 104 *a*, l. 33.

[3] In Met. 206. 20, ed. Bonitz.

which Aristotle means to give of the question, whether there is one or more than one ultimate principle in the πρώτη φιλοσοφία[1]; but the majority of future references refer to small and unimportant points which it is hardly conceivable that a man should have definitely decided to insert in a given unwritten work; instances of this class of reference are most common in the Ἱστορίαι, and the works on natural history generally[2]. But though by far most frequent in these books, these references are by no means absolutely confined to them; talking of the motion of the fifth body as eternal, Aristotle says this might be proved also through the methods of first philosophy[3]; now if this refers to anything in the book which we have, it must refer to the proof in book xi of the Metaphysics of the eternal motion of all those things which owe that motion to the direct influence of the divine will: in the same way in the Meteorologica[4] there is a reference to the book Περὶ αἰσθήσεως, though here the observation to which this is an allusion is not to be found in our present book of that name; another, perhaps more obvious case, is the reference in the Politics to the theory of κάθαρσις in the Poetics; this again is a passage not to be found in our Poetics, but we know that this book of ours is itself imperfect, and, if we are to believe the authority of Diogenes, there existed a treatise on Poetry in two books. Now it is to be noticed that the History of Animals in which these future references are most frequent cannot on any supposition be a course of lectures, so that Trendelenburg's theory of a repeated course cannot possibly apply to the explanation of these references. Neither

[1] Physics, i. 9. 192*a*. 35.

[2] Cf. Hist. Anim. i. 5. p. 489*b*. 16–18; De Part. Anim. iv. 4. 678 *a*, 16–20, etc.

[3] De Caelo, i. 8. 277 *b*. 10.

[4] Meteor. i. 3. 341 *a*. 14.

can these Ἱστορίαι have ever been formally edited books till they fell into the hands of later grammarians and critics; if, then, we are to believe that the references are Aristotle's, we must believe that from the beginning he had in his head a definite scheme, and had made up his mind as to where he would put every part of it, even in the remotest details. The real truth is this, that the expressions εἴρηται and εἰρήσεται mean merely that the person who is putting in the reference has got a definite order, and writes, 'it has been said,' if the passage precedes in that order, 'it will be said,' if the passage follows.

But perhaps the gravest difficulty in the way of believing that the references are generally those of Aristotle, arises from the frequent mis-references involving either ignorance, false order, doubtful order, or misunderstanding of doctrine. First, let us take the expression περὶ φιλοσοφίας or κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. This expression is generally, though not always, combined with the adjective πρώτης or πρώτην, and seems usually to mean the Metaphysics[1]; but at least once the Physics[2] are referred to as τὰ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. But as to the Physics themselves, a greater confusion prevails: the words τὰ περὶ φύσεως mean either in the narrowest sense the first five books of the Physics[3], otherwise called τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς; or they mean the whole four treatises[4], Physics, De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and the Meteorologica; or, finally, they mean our books of the Physics[5]. The last three books of the Physics are most commonly referred to as τὰ περὶ κινήσεως, but the sixth book is referred to in the eighth as ἐν τοῖς καθόλου περὶ φύσεως. Now is it in any way conceivable that an

[1] Physics, i. 9. 192 *a*. 35; Περὶ γενέσ. i. 3. 318 *a*. 6; De Caelo, i. 8. 277 *b*. 10, etc.

[2] De Part. Anim. i. 1. 642 *a*. 6.

[3] Physics, viii. 1. 251 *a*. 9.

[4] Metaph. i. 8. 989 *a*. 24.

[5] Met. xii. 9. 1086 *a*. 23.

author should at one and the same time be so accurate as to be able to give references which are usually correct to such an enormous series of works, and should yet be so careless as unnecessarily to confuse his readers by citing the same work under two or three different names, and by employing the same name, or almost exactly the same, with regard to two such different works as the Physics and the Metaphysics? The explanation is to be found in the constant changing of the titles of the whole or the parts of the Aristotelian treatises. This did not even end with Andronicus. With regard to the Physics, for instance, the earliest form in which they probably existed was as two treatises, Περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν and Περὶ κινήσεως; they were then arranged by Andronicus, together with the De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and the Meteorologica, into one volume or complex of scrolls, containing all the works which he considered to be validly Aristotle's bearing on the subject; for, if we are to accept Porphyry's statement, this was in truth the method of Andronicus. In the next volume or bundle to this would have come the De Anima, the Parva Naturalia, and all the treatises bearing on the lives and habits of animals; the two volumes would form a connected whole, which might be called Aristotle on Physical Philosophy. The individual treatises would still retain their names, but all the first volume would be distinctively called Τὰ περὶ φύσεως. All parts of this volume would be edited in relation to each other, so that πρότερον and ὕστερον might be in any part of the volume, however far off. The connection in the second volume would be a great deal less close than that in the first, since this second volume would contain not only definite acroamatic works, like those of which the first volume was composed, but a large, in fact a larger, number of mere ἱστορίαι. This volume would therefore get no single

definite name, though the connection of the treatises with each other, and their general relation to the first volume, is sufficiently clearly pointed out in the first chapter of the first book of the Meteorologica. The use of the name Physics, in the intermediate sense of the eight books now known to us under that name, seems to me the latest of all; and it is in accordance with this view that the only references we find to this use of the name are in the Metaphysics, the book which was last of all reduced into order. Thus far as to changes of name in the references.

As to absolutely mistaken references, one or two may be cited. There are distinct references in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics to the ninth; yet I shall try to prove at a later period that the ninth book belongs to a treatise which did not originally form part of the Ethics[1]. Again, in the second book of these Ethics[2] there is a distinct reference to the first chapter of the fifth book in its present form, and there is a reference I think equally distinct to the doctrine that all excellences indifferently are μεσότητες, a doctrine which, in fact, we find in some later Aristotelians quoted by Stobaeus, whom (because they wrote in Doric) he ingenuously called Pythagoreans. The words in this passage of the second book are usually otherwise explained, but they are only so explained because of a double assumption; first, that Aristotle wrote those words; secondly, that he could not seriously have written the statement that intellectual as well as moral virtue is a mean state: the second assumption is certainly true enough, but the first is, I hold, mistaken, and it is the first only which compels us to put a strained interpretation on the word ὁμοίως in the passage referred to.

What, now, are we to make of the double references which we get between the Topics and Analytics, and again, as I think I shall be able to show, between certain books of the

[1] Cf. ch. vii, pp. 142 sqq. [2] Eth. Nic. ii. 7. 1108 *b*, l. 6–10.

Politics[1]? I think we shall find that one explanation will make clear all cases; the books which thus alternately refer to each other have at different times been differently arranged; this we know to be the fact with regard to the Topics; many ancient editors considered the Topics should come immediately after the Categories, so much so that they called the Categories 'the treatise before the Topics' (the De Interpretatione we may leave out of the question, since, though it quotes several of the Aristotelian writings, it is mentioned by none, and, being considered of doubtful value, was probably put at the end of the collection of treatises with which it was connected). If at one time (or according to one school) the Topics preceded the Analytics, and the references were arranged accordingly, and if afterwards our present arrangement was resorted to, while the text, being at that time held sacred, was not altered, but elucidated by a number of marginal references, which afterwards got into the text; then our whole difficulty as to double references vanishes.

There is another class of references the nature and position of which throw great light on the whole subject; these are those which connect two successive books of a treatise or the end of one treatise with the beginning of another in our present order. Very frequently in such cases the same words, or almost the same, are given at the end of one book and repeated at the beginning of another; thus, for instance, at the end of the fifth book of the Metaphysics we have *φανερὸν δ' ἐν οἷς διωρισάμεθα περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἕκαστον, ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν,* while at the beginning of the sixth we find *τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς*: at the end of the fourth book of the Nicomachean Ethics we have *νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν*; the fifth book begins

[1] Ch. viii, pp. 172 sqq.

with περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον. Again, the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics ends with λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν; the eighth book begins with μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἕποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν. Similarly in the Politics, the third book ends with διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς. ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν, κ.τ.λ.; the fourth (seventh) book begins with περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τίς αἱρετώτατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν. Now in all these cases, except perhaps the first, there is some doubt as to the connection between the books; a reference therefore was wanted to pack the books together in the order believed in by him who inserted that reference: this reference might be put indifferently at the beginning of one book, or at the end of another, or it might be put, and probably often was put, in the margin in between the two books. A reference so inserted in the margin would in some MSS. get tacked on to the end of one book or treatise, in others to the beginning of another. The words of Simplicius in his account of the position of the fifth book of the Physics relatively to the sixth[1], seems to show that not only the arrangement of the treatises relatively to each other, but also the arrangement of books in a treatise was to a great extent the work of Andronicus; and to him we may with great probability attribute these connecting references; though the reduplication of the reference must in most, if not in all, cases have been due to the stupidity or the doubt of a copyist, who found some such reference in the margin of his MS., and was anxious, as copyists ever are, to squeeze it into the text.

[1] Simp. in Phys. fol. 216 *a*, ll. 1–34, Ald.

Some of the references show by their very nature, not only that they were not written by Aristotle, but that they were inserted by some editor who was doubtful either of the authenticity or of the value of the work to which he was referring. A very noticeable instance of this class occurs in the Politics[1], where the Aristotelian editor says φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. Now the mock-modesty which would say of his own works, 'if these works of ours are worth anything' is entirely alien to Aristotle; whoever put in that reference did so at a time when some question had been raised as to the Nicomachean Ethics. He himself, apparently, to some extent shared the doubt, whatever it was. This is the most striking instance of the kind, paralleling as it does the contemptuous or doubtful way in which the exoteric discourses or dialogues are invariably spoken of. If Rudolf Hirzel is right in his conjecture that λόγος in classical Greek always means a set discourse, then we get another proof of the lateness of the insertion of this reference, for the Nicomachean Ethics cannot be in any way described as a λόγος of this kind.

It has been assumed throughout this chapter that the inference drawn before from the speech and silence of all the successors of Andronicus is a correct one, and that the number of books arranged and accepted by Andronicus did not greatly exceed those which we at present possess. On the other hand we must admit that we have evidence, though it is not of very trustworthy character, that Andronicus' list contained a much larger number of works. David the Armenian solemnly asserts that Andronicus, the eleventh master of the school from Aristotle, possessed altogether a thousand of the Aristotelian works, or at least

[1] Polit. iv. (vii.) 13. 1332*a*. 7–10.

stated that there were a thousand [1]. If this statement of David were true, then indeed we should possess but a small portion of the Aristotelian treatises; but against believing it there are several insuperable objections. In the first place it is inconceivable that any man of sense should have believed that Aristotle or anybody else wrote a thousand complete treatises, *συγγράμματα* not *βιβλία*. In the second place the very number, a thousand, is extremely suspicious, for it is that precise number which David, in another place, says that Ptolemy Philadelphus possessed. Now Ptolemy Philadelphus, or, what is the same thing, the libraries of Alexandria, must have possessed a very considerably larger number of books attributed to Aristotle than were included in the list of Andronicus; for we know that either Andronicus himself, or some other editor, during or even before his time, had reduced the number of the Analytics from forty books to four, and in all probability a similar reduction was made by Andronicus in the cutting out of other spurious treatises. As a matter of fact David does not know Andronicus first-hand, for although he is aware that there is some doubt as to the validity of the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας [2], which he defends, he does not seem to be aware that it was Andronicus who raised this doubt. The whole passage of David is full of errors; he supposes, for instance, that Aristotle went all round the inhabited, or at least Hellenised, world with Alexander. Moreover, notwithstanding his wide statement of the number of *συγγράμματα* possessed or at least mentioned by Andronicus, his actual list almost exactly corresponds with ours.

Connected with the main question of the order of the Analytics and Topics respectively is the further question

[1] Schol. ed. Brandis, p. 24 *a*. 19.

[2] Cf. Alexand. Aphrod., Prior Analyt. 52. 33, p. 161, ed. Berol.

of their names; Galen[1], as we have seen, says that it is only οἱ νῦν who call the Analytics by that name; that Aristotle, which of course means some early editor, always alludes to them as τὰ περὶ συλλογισμῶν and τὰ περὶ ἀποδείξεως. We have, as I have said, a few references still remaining in this form, which I am inclined to think may be those of Andronicus; yet, as Waitz and other editors have pointed out, it does not seem probable that the more obvious names περὶ συλλογισμῶν and περὶ ἀποδείξεως should be exchanged for the less obvious one ἀναλυτικά, and I think the key to this difficulty is to be found in the fact that the name ἀναλυτικά was already, from a long time back, in use in the Alexandrine libraries; that amongst the forty books of Analytics, which these libraries at one time possessed, were in all probability at least the two books περὶ ἀποδείξεως, much as we now have them, which books may probably then have borne the name ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα μεγάλα, as we find it in the list of Diogenes; that the four books recognised by Andronicus consisted of these two and the two books περὶ συλλογισμῶν, for which four works he found, or thought he found, independent authority, whether that authority lay in the library brought from Skepsis, or in the tradition of the Peripatetic school.

Ammonius, it is true, tells us that these four books were separated from the rest and judged to be genuine because the interpreters considered that the thoughts and phraseology were more worthy of Aristotle than those of the rest, and further because the philosopher makes mention of these books in his works very frequently; but the last reason seems to me to be putting effect for cause. If Andronicus had, as it seems probable he had, some external evidence or tradition of the Schools in favour of these four books,

[1] Cf. ch. iv, p. 80.

and if the books, as he found them either in the Skepsis library or that of the Lyceum (of which he was, or had been president), bore the name respectively of τὰ περὶ συλλογισμῶν and τὰ περὶ ἀποδείξεως, while two at least of them, and perhaps all four, were already known to the literary world as part of the great Aristotelian logical collection called τὰ ἀναλυτικά, then it would be natural for Andronicus in republishing these books to preserve the general name under which they and others were already known, although on critical grounds he was compelled to reject the others. The few references to the older Grecian title of these books might be due either to Peripatetic philosophers earlier than Andronicus, or (if indeed they were due to Andronicus himself) would have been put in by him before he made up his mind to adopt the well-known Egyptian title for the whole of the four books. It is of course possible that Galen may be more exactly correct even than this, and that the name τὰ ἀναλυτικά may be later than Andronicus as applied to these four books; but in that case both sets of references, that to the order in which the Topics precedes, and that to the other order in which it follows, must be later than Andronicus, and that I think is not a probable supposition. As to the supposed identity of the Topics and the Methodica, I have already stated that I consider it unprovable, and as far as the evidence goes, it is against it; thus Aristotle, or his editor, in the beginning of the Rhetoric, alludes both to the Topics and the Methodica. Diogenes in his list mentions the Methodica, and also mentions some Topics, though they do not correspond with ours. Simplicius, who mentions the Topics frequently, also mentions the Methodica as a different work; but the Methodica was certainly a logical work, and must have covered much the same ground as the Topics, and I am inclined on the whole to think that it must have been in fact what

we call a second version or text of the Topics; but all such conjectures are unprovable and not very useful.

To sum up then, we find the titles of the Aristotelian books did not arrive at a fixed condition till some hundred years after the death of the master; that on the other hand the references assume all the titles as already fixed during his lifetime; and that even so they are not explicable, unless we grant further that he deliberately called several books each by two or three names; that he had planned out all his books before he began any, and carried all the details of books both written and unwritten in his head. Even these liberal assumptions will not get rid of all the difficulties, and the only satisfactory way of explaining the matter as a whole is to believe that all or the great majority of the references are post-Aristotelian, and that they proceed from editors neither of the same date nor altogether in agreement as to the nomenclature and order of precedence of the books[1].

[1] I have said nothing as to Rose's argument as to the agreement of all texts, including the Hebrew and Arabic, because I suppose that it must be obvious to all men that this agreement shows merely that no alteration was made after the text had passed through the hands of the Greek commentators, and had assumed its semi-final form. No one doubts that this is the case; but it is no argument against changes in the text by Andronicus himself, by his predecessors, and by his immediate successors, which is all I plead for.

# CHAPTER VI.

## OF REPETITIONS AND SECOND AND THIRD TEXTS, ILLUSTRATED ESPECIALLY FROM THE PHYSICS, METAPHYSICS, AND DE ANIMA.

In dealing with the Aristotelian writings as a whole we have, as I have already said, to deal with three separate classes of repetitions. Firstly, the repetition in considerably altered language of a whole treatise generally under some other name ; as the Aristotelian and Theophrastean History of Animals, Politics, Analytics, etc., and the Aristotelian and Eudemian Ethics, Physics, and Analytics ; secondly, the repetition of a whole book or large portion of a book either in the same or in two different treatises, as the Books B, Γ, E, Z, H, Θ, and the books M, N of the Metaphysics, or the Books B, Γ, Δ, E of the Physics and the latter part of K of the Metaphysics, or the three doubtful books claimed both for the Nicomachean and for the Eudemian Ethics ; thirdly, the repetition of short passages either close together or considerably removed from each other.

Now I do not believe that any one of these three classes can be adequately explained by a single hypothesis. Almost every such repetition must be taken and examined by itself, and the light which the explanation of any other apparently parallel case will throw is not nearly so great or clear as might be at first imagined. Nevertheless some general principles may be usefully stated and illustrated by examples.

The majority of cases of the repetition of whole treatises is, I think, to be explained on the general principles which I have laid down in the second chapter[1]. The course of lectures on each subject was continually repeated, with such slight variations of language and doctrine as the taste or ingenuity of the new expositor might suggest. But there are one or two treatises of the whole of which double versions exist, or have existed, which cannot, I think, be thus explained. Adrastus (quoted by Simplicius) tells us that there existed two texts of the Categories differing from each other in very few points, and having the same number of lines[2]. This latter statement is probably somewhat exaggerated, but we may take it, I think, that these two texts differed only in mistakes or alterations, which had been introduced by copyists or editors. A very similar phenomenon has been observed with regard to the whole of the Politics. The Latin translation ascribed to William de Moerbeke follows a text varying considerably from that of any of the Greek MSS., and on the whole considerably better. Susemihl conjectures, and I think correctly, that the definite division of the two texts was of a comparatively late date; certainly after Andronicus, and not before the time of the greater Greek commentators. The correctness of this conjecture I think I shall be able to establish, or at least greatly to strengthen by the examination of a parallel case, where the duplicate text does indeed exist only for a single book, but which may most conveniently be treated here, for the light which it throws both on the duplicate texts of the Categories and Politics, and also on the somewhat more complicated problem of the De Anima.

It has long been known that there exists a double version of the whole of the seventh book of the Physics,

[1] Chap. ii, pp. 28 sqq. [2] Simp. in Cat. 4 *b*, 50–5 *a*, 1, ed. Bas. 1551.

and that the text which till lately was given of the first chapter of that book was not the first and better but the second and worse. I think it more than probable that in the later chapters (3, 4, 5) of the textus receptus, we have still either the second text, or at least a mixture of the two. Spengel[1] unearthed a copy of the first version from Morell, and suggested that the second version was in fact the Eudemian book on the same subject; which Simplicius tells us was lost before his time, if it ever had been written. Spengel's suggestion is a taking one, and for a long time I was inclined to accept it, but on further study I was compelled absolutely to discard it for the following reasons. In the first place, the book in either text is almost certainly un-Aristotelian; it is not wanted and treats, in a much less satisfactory fashion, matters which are fully explained in the eighth book. Simplicius[2] and, as it seems, Alexander also treat it with some suspicion, though the former throws out the suggestion that it may be the original final book of the treatise, and that Aristotle may have afterwards added the more exact eighth book but may have been unwilling altogether to discard this one. Themistius leaves out altogether the first part of the book in his paraphrase, and gives a very short and practically useless account of the rest of the book. His method of dealing with it is in fact quite different from that which he applies to the rest of the Aristotelian works. I think therefore there can on the whole be no doubt that neither text is Aristotelian, and here I have the honour for once in a way of agreeing with Rose. Is then the first version Eudemian? That is at first sight a very possible hypothesis, but on the whole I am inclined to reject it also.

[1] Spengel, Abhdl. d. philos. Cl. d. k. Baier. Akad. d. Wiss. vol. iii. pp. 305–349.

[2] Simplicius in Physica, fol. 242 *a*, l. 5 sqq.

Eudemus, as we have already seen, is the least original and therefore the most faithful of the disciples of Aristotle[1]. In the Physics especially he seems, as far as we can judge from the very frequent citations of Simplicius, to follow his master foot by foot. Now the seventh book of the Physics, though it deals chiefly with the same questions as the eighth, treats them in a very different fashion. It plays with them rather than solves them ; being in this matter a contrast not only to the eighth but also to every other book of the treatise. I think then that the most probable solution is that the seventh book of the Physics is the production of some later Peripatetic in the time when interest in such purely abstruse speculations was still kept up, but when the faculty of dealing with them was somewhat on the wane. That is, that it was in no sense written by Aristotle, nor even by Eudemus, but that it is probably not later than the century succeeding Aristotle's death ; and, as I think likely, contains some portions from works or lectures of Aristotle's, noticeably the critique on the argument of Zeno as to the slightest grain of the κέγχρος sounding.

What then are we to say of the second text? I think we shall be able to fix its date satisfactorily, if only approximately, from the comparison of our present text with the commentary of Simplicius. In the first place the distinction between the two texts was certainly more definite in the time of Simplicius than it is now in any printed edition, or perhaps in any MS. Bekker notices that the majority of the MSS. mix the two texts[2]. Had he more carefully consulted Simplicius, who on this matter is our sole authority, he would have found that not the

[1] Notice the expression in this very passage of Simplicius—καὶ ὅγε Εὔδημος μέχρι τοῦδε τοῖς ὅλης σχεδὸν τῆς πραγματείας κεφαλαίοις ἀκολουθήσας and fifty like passages. Simp. in Phys. 242 *a*. 10.

[2] Ed. Berol. p. 243 note.

majority only but every MS. which he has consulted or collated gives, especially in the later chapters, readings from both of two texts. The only MS. which I have been able to find which almost invariably gives the first text is Paris Regius 1859 (Bekker's b), though even this has one remarkable exception to which I shall return later, as it is valuable as illustrating the gradual growth of the text. Thus we have in the time of Simplicius two distinct and definite texts running through the whole of this seventh book; each of them with a number of individual variants (the variants in the first text only are mentioned by Simplicius, but there must obviously have been parallel variants in the second text also). The two texts, as Simplicius very truly remarks, have very slight difference. The questions to be discussed and the proofs are identical and the order is the same. The chief change noticeable is in the letters taken as symbols for illustration; though there runs throughout a slight difference in the phraseology. Now the first and chiefest question for us to discuss is this: had Alexander Aphrodisiensis and his predecessors the same marked distinction between the two texts which we find in Simplicius? The evidence is unfortunately extremely scanty, but I think it is sufficient to enable us to answer this question in the negative.

In the Berlin edition, p. 248 *b*, ll. 6, 7, we have the words *ἀλλ' ὅσα μὴ ὁμώνυμα, πάντα συμβλητά*, referring chiefly to motions. There is also a second reading, *ἀλλ' ὅσα μὴ συνώνυμα ἅπαντα ἀσύμβλητα*, which is followed by all the MSS. which generally preserve the first text (Bekker only mentions one, H, but the same thing is true of b, c, d, and others). Now here Simplicius says, *ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἡ γραφὴ τοῦ ῥητοῦ τούτου διάφορος φέρεται· ὅπου μέν, 'ἀλλ' ὅσα μὴ ὁμώνυμα ἅπαντα συμβλητά,' ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔγραψεν· ὅπου δέ, 'ἀλλ' ὅσα μὴ συνώνυμα ἅπαντα ἀσύμβλητα.' τινὲς δὲ τὴν ἐν*

τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἑβδόμῳ βιβλίῳ γραφὴν ἐνταῦθα μετατεθείκασιν ἔχουσαν οὕτως, ' ἀλλ' ἆρά γε ὅσα μὴ ὁμώνυμα ἅπαντα συμβλητά[1].'

Here there are practically only two readings, for the first and third are really identical, so that we have here the fact that Alexander has got as his only reading one which belongs to the second text rather than to the first. A more marked instance is however to follow. In the fifteenth line of p. 249 *a* the Berlin text has ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος ἀεὶ ἄτομος τῷ εἴδει. ἢ ἅμα κἀκεῖνα εἴδει διαφέρει; This reading is entirely unknown to Simplicius and Alexander; and the reading which both of them actually prefer exists in no MS. that remains to us. But there is another reading which occurs in one MS. of Bekker (F) and the three Paris MSS. (b, c, d) which Simplicius tells us is quoted by Alexander as a variant; this reading runs thus, ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος ὁ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἄτομος τῷ εἴδει, ἢ ἅμα κἀκεῖνα εἴδει διαφέρει. Now having quoted this reading as one of those known to Alexander, Simplicius adds, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν γραφὴν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἑβδόμου βιβλίου ἐνταῦθά τις μετατέθεικε[2]. From this remark of Simplicius we may certainly infer that Alexander considers this as a variant of the textus receptus, or, as Simplicius would say, of the first text; but throughout Simplicius's commentary on this book he never once quotes Alexander as giving any reading as existing in the second text, or as being in fact conscious of the existence of the two texts. Yet the quotations from Alexander in the commentary of Simplicius are especially frequent in this book, and they more often than not refer to readings.

We have then these facts, first, that Alexander more than once gives either as a principal reading or as a variant one which Simplicius finds in the second or inferior text; secondly, that as far as we can judge from the testimony and silence of Simplicius, Alexander never notices the existence

[1] Simp. in Phys. f. 252 *a*. 48.

[2] Simp. in Phys. 253 *b*. 42–43.

of two texts. I think we may safely infer from this that either the two texts did not exist separately in the time of Alexander, or, at all events, that the difference between them was not nearly so marked as it was in the time of Simplicius. The truth as to the second text at least in this case is, I believe, that the distinction between it and the first arose from the labours of the two rival schools of commentators whose existence or chief activity is limited to the centuries which separate Alexander from Simplicius. The earlier commentators Alexander, Boethus, Nicolaus, Andronicus find and comment on a single text with a large number of variants [1]. If one reading out of these many variants is adopted by one school of the post-Alexandrian commentators, that in itself is an almost sufficient reason for the other school to adopt some other reading and to argue fiercely in favour of it. As the succession in the two schools is perfectly definite and the antagonism is continually more marked, out of merely a collection of variants there grow up two fairly distinct texts, though the distinction is necessarily one merely of form and not in any way of matter. Thus Simplicius always treats the second text, as he calls it, with very considerable contempt, though the readings in that text seem in no way worse or less probable than those of the first. It is of course barely possible that Simplicius may have had reason to believe that the readings of the first text were drawn from older or better authenticated MSS. than those of the second; but of this we have no proof whatsoever, and Simplicius usually seems to concern himself much more with the opinions of his predecessors in the School than with the comparative antiquity and authority of MSS.

I should conjecture then that the two texts of the Politics

[1] This statement applies of course only to the Physics and other treatises with parallel history, not to those where the duplication arises from earlier and entirely different causes, of which I have before spoken.

grew up in much the same way as those of the seventh book of the Physics. That the divergence between them cannot have been an early one is proved, I think, by the fact that they both have our present sets of references; that is, the divergence did not take place till, the order of books having first varied and references having been put in at different times to different orders[1], the present order was finally established. This could hardly have occurred before the time of Andronicus, and the divergence of the two versions could not have immediately followed, so that here, as with the book of which we have been treating, the probable origin of two versions may be traced to the labours of the rival schools during the third, fourth, and fifth centuries of our era. With regard to the Categories the case differs only in time. If there ever existed, as Simplicius tells us[2], two texts similar, but varying definitely in certain points, then these two texts must, I think, have been due to the labours of the grammarians and commentators of Alexandria. It may well be that the librarians of the different libraries (the King's library, the 'Ship' Library, etc.) may have constituted different schools of criticism; but on this point we have no evidence whatsoever. I do not think it is likely that one of the texts should have been a Peripatetic one (that is, should have come from the Lyceum library); nor again, that one of the two should be part of the find at Skepsis. The first supposition is improbable, because in that case the two texts must almost infallibly have diverged further than the words of Simplicius seem to imply; the second, because, had one of the two texts come from a source which Andronicus probably accepted as the test of accuracy, we should simply have heard no more about another text of inferior authority and

[1] Cf. ante, ch. v, pp. 107 sqq., et post, ch. viii, pp. 172 sqq.

[2] Simp. in Cat. 4 *b*. 50–5 *a*. 1.

so closely related. Perhaps the most simple and likely hypothesis with regard to these two Categories is that they were not properly two texts but merely two MSS. existing probably at Alexandria, and showing some variations of reading. If Simplicius or Adrastus found them separately named in what was really a library catalogue, he might very easily apply to them the critical ideas of his own time and consider them as two texts. Certainly Simplicius himself had never seen the two versions and probably Adrastus never had. They can hardly both have been included in the list of Andronicus, as Simplicius, who is acquainted with Andronicus, either directly or at least through Alexander and other early commentators, refers only to Adrastus as his authority. Adrastus in all probability was acquainted with the Egyptian library catalogues.

But it is not only for the question of double versions of books or whole treatises that the critical study of the Physics generally and of this book in particular is valuable. We find here in comparatively simple form one explanation at least, though not the only one, of minor corruptions and of repeated passages. In comparing the MSS. of the seventh book itself we find that, though they all [1] combine readings from the two texts, no two do so in precisely the same way. Some of the most curious and interesting variations are afforded us by those MSS. which come nearest to Paris 1859 in accuracy. Thus, near the beginning of the first chapter at the words *μὴ φάσκοι τις*, etc., p. 241 *b*, l. 32, the Paris MSS. 1861 and 2033 (c and d of Bekker) suddenly break into the second text, follow it for six lines, and then revert to the first, though this involves a confusion between one set of symbols and another; similarly a MS. in the

[1] Paris 1859 has, as far as one can prove certainly, only one reading from the second text, that which Alexander treats as a mere variant of the first. Cf. p. 122.

Bodleian library inserts in p. 242 *b*. 13 after the word πεπερασμένος a whole sentence from the second text, but in that case omits nothing from the first text but goes straight on. It is hardly necessary to say that the inserted sentence makes nonsense of the passage. A still more curious instance is one of repetition in p. 248 *b*, 15, ff. Here all the three better MSS. (b c d) have a reading different from that of Bekker's text, and nearer the words of Simplicius, but the two latter, having given this for five or six lines, begin again and give a somewhat different version of the same passage[1]; here, as both the sentence preceding and this repeated passage end with the same word συμβλητά, one is at first inclined to think that one is dealing merely with a copyist's repetition arising from the homoeoteleuton; but this would not account for the considerable variation in the repeated passage; and I am inclined to think that this third instance is to be explained by the method which certainly applies to the second, the supposition, namely, that the other reading was noted down in the margin and so passed into the text. As to the second passage, I imagine there can be no possibility of doubt. If a text is to be found which runs quite smoothly except for the insertion of a needless sentence, if further that sentence is known to come from the parallel passage in another text or set of MSS.; then I think we cannot doubt that its presence in this awkward position is due to the double work of a too careful editor, who noted it down by the side of the sentence to which it was parallel, and of a puzzled copyist who imagined that the marginale was a passage omitted by his predecessor and that it ought to be inserted in the text. As real omissions are often inserted as marginalia in all Greek MSS., and as the average

[1] [For these passages cf. the author's collation of this book in Anecdota Oxoniensia, Classical Series, vol. i, part iii. Oxford, 1882.]

copyist would have neither time nor critical skill to distinguish between one class of marginalia and another, this is probably the most frequent source of reduplicated passages in treatises which have either two distinct texts or frequent and widely differing variae lectiones.

As to the first passage I think that the explanation of it is entirely different from that of either of the two latter ones; here the second text has been brought in deliberately to fill up a lacuna in the first: either the MSS. which preserved the first text must in these instances have been spoiled to some extent by worms, damp, etc., and deliberate recourse must have been had to other MSS. which contained the second and not the first text to fill up the lacunae; or perhaps even in the same MS. both texts were given entire, just as now we often find the whole or the greater part of a commentator in the margin of a MS. copy of a work. If that were the case, the slipping from one text to another would naturally become more easy and frequent; it would occur whenever there was any difficulty in reading the MS. on one side, while the parallel passage on the other side was clearer. Something of this kind must be assumed in order to explain the frequent and irregular variations of all the MSS. which contain the seventh book of the Physics from one text to the other. But there is also another source of repeated passages quite independent of any we have mentioned; this occurs when an editor or commentator has put in the margin a sentence from some other portion of the work, and when the copyist has inserted this marginal sentence into the body of the text. A very good instance of this is to be found in the first book of the Physics. There is a reduplicated passage which occurs both in the second and in the third chapter of that book; Aristotle is talking of the anti-physical doctrines of the Eleatic School, and saying that they are really beyond argument for the

physicist, and if they are to be met at all must be met by the first philosopher, 'and,' says he, 'no one can be expected to meet a purely contentious argument;' he adds *ὅπερ ἀμφότεροι μὲν ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, καὶ ὁ Μελίσσου καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδου· καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν· μᾶλλον δ' ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τὰ ἄλλα συμβαίνει· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπόν*[1]. In the third chapter the passage is repeated, but with some variation: *ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συλλογίζονται, καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης· καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι· μᾶλλον δ' ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τἆλλα συμβαίνει· τοῦτο δὲ οὐθὲν χαλεπόν*[2]. Now Bekker, and Prantl following him, considered the former passage to be spurious and the latter to be authentic; but against this doctrine there are several strong reasons. The strongest of all is the authority of Themistius; Themistius has this passage in the second chapter, he has no trace of it in the third[3]; now Themistius, for all books but the seventh, is by far the most trustworthy authority on the Aristotelian Physics. But there is another very strong argument against this reading in the third chapter. All the MSS. which give it, with one exception, omit the words *αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι*; now without these words the article *ὁ* in the next clause has no subject to refer to: it is true that the MS. which gives the words *αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι* is the Paris MS. 1853, the E of Bekker; but I have attempted to show in another place that the authority of E at least for the Physics is not so great as Bekker and other German scholars following him have imagined. I think we can see exactly how this passage got into the text of the third chapter. Aristotle in the second

[1] 185 *a.* 8. [2] 186 *a.* 6.

[3] Themistius, ad loc., ed. Spengel, vol. i. p. 110, l. 8, etc.; cf. p. 115, ll. 1–5.

chapter makes a general statement condemnatory of the procedure of the Eleatic philosophers. In the third chapter he gives the ground of that condemnation, and says generally, with reference to what he has already said in the second chapter, that the method of argument of both Parmenides and Melissus is contentious. A careful editor put in the margin opposite this statement the more definite words of condemnation from the second chapter just as they stand in that chapter, beginning with *καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ* and ending with *οὐθὲν χαλεπόν*. Afterwards, as usual, some copyist introduced this marginale into the text; but in the text of this chapter as it stood it would not construe, therefore, later on, some fatally ingenious emendator inserted the words which we find in the MS. Paris 1853, *αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι*, and thus completed the mystification. Instances of this kind of reference which have got into the text are not uncommon. We have one, for instance, in the Nicomachean Ethics; in the sixth chapter of the first book Aristotle tells us that the result of his argument of exclusion is that the happiness of man must be the practical happiness of a reasoning animal. The words which follow in our text are *τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον*[1]; now the words as inserted clearly break the grammatical structure of the passage, and they are by all editors acknowledged to be spurious; the fact is that some ancient editor put these words in the margin very unnecessarily to explain the words *τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*, and they subsequently got into the text. A very similar instance occurs in the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where there is a passage repeated in two consecutive chapters, and where on the whole I am inclined to think that it belongs to the first rather than to the second, though in this case one cannot speak with anything

[1] 1098 *a*, ll. 4, 5.

like the same certainty. In the chapter on corrective justice the author tells us that the object of all such justice is to establish absolute equality; that therefore if one man through injustice exceed, the portion by which he exceeds must be taken from him and given to the other, so as to restore equality[1]; *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τοῦτο· ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον*: in the next chapter, after explaining that the general principle of trade-exchange is *τὸ Πυθαγόρειον δίκαιον* (that is, exact equality), he gives the instance of the shoemaker and the house-builder, and shows how their exchange is reduced to an equality, and we then find this sentence repeated[2].

Now the question is to which of these two passages the sentence belongs; the majority of editors have been inclined to refer it to the second rather than to the first; but here, I think, they were wrong; the sentence as appearing in the second passage is jejune and unnecessary; the author having laid down a general principle and illustrated it by a special case is made to say that this is true of all other similar cases; as if Euclid, after proving a proposition as to the triangle A B C, should take the trouble to inform us that the proof holds of all similar triangles. In the first passage, on the other hand, the author is informing us that a fact which applies to corrective justice applies also to exchange; he is in fact anticipating in a sentence the proof which he is going to give in the next chapter. An anticipatory method of this kind he frequently pursues. According to this theory the *τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν* in the passage has its most proper idiomatic Greek meaning, exclusive and not inclusive of the thing compared; and this use is extremely frequent in Aristotle. The only difficulty as to taking the sentence as belonging to the

[1] Eth. Nic. v. (Eud. iv.) 1132 *b*. 9–11. [2] 1133 *a*. 14–16.

first passage is to find an object of τοῦτο, but the real object of this word is the general fact that absolute equality must be arrived at, not the special statement which precedes. It is to be noticed further that the insertion of the sentence in the second passage spoils the order of the argument, for the γάρ which immediately follows (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν κ.τ.λ.) refers to the statement that equality must be arrived at between two different things before an exchange can take place; that is, to the sentence which precedes this interpolated sentence. We may notice also that the Paraphrast has the sentence in the first instance [1] and has it not in the second [2]; though of course his authority on the Nicomachean Ethics can in no way be compared with that of Themistius on the Physics.

We have arrived then at the explanation, or rather at a number of explanations of reduplicated books and passages short or long, and of a considerable number of other corruptions of the text: we have found that for double texts there are two explanations which apply to two different classes of such texts; first, when there have been from a time not much later than the death of Aristotle two or more workings-up of his subject by different hands. In such cases there is usually a considerable difference of expression and sometimes of doctrine between the two texts. On the other hand we have discovered that there is a considerable number of double texts, whose differences depend chiefly, if not entirely, upon the ingenuity of rival schools of commentators; instances of such double texts may be found in the Politics and in the seventh book of the Physics: we find that these texts differ from each other merely in point of expression and never in matters of doctrine, that they are exactly parallel throughout, and that the differences throughout, even in point of

[1] Paraphr. ed. Heinsius, Lugd. 1607, pp. 168, 169. [2] Id. pp. 172, 173.

expression, are not very great. We find further that when two texts of either of these two kinds exist, the text is sure to be further corrupted in at least two ways; first, by the insertion of passages supplied from one text to the other to fill a real lacuna; secondly, by the writing in the margin of parallel passages from the other text, and the gradual creeping of these marginalia into the body of the text. Lastly, we discovered another cause of corruption, which was not peculiar to treatises which possessed a double text, but applied equally to all; the insertion, that is, in the margin of passages for the purposes of reference, and the subsequent acceptance of these also into the text. Having thus arrived at a more or less complete view of the causes of reduplication and corruption, we are in a position to apply these general principles to some of those treatises which have caused the greatest difficulty to scholars[1]. We begin with the treatise De Anima, where it will be seen that the principles which we have evolved are especially useful.

It had been long ago noticed by scholars that the second and third books of the De Anima were in a peculiarly corrupt state, more corrupt perhaps than that of any other Aristotelian treatises, except that of the three doubtful books of the Ethics. Torstrik has the merit of finding what is to a great extent the clue to the evil, and also the means of remedying it; he discovered in the Paris MS. 1853 that there existed a page or two of another text of the second book of the De Anima, which probably at one time existed in this MS. for the whole of the second and

[1] I have said nothing here of such other well-known causes of corruption as the homoeoteleuton, or the anxiousness of learned men to make a sense out of a passage already corrupt, by which they did but deepen the corruption and render the true reading more difficult to detect; these causes had been at work on the Aristotelian texts no less than on any other; but they do not belong to distinctively Aristotelian criticism.

third books, but which was afterwards removed, with the exception of one long and one shorter fragment, to make place for a copy of the ordinary text. Torstrik on this arrived at the probable, nay, almost certain conclusion that the double text was the source of most at least of the confusion which we find in these two books. He was able to point out a large number of passages where quotations from the two texts followed one another immediately, and where the real order and sense would be restored if the second statement of the same thing in somewhat different words were omitted. But though acknowledging the transcendent merits of Torstrik in his application of his discovery, I cannot admit his explanation of the origin of the two texts. Torstrik's theory is that both versions are due to Aristotle, for he says that both versions are Aristotelian in style and form, and that no one but Aristotle himself would have dared to alter Aristotle; this last assertion seems to me to show an entire misconception of the facts of the case; Torstrik treats Aristotle as if he were a modern author, as if he had actually published books in perfected form, and, as the theory assumes, had afterwards re-edited them. Now, as I have already tried to show, Aristotle can in no sense be said to have published nor even to have put into literary form any of the books which we now possess; and so far from it being the case that no one of his disciples would have dared to alter Aristotle, that is precisely what his disciples spent their life in doing, as far as phraseology was concerned; in other words, they spent their time in repeating his lectures with such modification of language or doctrine as they considered necessary or advisable. Are then the two versions of the De Anima due to different representations of Aristotle's mind by his pupils? I think that they are not even that. So far as we can judge by the two

longer passages cited, the two texts differ from each other much more in the fashion in which the two texts of the seventh book of the Physics differ, or again, as the original of the Latin version of the Politics differs from most of the Greek MSS., than as the Eudemian Ethics differs from the Nicomachean, or as the Theophrastean History of Animals must have differed from the Aristotelian. In fact, I hold that the two versions of the De Anima depend upon the action of commentators, and probably late commentators.

As far as we can see, neither Themistius, Simplicius, nor Sophonias, whom Torstrik himself cites, had any notion of a double text of these books; yet all the Greek commentators were fully aware of the frequency of two texts of Aristotelian treatises; their silence seems to me a sufficient evidence that two such texts did not exist in their day. Of course Torstrik might rejoin that the two texts had already been moulded into one before the time of any of these commentators, but if that was the case we must assume that both the texts belonged to the Skepsis library, otherwise they would infallibly have been in some way corrupted; they must therefore have been worked into one either by Apellicon or by Tyrannion and Andronicus: the latter assumption seems to me entirely impossible, for in the first place the work is far too clumsy to be attributed to learned and skilful editors, in the second place where Andronicus discards one of two texts we seem generally to hear of it, as for instance in the case of the two texts of the Categories, which seems almost precisely similar. As to Apellicon, the evidence is that he only put together parts of separate treatises when rats, damp or neglect had so marred a MS. that it was unintelligible without such piecing; but here, according to the theory of Torstrik, we have two perfect editions, both

due entirely to Aristotle, coming into the hands of an editor, be he Apellicon or who he may, then being wantonly cut in pieces and put together again in unintelligible form: that this should have happened gradually by the action not of one editor but of a large number of copyists is precisely what I myself should assume; that it could either have been performed by Apellicon or have occurred in the short time that elapsed between the time of Apellicon and the full light of ancient Aristotelian criticism is, I think, absolutely impossible. If there were two texts of the Aristotelian De Anima included in the find at Skepsis, then both of them must have come into the hand of Andronicus and his immediate successors: had this been the case we should assuredly have heard of it, for the De Anima is a book which was peculiarly well-known in the first three centuries of revived Aristotelian interest, yet throughout the whole of this time there is not a trace of the existence of two separate versions. I think this line of reasoning leads us necessarily to the conclusion that these texts are, like most of the duplicate texts whose differences are small, the results of the labours of later Greek scholars. So much for the general theory.

As to the existence of a large number of reduplicated passages in the texts of the second and third books, that I think is sufficiently explained by the principles of reduplication which we arrived at in the earlier portion of this chapter. A sixth, seventh, or eighth century MS. must be the archetype of all the MSS. which we possess except the fragments which exist in Paris 1853; this MS. must have had in the margin a very large number of passages from the other text, and some copyist must have transferred all these passages wholesale into the text. During the latter part at least of this period Aristotelian interest was at its lowest ebb; it had been driven

out of Western Europe and had never really flourished at Byzantium; the number of times therefore that any MS. was copied was at this period very small, and it may well have been that when the next copy was made of the originally corrupted MS. from which all our MSS. take their source, the whole history of the corruption, together with its author, had vanished from memory.

The Metaphysics present us with a much more complicated problem; we have not a single treatise with a double text, but a complex of books some of which are repetitions of others, while others are excerpts from an independent work. The fact is that, from the beginning, the Metaphysics are not a treatise but a collection of parts of treatises; though the collection must have been an early one and I think probably anterior to the time of Andronicus. Although we have a commentary of Alexander at least on the first four books, our most definite evidence as to its origin comes from a considerably later author, Asclepius, a commentator of the beginning of the sixth century, or at least of the end of the fifth, who reports to us the lectures which he had received from his master Ammonius the son of Hermeas. He says that it is obvious to all men that the arrangement of this treatise is defective and that parts of it are mere repetitions in bulk of parts of other treatises, while other parts are repetitions of what has gone before in this same collection. The defence given for this (and Ammonius thinks that it is a just one) is that Aristotle having written the treatise sent it to his friend Eudemus the Rhodian, that Eudemus did not think it advisable to publish the book at the moment; that meanwhile Eudemus himself died and parts of the books were destroyed and that his successors, not daring to add anything from their own books or lectures to fill up the gap,

because they fell far short of the understanding of Eudemus, filled up the gap with passages from other treatises, connecting them as best they could[1]. Now the absurdity of this story as its stands is apparent at first sight; for in the first place Eudemus the Rhodian, the disciple of Aristotle, is not likely to have received a gift of books from Aristotle, having himself been instructed in the whole course, and books meaning, as we have shown, merely notes for or on lectures; the story assumes further that Eudemus had left the school before the death of Aristotle, which is against all we know of his history; but putting aside all these slight difficulties, is it reasonable to suppose that any man should think that he could supply the place of a lost book of a treatise by merely inserting the whole or part of a previous book? Yet that is what the editor, if we can so call him, of the Metaphysics is represented to have done. I think the story contains one grain of truth; I believe that the Metaphysics were not and were never supposed to be a portion of the Skepsis find; it seems to me that they contain a collection of works which represented the remnants which remained to the Peripatetics of the Aristotelian philosophy in the higher sense after all their sales and losses by will and otherwise. I believe on the other hand that the Physics, which omitting the seventh book have a purer text than any of our Aristotelian treatises, were in all probability a portion of the Skepsis library. On this assumption, I think we are able to explain the condition of our Metaphysics. The Peripatetics possessed throughout what we may call their dark age, first a continuous treatise represented by B, Γ, E, Z, H, Θ, and possibly I of the Metaphysics; they possessed also another treatise in one book which we now find as Λ of the Meta-

[1] Scholia, ed. Brandis, p. 519 *b*. 33–p. 520 *a*. 1.

physics; besides this they possessed another abbreviated and somewhat altered version[1] of the same six books which we have already mentioned, together with a book περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς[2], and a number of notes on subjects which we now call physical, constituting a treatise covering the same ground as the five books περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν of the Aristotelian Physics[3]. They had further a reduplicated text of portions of the first three books of the main collection of treatises, as we have them now, but with great omissions[4]; lastly they added to this collection of treatises the present first book, which is in all probability either a book or excerpts from a book of the dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας, and thus got together all that remained to them of the Aristotelian higher philosophy. The passages from the Physics contained in the last chapters of book K of the Metaphysics, are not really, as Bonitz states, a mere collection of excerpts from our Physics; they look more like an original draught for our Physical books. The order of these chapters is not a strange or unnatural one, and what they omit of the Physics is chiefly digression; in some places also the draught in these chapters is fuller than that in what we may call the revised version in our Physics; in the same way the passages in books M and N frequently are rather other versions than excerpts from or epitomes of the earlier books which they represent. Thus M 4, 5, pp. 1078 *b*, 32–1080 *a* repeats Metaphysics A 9. 990*b*, 1, etc., except that the text in book M has an inserted passage of nine lines, 1079*b*, ll. 2–11. The two are so near that they can be hardly called different versions, though perhaps book M is in this passage a little more correct than book A. The fact of a passage from book A appearing again in book

[1] Met. M, N.
[2] Met. Δ.
[3] Met. K, 8, p. 1065 *a* to end of book.
[4] Met. K, 1–8. 1065.

M is a proof that the former book must have been very early attached to the general series B, Γ, E, etc., that is, before the divergence of the text represented by M N from the general stock A, B, Γ, etc. The earlier portion of K seems to me to consist of scraps loosely put together of another MS. of the books B, Γ, E; thus K 7–8 down to 1065*a*, 26 is really another version of E 1–4, not differing more than we might expect two MSS. to differ in an uncritical time, though it has considerable omissions.

To sum up then; I think the facts of the case, the state of the books relatively to each other and to the Physics, combined with our knowledge of the early existence of the Metaphysics in their present form [1], can only be explained by assuming that the Metaphysics constituted the whole of the possessions of some individual or school bearing on the Aristotelian higher philosophy and consisting of a simple roll or bundle of rolls. That this library belonged to the Lyceum is in itself highly probable, for it must undoubtedly have been known to and named by Andronicus. He probably placed it after the Physics as covering to some extent the same ground and as being far inferior in authenticity. I have said nothing hitherto of the books Δ and Λ. The former because it is the work of some very dull Peripatetic, with however some scraps of Aristotelian lore, remembrances of the master's doctrine as to φύσις and αἰτία; the latter because, although I believe it to be Aristotelian in the highest sense, that is, as most truly representing the master's doctrine, yet I can find no very close connection between it and other parts of the collection, and assume that it only got connected

[1] Ammonius has exactly the same books as we have; the only one as to whose authenticity he is a little doubtful being the greater *a*. Had there been any dispute since the times of Andronicus as to the authenticity of the books he must have heard of it. Schol. p. 520 *a*, 2 sqq.

with them by the almost accidental link which ties them together; that is, that it too formed part of some person's or society's collection of Aristotelian MSS. bearing on the higher philosophy. That this and no other is the history of that strange growth, which we from the time of Andronicus onwards have continued to call the Metaphysics, seems to me almost mathematically demonstrable.

# CHAPTER VII.

## OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

I HAVE reserved the treatment of the Ethics and the Politics for two separate chapters, not because they involve the introduction of any new principles, nor because they present any special difficulties, but rather because in separate ways they furnish very pretty and interesting exemplifications of most of the positions which I have laid down in the two preceding chapters.

If we have not arrived at a satisfactory solution of all the questions connected with the Ethics, it certainly is not for lack of learning and genius expended upon them; for the Ethics have excited more attention both in England and in Germany than any other Aristotelian work: yet the differences of opinion on all the most vital points seem as strong as ever. Perhaps the reason of this may be that each expositor looked for one master-key to open all the locks, and invariably supposed that he had found it. His antagonists were always able easily enough to show that some of the locks he had in truth not opened but broken, and they then triumphantly produced their one master-key with precisely the same results. If we once admit that all the locks will not yield to any one key yet made, by patiently using all those furnished by our forerunners each for the lock which it really and naturally fits, and, if need be, furnishing one or two of our own for less important doors, we may perhaps in the end succeed in making our way through the house.

Before attacking the main and most difficult question as

to the origin of the three admittedly doubtful books, we may take as a bit of practice the two books *περὶ φιλίας*. That these are Aristotelian, in one sense at least of the term, no one will deny. That they are an integral portion of the whole which we call the Nicomachean Ethics can I think hardly be admitted. They are too long for a mere digression, and they interfere with the main plan which runs fairly regularly through books 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, (or their original Nicomachean representatives) and 10. As to book 7 there may be some doubt; but the question of the various developments of virtue and vice, and the imperfect stages of each, is at all events more closely connected with the general plan of the treatise, than the totally independent discussion of the nature of friendship, the points of casuistry to which it gives rise, and its metaphysical or psychological explanation.

There is further one bit at least of very direct evidence as to the non-Nicomachean nature of these books, and that is the careful working out of the doctrine as to the real nature of the 'self' as the highest part[1]. This certainly would not be wanted here if this were not intended as a separate treatise since its natural position is in the discussion of *θεωρία*, where we find the same doctrine repeated[2]. In this latter passage there is what seems to be a reference back to this very discussion in the ninth book, *ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν τοῖς προτέροις*; but the evidence of reference, as we have already seen, counts for little or nothing as to original connection. This very same ninth book gives us a very characteristic instance of mistaken reference. Talking of the necessity for the happy man of the possession of friends, or at least of a friend, the author or rather interpolator says, *ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ*

[1] Eth. Nic. ix. 8, p. 1168 *b*, l. 30, etc.

[2] Eth. Nic. x. 7, p. 1177 *a*, ll. 13, etc.

εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι[1]. The reference is here clearly to Eth. Nic. i, chapters 7 and 8, and more especially to the sentence διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ[2]; but the reference-maker has either forgotten or does not understand Aristotle's cardinal distinction between γένεσις and ἐνέργεια, for the meaning of the words ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι can only, I think, be that which the Paraphrast attributes to them when he says with reference to this passage ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια φανερὸν ὅτι γίγνεται καὶ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, καὶ οὐ γέγονε καὶ ὑπάρχει ἤδη καθάπερ τι κτῆμα[3]. It seems to me that it is quite impossible that the author of these two books which, however nearly or remotely they are related to the words of Aristotle, are at all events full of the genuine spirit, could have been guilty of such a mistake on so important a matter.

Besides this distinctly mistaken reference there might seem to be one in the former of these two books to a matter which now occurs in our fifth Nicomachean or fourth Eudemian book. The ninth chapter of the eighth book begins with the following words :—Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρώτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ[4] φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν δευτέρως. This reference, if it be a reference, must, I think, be ascribed to the original author since it forms an integral portion of the argument. The doctrine that the essence of justice is proportion and not equality occurs sufficiently frequently in our fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, specially in c. 6, p. 1131 *a*. 20–26, and still more exactly in c. 8, p. 1132 *b*.

[1] Eth. Nic. ix. 9, p. 1169 *b*, ll. 28–30. Paraphrast, ed. Heinsius, p. 364.

[2] i. 8. p. 1098 *b*, ll. 31–33.

[4] Eth. Nic. viii. 9. 1158 *b*, 29.

l. 31–1133*a*, l. 2; but here the doctrine is one of so general a character that it must have been perfectly well known to all Aristotle's disciples, and there is no reason that I can see for supposing any definite references to these passages. I feel the same doubt as to the other references between these books mentioned by Mr. H. Jackson in his edition of the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics.

But besides the one reference from the tenth Nicomachean book to the ninth, there is another of yet more definite character which, if we are to acknowledge the references to be Aristotelian, will at once settle the whole question. In the summary at the beginning of the last chapter of the work we find this passage: Ἆρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γνῶναι ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά[1]; Now the last part of this sentence undoubtedly belongs to the author of the whole chapter, for the connection from this point runs on without a break, therefore we cannot here, as elsewhere, point to the obvious insertion of a sentence. Nevertheless, I think I can show strong reason against the authenticity of the sentence as a whole. We have an apparent summing up of the whole treatise, which appears to break it up into four parts; ταῦτα, presumably that which immediately precedes; αἱ ἀρεταί, which may cover books 2 to 4, but would hardly include book 1; the books περὶ φιλίας, and a treatise about pleasure, which we may suppose to be that which forms the earlier part of this book. What an extraordinary order is this! It is neither direct nor, what is much more common in Aristotelian works, inverse. It compares, as if they were on the same level, slight discussions of two or three chapters

[1] Eth. Nic. x. 10, 1179*a*. 33–*b* 2.

with detailed and elaborated investigations running through several books. If Aristotle or the author of the Nicomachean Ethics was guilty of such a summary as this without order, principle, or reason, then indeed we need trouble ourselves no further as to the removal of absurdities or contradictions which occur in other parts of the text, but may merely put them down to the occasional idiocy of the greatest thinker of antiquity.

Are we then to adopt the other most obvious hypothesis, and treat the whole of this chapter as spurious? I think that that is a more violent remedy than is in any way necessary. The chapter as a whole forms an almost necessary connecting link between these ethical lectures and the closely cognate course, portions of which remain to us under the name of the Politics. The whole substructure of these books rests on the assumption that the science of man as an individual is in some sense subordinate to that of man considered as a member of an organised community. The chapter itself, moreover, is in no way unworthy of the author of the whole treatise. What then is our escape from our difficulty?

I believe it is to be found in the closer investigation of the passage with reference to what immediately precedes. In the eighth and ninth chapters our author has been talking about the life and happiness *κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν*, that is of the more active developments of those virtues of which he treated at length in the second, third, and fourth books. He then returns to the *εὐδαιμονία* of *θεωρία*, and shows that though the *εὐδαιμονικός* will need a sufficient supply of external goods to perform the ordinary virtues of man he will need less than many others, since his special function is not the performance of these virtues, but pure contemplation. He ends up the latter chapter by two small observations: first, that you must test your theories by life and by results;

and secondly, that it seems probable that the θεωρητικός will be best beloved by God since he is likest to God.

Now I believe that what Aristotle originally wrote was Ἆρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις κ.τ.λ., where ταῦτα meant these two subsidiary questions, and τῶν ἀρετῶν the relation of the theoretic life to the other virtues, which is the chief subject of discussion in the two preceding chapters; that some stupid editor, thinking that Aristotle intended by these words to sum up his book as a whole (a thing which the more real Aristotle rarely if ever does[1], whether at the beginning of a treatise anticipatorily, or at the end of it retrospectively), inserted the words ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς by way, as he imagined, of completing this summary, and thus created a most admired confusion. This editor must either not have found the three most doubtful books in his copy, or must have believed them to be spurious, or Eudemian, and therefore have omitted to mention them; but as we know nothing either of the date or the circumstances of the interpolation, the discovery of it will not help us at all to the elucidation of the main question.

Is there any trace of the separate publication of the books περὶ φιλίας? Both from their form and their lack of relation to the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics we should expect that they had originally been published as one complete treatise. We find in Diogenes' list two entries, περὶ φιλίας α. and θέσεις φιλικαὶ β. We have not much evidence as to what θέσεις means in the list of Diogenes; it probably is something the same as the θέσεις to which Cicero refers in

[1] The chapter at the end of the Sophistici Elenchi is not a summary but a history; the summary and plan constituting the first chapter of the Meteorologica is, I think, almost undoubtedly spurious, as are also those connecting links forming so often either the beginning of one treatise or the end of another, indifferently or dubiously.

the Topics [1], general questions as to the nature of a subject not differing very widely from ἀπορήματα. Now the latter part of the treatise περὶ φιλίας, beginning from the second chapter of the ninth book[2], is in fact a collection of ἀπορίαι, or points of casuistry with regard to friendship.

It is possible, though in no way provable, that the two entries in Diogenes really refer to one book; the first part of that book would more properly be called περὶ φιλίας, the latter part θέσεις φιλικαί. Perhaps the first MS. which he mentioned only contained the earlier part, the latter containing the whole was called θέσεις φιλικαί to distinguish it from the former, if we assume, what we have attempted to prove, that the names in Diogenes' list are names not of treatises but of MSS. The only conclusion which it seems to me we are absolutely justified in arriving at is this, that the two books περὶ φιλίας are not an integral part of the Ethics, and could not have stood in the original draught. How they got into our Ethics we have no means of determining; we certainly cannot accept Grant's somewhat naive theory that these *disjecta membra* of Aristotle's Ethics were found 'lying among his papers at his desk, and that Nicomachus, or some other editor, took in hand their amalgamation,' any more than we can accept as to the three doubtful books the dictum that 'Part of the original system of Aristotle being now lost, or for some cause or other wanting, Nicomachus probably took three of the Eudemian books as being the nearest approach to the doctrine and to the very words of Aristotle, and grafted them on with the view of presenting a complete treatise to the world.'

Before discussing at all the question of the doubtful books, it is advisable to ask ourselves whether we have any evidence as to what was the original plan of the author of

[1] Cicero, Topics, xxi. 79. [2] Eth. Nic. ix. 2. p. 1164 *b*, ll. 22 sqq.

the Nicomachean Ethics. On this we get several hints; first, we are told that it is to be an investigation of the chief good for man considered as a being in a social state; we are then told that one can only arrive at this chief good for man by considering his function or functions; these functions must be divided according to the divisions of his soul, and putting aside the merely nutritive portion we have two portions left to consider—the moral or emotional portion, and the intellectual portion. But we are to consider both only so far as the matter in hand requires, that is, only so far as concerns man's general well-being; the consideration of either his emotions or his intellectual powers in their essence will belong to a different portion of scientific enquiry; to that portion namely which Aristotle is wont to name *φυσική*, in a sense much wider than that of any of the reference-makers. This twofold division gives us the principle according to which our subsequent enquiry is to be governed, and the order of that enquiry is in fact determined by this division. The one thing absolutely regular in all genuinely Aristotelian treatises which in any way admit of it is the order: this, in fact, is the general order of all science; we begin with that which is material, formless, unreasonable, unstable; we rise up gradually to that which is immaterial, pure form, pure reason, and eternal. A very good exemplification of this we see in the De Anima (excluding the historical and dialectical first book), which, notwithstanding the mutilated and corrupt state of the text, still follows in its general outline the order which Aristotle must have originally given it in his lectures. The principle itself is most clearly stated in the Meteorologica[1], *Τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα ἥκιστα ἐνταῦθα δῆλον ὅπου πλεῖστον τῆς ὕλης· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ τὰ ἔσχατα ληφθείη, ἡ μὲν ὕλη οὐθὲν ἄλλο παρ' αὐτήν, ἡ δ' οὐσία οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὁ λόγος, τὰ δὲ*

[1] p. 390 *a*, ll. 3–7.

μεταξὺ ἀνάλογον τῷ ἔγγυς εἶναι ἕκαστον; but it is hinted at sufficiently definitely in the Nicomachean Ethics themselves, for in treating of the individual virtues the author states as the reason of taking Temperance after Courage, that these two virtues belong to the ἄλογα μέρη of the soul, that is, they are virtues which to some extent at least belong to man, not qua man but qua animal. The same principle applies to the arrangement of the fourth book, though it is not there equally obvious. μεγαλοψυχία, which the writer calls κόσμος τῶν ἀρετῶν, seems at first sight to come much too early; but although μεγαλοψυχία involves, as Aristotle says, all goodness, it is considered here rather in the light of its external manifestation than of its internal basis: moreover, it can occur earlier in point of time than the virtues which followed in the book, for it does not definitely assume a social state or social relation to other men. Like ἀνδρεία and (to a certain extent) σωφροσύνη, it is rather separative than agglutinative. The three virtues which conclude the fourth book depend, as Aristotle tells us, upon λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνία; that is, they are eminently social, and they are at least as much intellectual as moral[1]. The next excellence in order, δικαιοσύνη, is distinctly more intellectual than moral; its result, that is, its producing a mean, is, as the author himself tells us, that which constitutes it a virtue; it is not itself like the other virtues, a mean of action [Eth. Nic. v. (Eud. iv) cap. 9, p. 1133 *b*, l. 32 to 1134 *a*, l. 12]. Lastly, in the sixth book we deal with purely intellectual excellences, and with the highest of them all, σοφία, we have got to the furthest point away from the ὕλη and arrived at the purest form of the λόγος. So far this argument is all in favour of at least the

[1] I have omitted from account the chapter on αἰδώς, which is certainly misplaced, if in fact it has any place in the Nicomachean treatises, for αἰδώς, as the author himself tells us, is not a virtue.

fifth and sixth books belonging to the Nicomachean treatises ; neither do I attach very much importance to the difficulty which is raised that the sixth book ought to be an explanation of the ὀρθὸς λόγος, which is named in the definition of moral virtue in the second book, and whose explanation is promised later on. For this objection really proves too much : not only does the treatment of φρόνησις in the sixth book not give a sufficient explanation of the ὀρθὸς λόγος of the second, but it does not give any explanation at all. What we want in the sixth book, according to this theory, is not the account of some internal faculty, but that of some objective rule, some law of rightness. The chapter, moreover, in which the relation of φρόνησις to the ὀρθὸς λόγος is chiefly explained, is itself the most suspicious in the sixth book[1]. Schleiermacher has already pointed out that this book, considered as an answer to the promise in book ii, is both deficient and redundant ; deficient as giving us no real explanation of ὀρθὸς λόγος, and redundant as introducing the conceptions of σοφία, τέχνη, etc., which have nothing to do with ὀρθὸς λόγος at all. It may be noticed, moreover, that in the latter chapters of this sixth book φρόνησις, which according to this view is the chief subject of the whole book, is subordinated to, and made the handmaid of, σοφία. If the author intended this book as an explanation of the ὀρθὸς λόγος of the second, he certainly forgot his intention in the working out of the book itself.

But, as a matter of fact, the book is already promised, implicitly at least, in the division of the virtues at the end of the first book, and three of the most important excellences of which he is going to treat in the sixth book are there

[1] Eth. Nic. vi. (Eud. v.) ch. 5, p. 1140 *a*, l. 24–p. 1140 *b*, l. 30. Rassow has already pointed out the un-Aristotelian expression ἕξιν ἀληθῆ, and the unworthy pun on it can hardly be called an attempted derivation, ἀληθὴς ἀ-λήθη.

already named; for having mentioned the two divisions of the soul with which the πολιτικός is concerned he adds, διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς[1]. This sentence is not, and is not intended to be, a definite prospectus or plan of the books which are to come, for as we have before said, Aristotle does not favour us with these prospectuses; but it is, like the remark about the order of the virtues, a clear indication of the general idea which is running in Aristotle's head. That idea is throughout political, not narrowly moral, and it involves the enumeration and sufficient discussion of all the excellences which man possesses as man, from the point where he just rises above the irrational brute to the point where he is the fellow-worker with and almost the peer of the Divinity. That the latter portion of the plan is not thoroughly carried out in our present sixth book we must admit, but in the original Aristotelian plan we should have had a description concise but sufficient of all the excellences of the intellectual sphere, just as in the third and fourth we have a similar description of the excellences within the moral sphere. How then do I propose to treat the words ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ [τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου] καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς[2]? We might of course explain them by saying that Aristotle will incidentally, in treating of the intellectual excellences, treat also of φρόνησις, which in the sixth book is identified with ὀρθὸς λόγος; but, as we have already shown, the ὀρθὸς λόγος of the sixth book does not correspond very well with that of the second. I prefer then boldly to treat this sentence as another case of mistaken reference, and I am strengthened in this belief by the observation that the reference is

[1] 1103 *a*. 3. [2] Eth. Nic. ii. 2. p. 1103 *b*, ll. 32–34.

anyhow out of place ; if it comes anywhere it should come immediately after the statement of the general definition of moral virtue ; the words which immediately precede τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω would fall under a like condemnation. If they are wanted anywhere they are wanted in another place ; it is true that the expression ὑποκείσθω, which has caused such searching of spirit to Michelet and one or two other editors, can be immediately paralleled by a passage in the Physics, δειχθήσεται δ' ὕστερον νῦν δὲ τοῦθ' ὑποκείσθω [1], but the parallelism is unhappily a little too close, for this passage also looks more like the insertion of a reference-mongering editor than part of the original text.

The fact is, a good deal of misconception has been due to the sin of the original editor or compiler, who chose to call his collection of Aristotelian treatises ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια. Of the whole number of books of this conglomeration, only three are distinctly ethical, for, as we have seen, Aristotle's conception of δικαιοσύνη is at least as much intellectual as ethical ; if the collection as a whole is to have any general name, that name should be περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, or περὶ τἀγαθοῦ ; this name would apply to the first six books and the tenth, which seem to constitute the whole original plan of the course of lectures.

But if on the one hand we are compelled to admit that the fifth and sixth books at least of the three doubtful books belong to the original plan of the author of the Nicomachean Ethics, yet, on the other hand, we must admit that the execution of these books as we now possess them, neither corresponds with their intention, nor can possibly be altogether assigned to the author of the Nicomachean Ethics. Thus, for instance, the passage on εὐβουλία would certainly not be wanted by anyone who

[1] Physics, viii. 7. p. 260 *b*, l. 24.

had already got the fuller treatment of βούλευσις in the third Nicomachean book; the use of προαίρεσις, too, is different in several passages in this book from that which is explained in Ethics, book iii. προαίρεσις in the sixth book, and also in the seventh, seems to be choice not of special means, but of end; answering more to the English word 'purpose' than to the proper Nicomachean use of the word [1]. But the most striking change of front occurs with regard to the question as to the equipment with which every man starts in life. According to the treatment in the beginning of the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics, all men seem to start about equal; the δυνάμεις, out of which the perfected ἕξεις, whether for good or evil, are evolved by habit, seem to be those purely negative potentialities, whose essence is that they are δεκτικαὶ τῶν ἐναντίων as opposed to the φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις, which are οὐ δεκτικαὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. It is not probable that Aristotle really thought that all men started precisely fair; in fact, in the special treatment of the virtues in the third and fourth books, we have several notices of natural tendencies, which when properly trained may become virtues, though when left unrestrained and undisciplined they become one of the two opposed vices. Thus θυμός stands in this relation to the perfected virtue ἀνδρεία, and the natural form of ἀσωτία to the virtue ἐλευθεριότης; but the general preliminary chapters (β. 1–6) would certainly leave the careless reader under the impression that all men start equal in the race of life, and that it is a mere matter of education and habituation whether a man must turn out a hero or a scoundrel. Now in the latter end of our sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, we hear for the first time of φυσικαὶ

[1] Eth. Nic. vi. (Eud. v.) 2, p. 1139 *b*, l. 4, and Eth. Nic. vii. (Eud. vi.) 6. p. 1148 *a*, l. 9.

ἀρεταί[1], that is, natural tendencies towards virtue, from which we may assume also their converse, φυσικαὶ κακίαι, or natura tendencies towards vice. The mention of these natural tendencies seems like a correction of the Aristotelian doctrine, as it is too barely stated at the beginning of the second book ; and the idea is worked out more fully in the seventh book, where a more definitely physiological view is taken both of virtue and of vice. This is not, moreover, the only instance in which these books seem to furnish a correction of the Nicomachean books in the strictest sense ; Spengel in his Aristotelische Studien has pointed out two or three such corrections, the most obvious of which occur at the beginning of this sixth book ; the passage runs—Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐστί τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἐστὶν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐθὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος[2]. Now it is obvious to the meanest capacity that these words cannot be written by the author of the Nicomachean treatise, but I very much doubt whether they were written by Eudemus ; it seems to me that they are merely an-

[1] Eth. Nic. vi. (Eud. v.) 13, p. 1144 *b*, ll. 1–6 and 32–p. 1145 *a*, l. 1.

[2] Eth. Nic. vi. 1. (Eth. Eud. E), p. 1138 *b*, ll. 18–34.

other spurious connecting link like the first chapter of the Meteorologica.

Let us turn now to the undoubtedly Eudemian books, and see what evidence can be extracted from them. The first thing which we notice is, that there are considerably more direct references to these three doubtful books. But against this we must put the fact that references generally are much more frequent in the Eudemian Ethics than in the Nicomachean; thus, for instance, in the second book of the Eudemian Ethics, cap. 10[1], we have a direct reference to the amount of voluntariness which differentiates misfortune, fault, and crime, as treated in the fifth book of the Nicomachean (Eud. iv), with these words added, *ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει*; but only a very few lines further on we have an almost unnecessary reference to the Analytics[2]. In the same way, in the third book and second chapter there is what seems to be a preliminary discussion of the relation of *ἐγκράτεια, ἀκρασία, ἀκολασία*, with the added reference, *ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας*[3], but from such references as these we can prove nothing whatsoever, except perhaps the fact, hardly worth proving, that at some time or other the three doubtful books were treated as a part of the Eudemian Ethics. As little as on the other hand can we infer that the treatise on pleasure at the end of the seventh book belongs to the Nicomachean Ethics, because, as Bendixen, I think correctly, argues, there is a reference to it in a passage in the Politics[4].

[1] p. 1227 *a*, ll. 2 and 3. [2] Id., ll. 10–11. [3] 1231 *b*. 2.

[4] Polit. iv. (vii.) cap. 11. p. 1295 *a*, l. 35, *εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, κ.τ.λ.* I think, notwithstanding Spengel's criticism, that the author of this insertion had in his mind the passage in the Ethics where the word *ἀνεμπόδιστος* is so frequently repeated, Eth. Nic. vii. (Eud. vi.), c. 14, p. 1153 *b*, ll. 1–25,

I do not think much can be made of the 'evidence of style,' for, as Spengel very well observes, one man may imitate another's style, and the same man may write two different styles. There are certainly a number of expressions in the Eudemian Ethics which seem to be not only post-Aristotelian, but later also than any date to which the composition of the Eudemian Ethics has yet been assigned. One is the absolute use of ἐξέστηκα = I am mad. In the seventh doubtful book ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως is used in this sense; but in the Eudemian Ethics we have the form ἐξέστηκε continually used absolutely, without any case whatsoever to imply madness. We have two cases of this, in the first chapter of the third book, page 1229 *a*, l. 3, διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τοῦτον ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἤτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· and line 25, διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι θῆρες ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν: this reminds us of the use, common in the commentators and the later philosophers, of ὁ ἀναβεβηκώς to signify him who has passed from the realm of sense to that of pure science. We also have what seems to be an un-Aristotelian expression, ποιητικὴ ἐπιστήμη[1]. There is one sentence in the Eudemian Ethics which looks almost certainly post-Christian—ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ λανθάνειν μάλιστα πρὸς ἃ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν, εἴ τῳ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώτερον εἰπεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην ἂν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν[2]: but, after all, all such instances as these prove very little. It is certainly the case that we find none of them in the three doubtful books, but these corruptions of the Eudemian books may have taken place at a time when there were

but with all ancient writers τὰ ἠθικά seems to be used just as much of the Eudemian as of the Nicomachean Ethics, and our editor probably made no distinction.

[1] Eth. Eud. i. 5. p. 1216 *b*, ll. 16, 17; iii. 1. p. 1230 *a*, l. 24.

[2] 1215 *a*. 8.

other copies of the doubtful books inserted in the Nicomachean Ethics; and as it was then presumably agreed that these doubtful books belonged equally to both these treatises, any corruptions of this kind which were put into these three books in the Eudemian treatises would be cut out again by comparison of them with the Nicomachean, while those in the other books would remain, having nothing to be compared with. But in the much more important matter of Philosophy there are at least two or three passages where the doctrine of these Eudemian books is in direct opposition to that of the doubtful books: the most striking are two passages on the subject of *φρόνησις*; the first is in Eth. Eud. bk. i. c. 4, where, talking about the different courses of life, the author says, *τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων τριῶν ὄντων, τῶν καὶ πρότερον ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὁρῶμεν καὶ βίους ὄντας, οὓς οἱ ἐπ' ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἅπαντες, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν*[1]. Now here we have *φρόνησις* used as identical with *φιλοσοφία*, to which in the second of our three doubtful books it is carefully opposed (Eth. Nic. vi. Eud. v). The second passage curiously enough gives us *φρόνησις* at the extreme opposite end of the scale; no longer an intellectual virtue at all, but merely a moral one. In the second book of the Eudemian Ethics we have a *ὑπογραφή* of the moral virtues in general corresponding to that given in the second book of the Nicomachean, but with considerable differences. At the end of this list we have the items *πανουργία εὐήθεια φρόνησις* as two opposed vices and their corresponding virtue. Now nothing can be more opposed to this doctrine than the express statement of the second doubtful book, that *φρόνησις* is not any special virtue, but the necessary intellectual element in all virtue,

[1] p. 1215 *a*, l. 32–*b*, l. 1.

ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν [αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί][1].

We have arrived then at this not very satisfactory conclusion, that the three doubtful books can by reason of clear points of doctrine, and not of the doubtful argument of style, be assigned neither absolutely to the Nicomachean nor absolutely to the Eudemian Ethics. Nor again can we accept the solution of Fischer and Fritsche, who attempt to draw a dividing line between the portions due to each; for in the sixth (fifth Eud.) book, which we have taken as our chief test, we find dispersed throughout the book passages from which we may safely conclude that the book as a whole does not belong either to the Nicomachean or to the Eudemian version of Aristotle's lectures. We are reduced then to the humiliating conclusion that there is a mixture at least of those two versions running through the three books, and that we can never hope satisfactorily to discriminate one from the other. One or two remarks we may safely hazard. First, that the chapters on *σοφία* and the general view of the whole intellectual operations are rather Nicomachean than Eudemian, for the Eudemian work is far more distinctly ethical in its plan than the Nicomachean. Secondly, that the physiological view of virtue and vice which appears in the doctrine of *φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί*, and in the explanation *φυσικώτερον* of the phenomena of *ἀκρασία*, is probably due to the Eudemian treatise; for, as I have already pointed out, the Nicomachean Ethics has no hint of such natural differences in its treatment of the general question of the origin of virtue and vice; while in the Eudemian we have in the parallel passage this very same principle pretty distinctly stated—*λεκτέον δὴ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς ποῖ' ἄττα ἤθη. ἔσται δὲ κατά τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ' ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ*

[1] Eth. Nic. vi. (Eud. v.) 13, p. 1145 *a*, ll. 1–2.

τὰς ἕξεις, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πως ἢ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι[1]. It is curious that this notion of natural tendency to this or that affection is repeated in the Categories, whose right to stand in the first rank of proximately Aristotelian treatises has been somewhat sharply questioned both in ancient and in modern times. It is noticeable, however, as showing how entirely inseparable is the mixture, that the Nicomachean doctrine of σοφία occurs in the same chapter as the Eudemian view of φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί.

There remain two questions; that of the order of the passages in the individual books, a question which mainly concerns the first of the doubtful books, and that of duplicated and triplicated passages which concerns all three books equally.

As to the first matter let me say at once that I have no hope that any good will ever result from attempted shiftings of this or that sentence or passage hither or thither. They are all very ingenious, and make some kind of sense sufficient at least to satisfy their inventors; but the very fact that two or three such transpositions equally make some kind of sense seems to me to condemn them all; A's arrangement makes about as much sense as B's or C's. They cannot all be right, and it really would be invidious to prefer one above another. Besides, they all involve the, to my mind, radically mistaken belief that the book would make some consecutive sense if you were to shake it up enough, and put all the heads where the tails were before. I hold that the corruption began and was carried on for centuries before the book attained its present form; that emendation followed corruption redoubling the evil, and that fresh corruption followed on the top of emendation. Imagine an originally much ruined

[1] Eth. Eud. ii. 2, p. 1220 *b*, l. 6.

MS. of the Nicomachean treatise, first doctored by Apellicon and roughly pieced from the Eudemian and probably one or two other treatises, then treated with a more critical hand by Andronicus, but still full of corruptions and doubtful readings; imagine further these doubtful readings giving rise to two or more separate versions in the hands of the later schools of commentators, and then again being corrected backwards and forwards one from the other. There we have something like the true history of the jumble, full of valuable remarks and impossible inconsistencies, which we have before us in these three books.

The question of the reduplicated passages is a somewhat different one. Here I think we must distinguish between two classes of reduplication. The repetition of long arguments such as the two treatments of the question of the possibility of doing injustice to oneself, and the double explanation of pleasure in books vii and x; and on the other hand the shorter repetitions which usually follow one another very closely. The longer passages I agree with most critics in assigning to the clumsy work of the original book-maker, were he Apellicon or some other. These passages were undoubtedly in all cases taken directly from some Aristotelian or Peripatetic MS. When the patched text was once made it was esteemed of higher value than any of the MSS. out of which it was composed, and these MSS. naturally also disappeared; the survival of the remaining Eudemian books depends just precisely upon the fact that the Nicomachean books for this part of the text were in fairly legible condition, and that therefore the Eudemian were not used for patching. It is possible also that the Eudemian books iv, v, vi, themselves were in worse condition than the rest of the treatise, and were almost unintelligible; the text of the remaining Eudemian books does

not warrant us in forming a very high conception of the condition of those which, having been used for piecing the Nicomachean text, afterwards disappeared.

With regard to the smaller repeated passages I see no reason for varying the doctrine as to their origin which we have arrived at with regard to similar passages in other Aristotelian treatises. No work imputed to Aristotle is altogether without these repeated passages. They occur not unfrequently even in the earlier and comparatively pure Nicomachean books. I will cite only two from the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics, a book which is by no means one of the lowest in point of purity of text.

Eth. Nic. iii. 1, p. 1110 *a*, l. 1 sqq.: *Βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σώζοιντο, μὴ πράξαντος δὲ ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις· αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. Καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. Πράττει δὲ ἑκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή. ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἴσχιστ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν*

*ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δὲ ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή.*

Eth. Nic. iii. 1, p. 1110 *b*, l. 1 sqq.: *Τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἁπλῶς μέν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἑκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα.*

Here it is perfectly obvious that the second passage is merely a repetition of the first with the omission of all explanations and illustrations. The more important sentences are repeated with almost exact verbal accuracy; while there is not a single additional idea introduced in the second passage. This instance then is altogether beyond doubt. Our second is still less doubtful, but of a somewhat different character. In the eleventh chapter of the book, p. 1116 *b*, ll. 33–35, we have this remark about beasts, *Οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν*, and four lines later (p. 1117 *a*, ll. 2–3) we have, *Οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον.* In this latter case we have undoubtedly merely a copyist's accidental repetition slightly disguised by an editor, who finding the words given twice over, thought it his duty to make some kind of sense of both; but the former case is one of a real double text, precisely similar to those of which we find so many in the De

Anima, and in our three doubtful books. All these, as I have before said, have one and the same immediate origin, the inserted marginale. But that marginale itself may be due to three sources; first, a mere editor's quotation for reference; secondly, a various reading; and thirdly, a double text which, as I hold, in most cases has grown out of the various readings of antiquity systematised by rival schools. It is these last two classes of marginalia which naturally and necessarily occur most frequently when the text is originally in a corrupt state, and by their subsequent inclusion in the text render the confusion worse confounded. It is the work of the critic to notice as frequently as they occur these interloping marginalia, and by bracketing or excising them to give as far as possible a continuous text. Much of this work has already been done for the Ethics [1], but I am convinced that careful reading will discover more of these dittographs in portions of the text where they are least expected. The search for them will tend much more to the advancement of Aristotelian knowledge than enquiries, which by the nature of the case can never get an answer, as to the authorship of this or that sentence or passage, or the time at which it got included in the text.

[1] Especially by the labours of Rassow and (for the seventh book) of Mr. Wilson.

# CHAPTER VIII.

## THE POLITICS AND THE EVIDENCE FROM AVOIDANCE OF HIATUS.

THE question as to the Politics, unlike that as to the Ethics, is, or has been treated chiefly, as one of the order of the books; nevertheless the two points (of order and of authenticity) are not so entirely disconnected as they appear at first sight.

The chief matter of which we have to treat is that of the nature and position of the two books on the best constitution vii (iv) and viii (v). We shall see that the history of these books is in fact that of the whole question.

Now there is one thing observable about these books which does not occur in any other Aristotelian work to such a large extent. From beginning to end of these two books, there is a careful and deliberate observance of the rule of the avoided hiatus. This observance is so nearly absolute that we must suppose that the few infractions of it which occur are due either to a slip of the writer, the carelessness of the copyist, or the folly of the revising editor. Now this avoidance of the hiatus is to be found in smaller parts of works also attributed to Aristotle. It is to be found in portions of the De Caelo, of the first book of the Metaphysics, and in somewhat larger fragments of the Parva Naturalia; and, as I have already noticed, we have a perfect instance of it in the fragment from the Eudemus preserved for us by Plutarch. It has been conjectured that the passages in

the De Caelo and the first book of the Metaphysics are excerpts made by Aristotle himself or by some editor from the dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας. Even supposing it provable that this avoidance of the hiatus is due to Aristotle's own handicraft, I should much doubt whether the former of these hypotheses (which is the one held by most of those who have noticed the fact) is the more likely one. If Aristotle 'wrote' the De Caelo for publication, then assuredly he would have noticed that the contrast between his usual style abounding in harsh sounds and hiatus would be painfully contrasted with the smooth and running style of these passages. It seems much more likely that if these passages are derived from the dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας they are the result of some post-Aristotelian patching of the two books in question. This is rendered more probable, with regard at least to the Metaphysics, by the fact that that whole treatise is itself a gigantic bit of patchwork; and though we have no positive evidence of the time at which its parts came together, no one in the present day would be likely to attribute the putting together to Aristotle. For the De Caelo we can only say that as far as we know a considerable part of the dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας went over the same ground and may have been useful to fill up considerable gaps, though the text of that treatise as a whole seems fairly good and the argument unbroken.

What exactly is the evidence which the avoidance of the hiatus gives us? I think we must say that it is merely this, that we have, wherever it occurs, a work or a portion of a work in exactly the state which was given to it by the author who threw it into its present form. As to whether this author was or was not Aristotle himself a good deal may be said on either side. Against the Aristotelian authorship of these passages, and more especially

of the two books with which we are chiefly concerned, it may be urged that the Aristotle whom we know shows the most absolute contempt for all matters of style, and he seems likely to have been the last instead of one of the first of prose writers to adopt a rule which hitherto had been observed only as a matter of ear in set orations, and appears to have been first formulated as a general principle of composition by the rhetorician Isokrates [I set aside the supposed enmity of Aristotle and Isokrates as unproven, and, in any case, quite beside the question]. As to the dialogues, it may be perhaps argued that they were written when Aristotle was a young or younger man, and that he may have sought in his youth graces of style which in his maturer years he despised. But unfortunately for this argument it is quite clear that these books of the Politics are the work of a man of maturer years, and there is what I think indisputable general evidence, that they were written after the death of Plato; to which we may add this special fact, that in criticising the various styles of music and the special purposes for which each is fit the author adds: Ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μόνην καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν κ.τ.λ.[1] Now if we remember the elaborate apology to the Platonists with which Aristotle begins his hostile criticism of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in the Nicomachean Ethics, which were certainly written after Plato's death, we shall hardly believe that the same writer would have used during Plato's lifetime the curt sharpness of οὐ καλῶς καταλείπει. Yet at the time of Plato's death Aristotle was no longer a young man; if then these two books are the work of Aristotle we have the phenomenon of an author writing, in his mature years, two such different

[1] p. 1342 *a*, ll. 32–*b*. 1.

styles, that the one must seem the condemnation of the other.

Much, however, may be urged on the other side. In the first place, as I have already noticed, the tradition of times immediately following Aristotle is stronger for the dialogues than for any of the works which we now possess. In the second place, whatever may be said for the intrinsic value of the dialogues, we have here a work composed apparently in the same style which even the most captious critic would hardly dare to call unworthy of Aristotle. Moreover it may be urged that we have in fact no other complete instance of a book attributed to Aristotle and clearly prepared for general publication. Though a man is not likely, through a considerable portion of his lifetime, to have kept up two so entirely opposite styles of writing for publication, yet there would be nothing either wonderful or difficult in keeping one style for oral lectures and another for published books. Still less wonderful would it be if there was a wide difference to be found between mere notes for such lectures and deliberately finished publications. If we adopt the theory that these two books represent Aristotle's finished style, and that nothing unfinished was ever given to the general public during his lifetime or with his consent, we shall arrive at some very convenient results. In the first place we shall be able to admit that there is some value to be given even during Aristotle's lifetime to the distinction between exoteric and esoteric, though of course not precisely that which even our earliest authorities give to it ; still less that which later Romanists like Aulus Gellius, or slapdash writers like Plutarch, graft upon the more modest and meagre statements of their forerunners. Secondly, we may acquit Cicero of all tendency to exaggeration in what otherwise seem his

hyperbolic expressions of praise of the Aristotelian style. Bernays, who does not notice the avoidance of the hiatus, is full of just praise of the style of the first part of the seventh (fourth) book; but he might well have extended that praise to the whole of the two books; and the absence of hiatus is just one of those points which would strike the ear of a pure stylist like Cicero. I am not here asserting that Cicero had read the Politics; of that I can find no evidence whatsoever. I merely say this, that assuming, as I think we may assume, that the dialogues which Cicero had read resembled in style these two books, and assuming further, that in speaking of Aristotle's style he speaks only of published works as opposed to 'commentaria,' his admiration is explained and justified.

One more point may be urged which tells perhaps somewhat in favour of the directly Aristotelian origin of these books. I have already noticed[1] that in Diogenes a work presumably our Politics is πολιτικὴ ἀκρόασις ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου in eight books, while turning to the list of Theophrastus we find nothing nearer to this description than πολιτικά in six books. It might be plausibly argued that if the two books on the best constitution were published in Aristotle's lifetime, or known to be his finished work in a stronger sense than the lectures, this difference of number of books could be easily explained. Theophrastus would repeat Aristotle's course of lectures on this as on other subjects, apparently in this course making very few alterations, so that these lectures might be variously attributed to him and to Aristotle; on the other hand the books on the best constitution once published would be known for certain to be Aristotle's work, and therefore at whatever period these two books were added to the MS. of the Aristotelian lectures on politics,

[1] Cf. p. 87.

they were not similarly added to that other slightly differing text which bore the name of Theophrastus. We find indeed that there was a treatise on the best constitution in one book attributed to Theophrastus himself[1], but that for some reason, or probably from mere chance, was not included in the general course of lectures which bore the name of Theophrastus, as was the similar treatise in the MS. ascribed to Aristotle.

But after all it is a mere hypothesis. These books may be Aristotelian and give us a real sample of the master's finished style, or they may be the work of some clever pupil, putting the rugged wisdom of his master into a form likely to be acceptable to those later Athenians who were more critical of ear than of mind. All that we can assert with safety, and all that it greatly imports us to know, is that whoever was their author, they were not written as part of the general course to which the remaining books of the Politics belong. If this view be the true one, then strictly speaking these books have no proper place in the treatise to which they are attached. It is a mere matter of private taste where they shall be put, unless indeed we shall say that there must have been some treatment of the subject in the general lectures which is now lost to us, and that wherever that would have come there these books must be inserted. This is probable enough as a theory, but after all gives us no very definite clue. I am inclined to think that at least of the 'Political lectures' of Aristotle (represented for us merely by the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics) a very large amount was either never reduced to writing at all, or was lost before the days of catalogue and reference-makers. This, I think, may be argued not from the most uncertain ground of references, but from the

[1] Diog. Laert. v. 45.

general aim and plan of the work as it dimly stands forth to us. We have neither a finished whole as in the Physical writings and the Analytics, nor again a mere collection of facts which may be enlarged or contracted at will like the ἱστορίαι and προβλήματα. There must have been a real course on Oeconomics, one probably on anger (a point on which the Peripatetics were very strong) and a good deal more on the intellectual excellences than we have in our present sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. What further was included in the Political lectures in the narrower sense we know not. Incomplete they certainly are, and the insertion of our two books does not complete them, nor make a connected whole. The position of these books then cannot be settled as a matter of right on these grounds or any other.

But as a matter of history we may arrive at some conclusion.

Two orders of books find favour with modern editors. A. Stahr, Forchhammer, and V. Rose defend that which appears in the MSS., while the great majority of editors and critics from St. Hilaire downwards have preferred as more reasonable and logical the order i, ii, iii, vii, viii, iv, vi, v. We see here that there are two distinct suppositions, the one that the two books on the perfect form of constitution should be transplanted from the end to the middle of the treatise, the other that books v and vi should be transposed. As the latter is a separate and more simple question it will be advisable to deal with it first.

Logically, I think there can be no doubt of the superiority of the order iv, vi, v to iv, v, vi. Book vi is a natural continuation of book iv, and neither of them stands in any very close relation to book v. On the other hand, the references seem with one doubtful exception all to point to the order v, vi, and not vi, v. The sixth

book begins with a reference to the fourth, with which, as I have said, it is naturally and necessarily connected, and proceeds, ἔτι δὲ [εἴρηται] περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίγνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας[1]. It would be impossible to find a clearer statement as to the order which the reference-inserter had before him. Similarly in the fourth chapter of the book we have ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρότερον τὰ πλεῖστα σχεδόν[2]; and again at the end of the first chapter, Ζητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες ἅπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴρηται πρότερον[3]. The only passage which has tended to raise any doubt is the following: talking of the weakening of the βουλή when the ἐκκλησία is paid the author says, εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει τὰς κρίσεις πάσας ὁ δῆμος εὐπορῶν μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης[4]. The reference here seems certainly to be a parallel passage in the fourth book, where the same doctrine is asserted with the same terms, but at somewhat greater length—καταλύεται δὲ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς ἡ δύναμις ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν αἷς αὐτὸς συνιὼν ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάντων. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνειν εἴωθεν, ὅταν εὐπορία τις ᾖ ἢ μισθὸς τοῖς ἐκκλησιάζουσιν· σχολάζοντες γὰρ συλλέγονταί τε πολλάκις καὶ ἅπαντα αὐτοὶ κρίνουσιν[5]. But the expression ἡ μέθοδος ἡ πρὸ ταύτης, if it does indeed mean 'the preceding book' (as it almost certainly does), can not only not be Aristotelian but must be very late; if it means merely the course of enquiry which preceded this, then it may be made as loose or as definite as we will, though it must be admitted that it will be a very strained extension of the term to treat either books iv and v, or books v and vi, as a single μέθοδος. As how-

[1] vi. p. 1316 *b*, ll. 34–35. [2] p. 1319 *b*, ll. 4–6. [3] p. 1317 *a*, ll. 35–38.
[4] vi. 2. p. 1317 *b*, ll. 32–35. [5] iv. 15. p. 1299 *b*, l. 38–p. 1300 *a*, l. 4.

ever the most enthusiastic supporters of the new order will hardly go so far as to say that the division into books is as old as Aristotle himself, no very certain argument on either side can be drawn from this passage.

On the whole then, as to these three books iv, v, vi, all we can safely conclude is that iv and vi stand in so close a relation that they must probably have come near each other in the original course of lectures; but that from the time of the earliest reference-makers the order in the MSS. was iv, v, vi. How v originally got wedged into its present position we have no evidence.

When we come to deal with the two inserted books, vii, viii (iv, v), we find no such unanimity among the authorities, but rather proofs of a very ancient controversy. On the one hand the majority or perhaps all of the references are in favour of placing the books in the order suggested by St. Hilaire; on the other hand we have one very definite statement on the authority of a very ancient commentator in favour of the order now to be found in all the MSS.

The first strong reference in favour of the new order is the final sentence of the third book which consists of these words, *διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς*[1]; that is, the third book ends with a promise of what in the old order is the seventh, omitting all reference to the intermediate books.

In the second chapter of the fourth book we have this sentence—*Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διειλόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατίαν δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τούτων*

[1] iii. 18. p. 1288 *b*, ll. 2–4.

ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων κ.τ.λ.[1] Here we have another clear case of μέθοδος used as equal to the librarian's division of a roll or a book, and I am inclined to think that this long reference (for there is yet more of it) was inserted by the same editor to whom is due the similar passage in the seventh (sixth) book. He at least has no doubt about the order. Again, in the next chapter we have—ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ κατ' ἀρετήν, κἂν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ διειλόμεθα ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις[2]. This is an obvious allusion to the process of analysis of an organised society into its ultimate elements which is performed for us in book vii (iv) chapters 8, 9 [p. 1328 *a*, 21 sqq.]; and yet later in cap. 7 we get—ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν[3]. Here the reference, though no less clear than in the former passages, is rather general than particular. Lastly, we have two references to this order in the sixth (seventh) book, both occurring in the same chapter and passage (eighth): ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι καλῶς τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, πόσαι καὶ τίνες καὶ τίνων, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν χωρὶς ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐν μὲν ταῖς μικραῖς ἐλάττους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις πλείους, ὥσπερ τυγχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον[4]. Here the reference is certainly to the fifteenth chapter of the seventh (fourth) book.

But against this very definite evidence of reference we have a fact to face which cannot be explained away.

[1] iv. 2. p. 1289 *a*, ll. 26–32.
[2] iv. 2. p. 1289 *b*, l. 40–p. 1290 *a*, l. 3.
[3] iv. 7. p. 1293 *b*, ll. 1–5.
[4] vi. 8. p. 1321 *b*, ll. 4–7.

Didymus the commentator, whom I have already mentioned, gives us a fairly complete analysis of the Aristotelian Politics. In this analysis the order is that of our MSS. as far as it is continued, for it gives us nothing of the eighth book[1]. If then we have really here the words of a commentator of the time of Nero, we can only reconcile them with the fact of all our references being the other way by assuming either that the order of the books being originally that of St. Hilaire was changed before that period, or that the references are even later than that time and represent an experiment in the way of change of order which was not persevered with at the time, but has been revived in our days. Were the books a portion of a treatise so early commented on as the Physics or the Logical works, no one could hesitate to decide in favour of the former rather than the latter hypothesis; as however they belong to that class which at first at least seems to have missed the notice of the commentators, the question is not so easily solved, and on the whole I am somewhat, though not greatly, inclined in favour of the latter solution. In the first place, the natural point at which an addition on a somewhat kindred subject would be affixed, would be the end of the manuscript—unless indeed this addition was distinctly wanted to fill an obvious gap in a given place; but that is not the case here for, putting aside the references, there is no great reason why the two books on the best constitution should precede rather than follow books iv and vi. In the second place we must in any case admit that there has been a double shifting of the order of the books, for supposing we assume that the original order was that recommended by St. Hilaire and also by our anonymous reference-maker, then we must also believe, I think, that at that time book vi was placed

[1] Mullach, Fragmenta Philosophorum, vol. ii. pp. 100 sqq.

before book v, since the phraseology of the single reference in book vi, by which it is made to precede book v, is precisely like that of one of the several references which involve the position of books vii and viii as preceding books iv, vi, and v. If then we assume that this was the original order, we must assume not only that subsequently the books were placed in different order, but that all the references but one in books iv, v, and vi were rewritten, in so far as they touched upon the respective order of those books. Now it happens that the number of these references is considerably larger than that of those in which vii and viii are made to precede the others; and though we cannot in this case count heads, since the two matters are in their nature independent, yet I think it more reasonable to suppose that the change which involved the less alteration in the text was the later rather than that which involved the greater alteration.

I think then that the history is something like this. First there existed six books of Aristotle's political lectures and two of his finished tract of The Perfect State[1]; then these two works were for some reason copied on the same parchment or roll, the two books on The Perfect State being affixed at the end of the other six. While this state of things existed the majority of the references grew up, especially those connecting books iv, v, vi. I should conjecture that during this time the two annexed books were still so far treated as a separate work, that they were not connected by references and cross-references with the other books. Then at some unknown date, but probably later than the time of Didymus, a re-arrangement of the books was attempted which took the same form as that of recent

[1] In talking of Aristotle's lectures and of his finished tract, I do not wish to assume that either the one or the other is directly his, but merely that both bore his name in the library catalogues.

critics has done. The re-arranger wrote all his references connecting the two books with the others on the assumption that they belonged to the place where he had put them, that is, between books iii and iv. He also reversed books v and vi and put in the single reference which assumes that reversal, but, like the majority of the older commentators and critics, was more bold at inserting than at excising, so did not cut out from his text the older references.

This history has the single merit of attempting to account for all the facts. The only certain results of our investigation in this chapter are: first, that the Politics are made up of two separate treatises of different classes, and certainly originally separately published; second, that they had already been twice edited on two different hypotheses as to the order of the books, in the days when editors still amalgamated their remarks with the text, or at least when editor and copyist together produced that combination.

I have in this essay attempted to prove, first, that of the great bulk of the Aristotelian works as we now have them, there was no kind of publication during the lifetime of the master, nor probably for a considerable period after his death. Secondly, that as to this portion of the Aristotelian whole, we cannot assert with certainty that we have ever got throughout a treatise in the exact words of Aristotle, though we may be pretty clear that we have a fair representation of his thought. The unity of style observable may belong quite as well to the school and the method as to the individual. We have certainly got a most precious Aristotelian literature; we have not certainly got Aristotle in the strongest and most literal sense. Thirdly, I have tried to prove that the works which are preserved to us come chiefly, if not entirely, from the tradition of Andronicus, and stand in no very definite relation to the

list of Diogenes, and consequently we have a very considerable proportion, and not a merely insignificant fraction of the reputed works of Aristotle known to Latin antiquity. Fourthly, I have laid down that the majority of the titles, and probably all the definite references, are post-Aristotelian, and that therefore no safe argument can be drawn from the latter as to the authenticity or original order of the Aristotelian works, though other very valuable inferences as to the subsequent history of these works result from their careful consideration. Fifthly, I have attempted to trace the double texts and repeated passages each to several original sources, and not to a single point of origin. I have applied the doctrines arrived at to the consideration of those Aristotelian treatises which have given rise to most controversy, and seem to myself to have found some solutions at least, through the method I have followed. Incidentally I have been led to investigate the question of another class of works which bear Aristotle's name, of which we can say with certainty that the portions which we have of them are precisely as the final author wrote them; but cannot with equal certainty assert that that author was Aristotle. We can safely assume, however, that these works, and works like these, were those best known to our earliest authorities on the subject, Cicero and his predecessors, and that on them all the praise of Aristotle's style is founded.

If there be any value in these conclusions, the practical lesson to be drawn from them will be, that the present duty of scholarship is to determine as far as possible the course of the Aristotelian argument, by bracketing superfluous and repeated passages. In some cases there will be internal or external evidence for bracketing the one of two passages rather than the other. In other cases, and I believe they will be the majority, there will be no trust-

worthy evidence which shall lead us to reject one of such passages more than the other. We shall not follow such assumptions as that of Torstrik in the De Anima, that the former of two like passages is always the preferable; nor shall we rashly assume that the one is more strictly Aristotelian than the other. When we have pointed out such reduplications to the student we shall leave him to choose which of them he prefers, showing him only that both cannot be wanted in the text. If we bracket at all, it will not be that we assert the one passage rather than the other to be spurious (except in those rare cases where we have definite proof). It will merely be in order that he may see what is the general line and connection of the argument. We shall be cautious in many cases in assuming even reduplication; for an author or lecturer may deliberately repeat himself. But this caution will not be necessary in the case of repeated and almost identical passages which follow immediately after each other.

In a word, we shall try to get as near as we can to the earliest form of the teachings of the master, but shall not vainly and pedantically hope to restore his actual words; nor shall we rashly reject this or that passage or phrase as being clearly un-Aristotelian, since we shall know well that the Aristotle we have can in no case be freed from the suspicion (or rather almost certainty) of filtration through other minds, and expression through other voices. Criticism of Aristotle must in truth always be of thought rather than of phrase, of sentence rather than of word.

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